- House of Representatives Introduced Bill H.R. 855 to Permanently Extend the New Markets Tax Credit which was designed to spur new or increased investments into operating businesses and real estate projects located in low-income communities. The NMTC Program attracts investment capital to low-income communities by permitting individual and corporate investors to receive a tax credit against their Federal income tax return in exchange for making equity investments in specialized financial institutions called Community Development Entities (CDEs).
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Banking Regulators Seek Public Comment – The Agencies are asking the public to comment on regulations in the Banking Operations, Capital, and the Community Reinvestment Act categories to identify outdated or otherwise unnecessary regulatory requirements imposed on insured depository institutions and their regulated holding companies.
Tag Archives: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Krimminger and Calabria on Conservatorships
By Michael Krimminger and Mark Calabria have shared The Conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Actions Violate HERA and Established Insolvency Principles. The paper opens,
When the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) was appointed conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, it was the first use of the conservatorship authority under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”), but it was not without precedent. For decades, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) has successfully and fairly resolved more than a thousand failing banks and thrifts using the virtually identical sections of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (“FDIA”).
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The predictability, fairness, and acceptance of this model led Congress to adopt it as the basis for authorizing the FHFA with conservatorship powers over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in HERA. Instead of following this precedent, however, FHFA and Treasury have radically departed from HERA and the principles underlying all other U.S. insolvency frameworks and sound international standards through a 2012 re-negotiation of the original conservatorship agreement.
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This paper will:
- Describe the historical precedent and resolution practice on which Congress based FHFA’s and Treasury’s statutory responsibilities over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac;
- Explain the statutory requirements, as well as the procedural and substantive protections, in place so that all stakeholders are treated fairly during the conservatorship;
- Detail the important policy reasons that underlie these statutory provisions and the established practice in their application, and the role these policies play in a sound market economy; and
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Demonstrate that the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ignore that precedent and resolution practice, and do not comply with HERA. Among the Treasury and FHFA departures from HERA and established precedents are the following:
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continuing the conservatorships for more than 6 years without any effort to comply with HERA’s requirementsto “preserve and conserve” the assets and property of the Companies and return them to a “sound and solvent” condition or place them into receiverships;
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rejecting any attempt to rebuild the capital of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac so that they can return to “sound and solvent” condition by meeting regulatory capital and other requirements, and thereby placing all risk of future losses on taxpayers;
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stripping all net value from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac long after Treasury has been repaid when HERA, and precedent, limit this recovery to the funding actually provided;
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ignoring HERA’s conservatorship requirements and transforming the purpose of the conservatorships from restoring or resolving the Companies into instruments of government housing policy and sources of revenue forTreasury;
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repeatedly restructuring the terms of the initial assistance to further impair the financial interests of stakeholders contrary to HERA, fundamental principles of insolvency, and initial commitments by FHFA; and
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disregarding HERA’s requirement to “maintain the corporation’s status as a private shareholder-owned company” and FHFA’s commitment to allow private investors to continue to benefit from the financial value of the company’s stock as determined by the market. (1-3, footnotes omitted)
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I am intrigued by the recollections of these two former government officials who were involved in the drafting of HERA (much as I was by those contained in a related paper by Calabria). But I am not convinced that their version of events amounts to a legislative history of HERA, let alone one that should be given any kind of deference by decision-makers. The firmness of their opinions about the meaning of HERA is also in tension with the ambiguity of the text of the statute itself. The plaintiffs in the GSE conservatorship litigation will see this paper as a confirmation of their position. I do not think, however, that the judges hearing the cases will pay it much heed.
Running CERCLA around FIRREA
Law360 quoted me in High Court Environmental Ruling Could Clear Air For Banks (behind a paywall). The article reads in part,
A recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling that a federal environmental law does not preempt state statutes of repose has inspired banks and other targets of Wall Street enforcers to test the decision’s power to finally fend off lingering financial crisis-era cases on timeliness grounds.
The high court on June 9 found that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act could not extend the 10-year statute of repose in a North Carolina environmental cleanup suit in the in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger case. Although the decision pertained to a case outside of the financial realm, attorneys say it could limit the ability of federal financial regulators to bring claims on behalf of failed financial institutions under two of their favored tools: the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act and the Housing and Economic Recovery Act.
That’s because the defendants in those cases, including banks but others as well, will now be able to argue that regulators like the National Credit Union Administration, the Federal Housing Finance Agency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. missed their chance to bring claims on behalf of institutions in receivership.
Given the Supreme Court’s interpretation, the regulators may be on shaky ground.
“The government is going to have a much more difficult time sustaining the arguments it’s been making after CTS,” said Jeffrey B. Wall, a partner with Sullivan & Cromwell LLP and a former assistant solicitor general.
In its CTS ruling, the Supreme Court found that CERCLA does not preempt state statutes of repose like the one in North Carolina, citing CERCLA’s exclusive use of the phrase “statute of limitations.”
