Tag Archives: Dodd Frank

What Are Mortgage Borrowers Thinking?

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photo by Robert Huffstutter

Freud’s Sofa

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) have released A Profile of 2013 Mortgage Borrowers: Statistics from the National Survey of Mortgage Originations. While sounding dull and perhaps a bit dated, this document is actually an extraordinary overview of the much discussed but rarely seen mortgage borrower. And while the information is from 2013, it provides a good baseline for the post-financial crisis and post-Dodd Frank world we live in.

Historically, it has been difficult for government and academic researchers to get comprehensive data about mortgage borrowers. The impetus for this report was the Housing and Economic Recover Act of 2008 which requires the FHFA to conduct a monthly mortgage market survey. In the long term, this survey will help policymakers respond to the rapid changes that are so common in our dynamic mortgage market.

The National Survey of Mortgage Originations (NMSO) focuses on

mortgage shopping behavior, mortgage closing experiences, and other information that cannot be obtained from any other source, such as expectations regarding house price appreciation, critical household financial events, and life events such as unemployment, large medical expenses, or divorce. In general, borrowers are not asked to provide information about mortgage terms in the questionnaire since these fields are available [from other sources]. (1)

Here are some of the findings that I found interesting, albeit not always surprising:

  • Mortgage shopping behavior differed significantly by borrower characteristics and by whether the consumer was also shopping for a home at the same time as the mortgage. (14)
  • First-time home buyers differed significantly from repeat home buyers in their mortgage search behavior and repeat borrowers differed significantly in their mortgage search behavior depending on whether they were refinancing or purchasing a home. (14)
  • Slightly more than 40 percent of all respondents reported having a difficult time explaining the difference between a prime and a subprime loan. (16)
  • Overall about one- quarter of borrowers reported that they could not explain amortization or the difference between the interest rate and APR on a loan.(18)
  • Roughly one in five borrowers had to delay their closing date. (26)
  • In general, respondents believe that mortgage lenders treat borrowers well. (35)
  • Fifteen percent of respondents expected to have difficulties in making their mortgage payments in the next couple of years. (44)

There are a lot more interesting nuggets about the subjective views of borrowers in the report. I hope that later reports offer more analysis that ties this information into other objective sources of data about borrowers and their mortgages. How well do they know themselves and how good are they at predicting their ability to maintain their mortgages over the long-term?

Testing CFPB’s Constitutionality

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by Junius Brutus Stearns

Law360 quoted me in PHH Case Poised To Test CFPB’s Constitutionality (behind a paywall). It opens,

A battle over the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s interpretation of mortgage regulations in assessing a $109 million penalty against a New Jersey-based mortgage firm has morphed into a fight over the authority vested in the bureau’s director that could reshape the consumer finance watchdog, experts say.

The appeal from PHH Corp. to the D.C. Circuit originally centered on CFPB Director Richard Cordray’s decision to dramatically hike a $6 million mortgage insurance kickback penalty issued by an administrative law judge against a company subsidiary, to the final, $109 million figure. But the judges hearing the case warned the bureau to prepare to answer questions at oral arguments Tuesday about language in the Dodd-Frank Act that says the president could remove the CFPB director only for cause, and about how the court should view an administrative agency led by a single director rather than the more typical commission structure.

Those questions have been hanging over the CFPB since its inception in the 2010 law, and if the D.C. Circuit rules against the bureau, that could fundamentally alter the way the bureau operates, said Jonathan Pompan, a partner at Venable LLP.

Cordray “is potentially going to have to address questions that go to the core of his authority, which really hadn’t been at the forefront of the PHH case until now,” he said.

Challenges to the CFPB’s constitutionality are not new. Everything from the bureau’s single-director rather than commission structure to the agency’s funding through the Federal Reserve’s budget rather than the congressional appropriations process have been constant refrains for the CFPB’s opponents.

Those concerns have been addressed through legislation aimed at curtailing the CFPB’s power, and claims challenging the agency’s constitutionality have been an almost pro forma rite of any litigation involving the bureau.

Up until now, however, those complaints and attempts to curb the CFPB have gone nowhere.

So it was a surprise when the D.C. Circuit last Wednesday told the bureau’s attorneys to be prepared to face questions about whether Dodd-Frank’s provision stating that the president can remove the CFPB director only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” passed constitutional muster.

The panel, made up of three Republican appointees led by U.S. Circuit Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh, is also seeking answers about potential remedies for any problems that that provision brings, including potentially removing it from the statute and allowing the president to remove the CFPB director without any specific cause.

The judges also want to know how any fix to the problem, if they determine there is one, would affect the CFPB director’s authority.

“This is not, by any stretch of the imagination, idle thinking on their part,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

The questions being posed by the D.C. Circuit panel do not pose the same level of threat that the other constitutional challenges the CFPB could potentially face would, but it is certainly a more defining question than what most observers thought the case would be about.

PHH is challenging Cordray’s interpretation of violations under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act that allowed him to supersize a $6 million penalty handed down by an administrative law judge, to the $109 million that the CFPB director handed down when PHH appealed.

But the arguments set for Tuesday are expected to go far beyond that issue.

There will be the central question of whether the U.S. Constitution allows Congress to put in restrictions on when the president can fire officials at an administrative agency. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed these issues in the 2010 Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board decision, which affirmed a D.C. Circuit ruling that such protections were constitutional.

Judge Kavanaugh cast a dissenting vote in that case, stating that a president should not have to notify Congress as to why the director of an administrative agency is removed.

“If the challenges were going to be taken seriously anywhere, it was probably going to be this panel,” said Brian Simmonds Marshall, policy counsel at Americans for Financial Reform, which seeks tougher banking regulations.

Removing that provision from the statute, should the D.C. Circuit elect to do so, could limit the CFPB’s independence, as well as that of other administrative agencies for which statute requires a reason for the dismissal of officials, he said.

“The CFPB doesn’t have to check with the White House right now before it brings an enforcement action,” Simmonds Marshall said.

Another case that will be heavily scrutinized will be a 1935 Supreme Court decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S., which allowed for restrictions on the removal of Federal Trade Commission commissioners.

The CFPB relied heavily on that case in its filings with the D.C. Circuit, noted Benjamin Saul, a partner at White & Case LLP.

“I’ll be looking for the questions being driven by Judge Kavanaugh and his comments from the bench, particularly on the Humphrey’s case,” Saul said.

Whether the arguments focus mostly on the constitutional questions about the ability to remove the CFPB director or on remedies to fix that could also indicate where the court is headed on these questions, according to Reiss.

“It does sound that they’re searching for remedies that are not earth-shattering remedies,” Reiss said.

Did Dodd-Frank Make Getting a Mortgage Harder?

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Christopher Dodd

Christopher Dodd

Barney Frank

 

 

____________________________________________________________

The short answer is — No. The longer answer is — No, but . . .

Bing Bai, Laurie Goodman and Ellen Seidman of the Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center have posted Has the QM Rule Made it Harder to Get a Mortgage? The QM rule was originally authorized by Dodd-Frank and was implemented in January of 2014, more than two years ago. The paper opens,

the qualified mortgage (QM) rule was designed to prevent borrowers from acquiring loans they cannot afford and to protect lenders from potential borrower litigation. Many worry that the rule has contributed to the well-documented reduction in mortgage credit availability, which has hit low-income and minority borrowers the hardest. To explore this concern, we recently updated our August 2014 analysis of the impact of the QM rule. Our analysis of the rule at the two-year mark again finds it has had little impact on the availability of mortgage credit. Though the share of mortgages under $100,000 has decreased, this change can be largely attributed to the sharp rise in home prices. (1, footnotes omitted)

The paper looks at “four potential indicators of the QM rule’s impact:”

  1.  Fewer interest-only and prepayment penalty loans: The QM rule disqualifies loans that are interest-only (IO) or have a prepayment penalty (PP), so a reduction in these loans might show QM impact.
  2. Fewer loans with debt-to-income ratios above 43 percent: The QM rule disqualifies loans with a debt-to-income (DTI) ratio above 43 percent, so a reduction in loans with DTIs above 43 percent might show QM impact.
  3. Reduced adjustable-rate mortgage share: The QM rule requires that an adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) be underwritten to the maximum interest rate that could be charged during the loan’s first five years. Generally, this restriction should deter lenders, so a reduction in the ARM share might show QM impact.
  4. Fewer small loans: The QM rule’s 3 percent limit on points and fees could discourage lenders from making smaller loans, so a reduction in smaller loans might show QM impact. (1-2)

The authors find no impact on on interest only loans or prepayment penalty loans; loans with debt-to-income ratios greater than 43 percent; or adjustable rate mortgages.

While these findings seem to make sense, it is important to note that the report uses 2013 as its baseline for mortgage market conditions. The report does acknowledge that credit availability was tight in 2013, but it implies that 2013 is the appropriate baseline from which to evaluate the QM rule. I am not so sure that this right — I would love to see some modeling that shows the impact of the QM rule under various credit availability scenarios, not just the particularly tight credit box of 2013.

To be clear, I agree with the paper’s policy takeaway — the QM rule can help prevent “risky lending practices that could cause another downturn.” (8) But we should be making these policy decisions with the best possible information.

The Future of Securitization

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SEC Commissioner Piwowar

SEC Commissioner Piwowar

SEC Commissioner Michael Piwowar’s Remarks at ABS Vegas 2016 are worth a look for all of those interested in the future of the mortgage-backed securities market. I have interspersed selections of his remarks with my comments:

As our country’s capital markets regulator, the SEC’s tripartite mission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.  Securitization can transform illiquid assets like mortgages, auto loans, credit card receivables, and future sales of David Bowie albums into marketable securities.  By serving as an efficient means of allocating scarce capital, securitization supports economic growth, business development, and job creation.  Securitization further fosters resiliency by diversifying the funding base of our economy.

There are many other benefits associated with securitization, including the potential for reduced costs of, and expanded access to, credit for borrowers, the ability to match risk profiles for specific investor demands, and increased secondary market liquidity.  Because banks and other originators can move loans off of their balance sheets into asset-backed securities (ABS), securitization can increase the availability of credit for both businesses and individuals.  In many instances, securitization can allow a person to obtain more favorable terms than can be obtained from a bank or other financial institution.

Thus, the ABS market serves as a critical source of capital, providing funding for home and automobile loans, credit cards, and many other purposes.  Yet, as shown during the recent financial crisis, investors may abandon the ABS market if they do not believe they possess sufficient information to evaluate the risks associated with a particular asset-backed security and to price it accordingly.

While I generally agree with Piwowar’s assessment of securitization’s value, it is worth noting that he does not acknowledge how important robust consumer protection is to maintaining a healthy securitization market over the long run.

I found his discussion of the Dodd-Frank credit risk retention rules particularly interesting:

For the record, I voted against the credit risk retention rules.  These rules require a securitizer to retain a minimum 5% credit risk of any securitization transaction and generally prohibit the sponsor from hedging its retained interest.  I was particularly dismayed by the “one-size-fits-all” approach taken by the regulators to create a flat 5% risk retention requirement for all asset classes, except for securitizations involving so-called “qualified residential mortgages” (QRMs) for which the risk retention level is zero.  These were arbitrary choices.

Residential mortgages, commercial mortgages, credit card receivables, and automobile loans each have distinct and different attributes associated with their underlying borrowers.  Rather than carefully examining these attributes to determine an optimal credit risk retention rate for each asset class, prudential regulators in Washington, D.C., took the easy way out – they simply set it at the maximum statutory rate and ignored the authorization from Congress to create lower risk retention requirements or use alternative methods to align interests.

Perhaps the prudential bureaucrats had their own conflict of interests in setting these requirements.  After all, a prudential bureaucrat has a strong interest in self-preservation.  Will a prudential bureaucrat get credit if optimally tailored risk retention rates increase economic growth and provide additional opportunities to families and businesses across America?  No.  Will a prudential bureaucrat take the blame if the next financial crisis – and there will be one eventually – relates at all to securitizations?  Probably.  Hence, what better way to side step responsibility than to refrain from using reasoned judgment and rely solely on the most risk-averse interpretation of statute instead?

Bureaucratic self-preservation might also explain the decision to adopt as broad of an exemption for QRMs as possible, so as to minimize any political fallout from the real estate and housing industries.  Few will disagree that residential mortgage-backed securities played an important role in the 2008 financial crisis.  For those in the audience involved in RMBS offerings, you must be quite happy with the broad exemption from the risk retention rules.  For those of you in the audience who are involved in other types of securitizations that had little, if any, part in causing the financial crisis, you are probably wondering why you were unfairly targeted.  Unfortunately, unlike Las Vegas, what happens in Washington does not stay in Washington. (footnotes omitted)

Piwowar gives short shrift to the benefits of clear and simple rules, but it is still worth paying attention to his critique of the “one size fits all” risk retention rules. If researchers can demonstrate that these rules are not optimally tailored, perhaps that would provide a reason to reconsider them. This is, of course, a long shot, given that the rules have been finalized, but Piwowar is right to shine light on the issue nonetheless.

Candid and thoughtful remarks from regulators are always refreshing. These make the grade.

Why Have a Complaint Window?

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733px-Complaint_Department_Grenade

Angela Littwin of the the University of Texas School of Law has posted Why Process Complaints? Then and Now to SSRN. The abstract reads,

The creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) established the first comprehensive federal forum for processing consumer complaints about financial products and services. The CFPB not only handles consumers complaints; it also publishes a database that includes most complaints and their initial resolutions. For a symposium honoring the scholarship of Professor William C. Whitford, I analyze the CFPB’s complaint system and database using a framework he developed to explore the reasons why government agencies process consumer complaints and whether these reasons justify the resources that complaint processing entails. Whitford and his co-author proposed three “obvious” reasons to process consumer complaints: to settle consumer disputes; to inform the agency’s regulatory activities; and to generate good will for the agency among constituencies such as consumers, government actors, and the companies the CFPB regulates.

I find that the CFPB has mixed success in providing an alternative dispute resolution forum for consumers. I am, however, missing key information for this evaluation. The CFPB Consumer Complaint Database contains the financial institutions’ responses to consumer complaints but there is almost no information available about any follow up actions the CFPB takes. The CFPB is particularly strong on the regulatory function. It makes significant use of complaint data in its regulatory roles and evinces a commitment to ensuring that companies are handling complaints well. Last comes good will. With respect to public good will, I was unable to find much evidence one way or the other. As for good will among government actors, the CFPB appropriately appears not to apply different treatment to complaints referred by government entities or officials. Finally, the CFPB’s complaint data reveal an intriguing possibility that the process may provide some legitimization of financial institutions’ complaint resolutions. But given that consumer financial companies are pushing for the CFPB’s elimination, working to generate good will among financial institutions in this way may be entirely reasonable on the CFPB’s part. This is especially true because the CFPB has made important complaints decisions – such as publishing the database without redacting company names – despite financial companies’ vociferous objections.

I was interested by the “argument regarding bureaucratic companies . . . that a complaint process can find and resolve violations of the bureaucracy’s own rules.” (944) But Littwin also notes that the key issue is the “ineffectiveness in handling the harder cases, such as those raising issues of fact or law.” (Id.) We are still a long way off from figuring out the optimal system for addressing consumer complaints, but this article helps to frame the issue nicely.

Troubles with TRID

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"The Trouble with Tribbles" Stark Trek Episode

Law360 quoted me in Rule-Driven Home Sale Slump Could Be Temporary. It reads, in part,

A slump in existing home sales in November can be traced to the implementation of a new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau mortgage closing regime, although experts say that most of the closing delays could ease as the industry and consumers get more comfortable with the new rules.

The National Association of Realtors released a report Tuesday saying that while a continued lack of inventory of existing homes for sale and other factors helped drive down the number of completed home sales in November, the number of signed contracts for home purchases remained relatively constant. With that in mind, the Realtors pointed to the CFPB’s TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosure rule, which combined two key mortgage disclosure forms and went into effect in October, as the reason for the slowdown.

That slowdown was anticipated because real estate agents and lenders had reported difficulties in complying with the rule, which combined closing forms required by the Truth In Lending Act and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, prior to it coming into effect. However, experts say that the closing delays are likely to decrease as the industry understands the rule better and technology to comply with it improves.

“It’s like a python swallowing a boar … the boar has to work its way through the python,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

The National Association of Realtors reported that existing home sales slumped to 4.76 million nationwide in November from 5.32 million in October, a fall of 10.5 percent. That October figure was also revised down from an initial estimate of 5.36 million.

The November figure was also down from the 4.95 million existing sales figure from the same period last year, and put total existing home sales 3.8 percent behind the total from last year, the National Association of Realtors said.

While the real estate industry group cited the usual factors of tight supply and inflated prices in many regions of the country as a reason for the slowdown in existing home sales, it also cited the TRID rule’s implementation as a reason for the slump.

*     *     *

Most lenders, real estate agents and other market participants had already begun to factor in the new TRID requirements in the closing process, adding 15 days to the usual 30-day closing process, said Richard J. Andreano, a partner at Ballard Spahr LLP.

“When I saw the November drop, I thought that was a natural consequence of correct planning,” he said.

Despite the slowdown, Yun said in the NAR release that because contracts were signed and the problems came down to issues with closing.

“As long as closing time frames don’t rise even further, it’s likely more sales will register to this month’s total, and November’s large dip will be more of an outlier,” he said.

The CFPB, Reiss and Andreano all agreed that at least some of the delays will work out of the system as the industry gets more accustomed to TRID’s changes.

“The ones that have adjusted have done it by adding a lot of staff, either reallocating or hiring and assigning them to the closing process to get it done,” Andreano said.

And the delays that remain may not be a bad thing, Reiss said.

“It really keeps consumers from being surprised at the closing table. This gives a little bit more time to the consumer where they’re not getting waylaid,” he said.