Statutes of repose and statutes of limitations are distinct enough terms in their usage that it’s proper to conclude that Congress didn’t intend to preempt statutes of repose when it crafted CERCLA, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said in the majority opinion. The justice cited a 1982 congressional report on CERCLA that recommended repealing state statutes of limitations and statutes of repose but acknowledged that they were not equivalent.
According to a memo released June 10 by Sullivan & Cromwell, both FIRREA and HERA are susceptible to similar readings by courts.
Both statutes include extenders that allow government agencies suing on behalf of failed financial institutions to move beyond statutes of limitations on state law claims. However, much like CERCLA, both say nothing about extending statutes of repose, the memo said.
And that could make a major difference for a large number of defendants trying to fend off claims from the FDIC, NCUA and FHFA, Wall said.
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The CTS ruling is likely to play out in cases brought by financial regulators in smaller cases over losses incurred by failed financial institutions using FIRREA and HERA. But FIRREA has also become a favored tool in the U.S. Department of Justice’s big game hunts against ratings agency Standard & Poor’s and Bank of America.
Because those cases are largely predicated on federal claims, the CTS case is unlikely to be a help for those institutions, according to Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss.
“I don’t read it as having an extension on the higher-profile FIRREA cases,” he said.
But even if CTS is limited to state law claims brought by financial regulators, that could have a major impact given the sheer number of cases the FDIC, NCUA and FHFA bring.
Reiss on FHFA Leadership of Housing Finance Reform
Law360.com quoted me in FHFA Set To Take The Lead In Housing Finance Reform (behind a paywall). It reads in part,
With hopes for a legislative fix for the U.S. housing finance market fading after six key Democrats reportedly refused to support a reform bill pending in the Senate Banking Committee, the Federal Housing Finance Agency will become the central player in reshaping the market and set the terms for any future changes.
The Banking Committee’s leaders — Chairman Tim Johnson, D-S.D., and ranking member Mike Crapo, R-Idaho — were unable to scare up the overwhelming support their housing finance reform bill needed in a last-gasp effort at getting a vote from the full Senate. That leaves the bill’s prospects of getting to President Barack Obama prior to the midterm elections at near zero and the FHFA, the conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac since 2008, as the biggest player in reshaping the U.S. housing market.
“It was always my operating assumption that it was going to be exceedingly difficult to get congressional consensus. Most of the action was going to take place by way of the actions at the FHFA,” said former Republican Rep. Rick Lazio, now a partner at Jones Walker LLP.
The lack of legislation also throws a wild card into the equation, since FHFA head Mel Watt has essentially been silent about his intentions for the FHFA since he won Senate confirmation in December.
“Hopefully, Watt will have a positive vision of the future of the two companies,” said Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss.
More than five years after Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed under FHFA conservatorship after receiving a more-than-$187 billion taxpayer bailout in the fall of 2008, Congress has yet to act on creating a new system for home purchases and eliminating the two companies.
And then, beginning last spring, Congress kicked into gear.
First, Sen. Bob Corker, R-Tenn., and Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., introduced a bill that Johnson and Crapo would use as the basis for their own legislation, leaving a limited role for government in guaranteeing the mortgage market.
Soon after, the House Financial Services Committee passed its own housing finance reform bill looking to eliminate the government’s role in the housing market entirely.
Johnson and Crapo released their bill, which would eliminate Fannie and Freddie within five years and replace it with a mortgage insurance agency modeled on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., in March. They scheduled a markup and vote on the bill for late April.
But the two senators delayed the vote at the last minute when it became clear that while they had the 12 votes needed to pass the bill out of the 22-member committee, they lacked the 16 to 18 votes needed to force Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid to bring it up for a vote.
Johnson and Crapo said they would continue negotiations with six undecided Democrats, but according to media reports, those negotiations foundered on worries about access to affordable housing in the bill.
Undeterred, Johnson vowed to bring the bill up for a vote next week.
“Those involved in the negotiations have indicated they are interested in continuing to work together to try and find common ground, so the Banking Committee will keep working after favorably reporting out the bill next week,” Sean Oblack, a Democratic spokesman for the committee, said in a Thursday statement.
Still, the failure to get overwhelming support for the Johnson-Crapo bill essentially dooms the prospects for housing finance legislation this year, Lazio said.
“The administration will probably wait until early next Congress to make a decision about whether they think reform is possible,” he said.
But reform efforts will not stop, since the FHFA has a large amount of discretion over the futures of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
“The regulator here is very powerful,” Reiss said.
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Inside Johnson-Crapo
Enterprise Community Partners, Inc. has posted Inside Johnson-Crapo: What the Senate Housing Finance Reform Bill Could Mean for Low- and Moderate-income Communities. Parsing the various Congressional proposals for housing finance reform is hard enough for an expert, let alone for an interested observer. This policy brief provides a helpful overview of the proposal that is setting the terms for the debate today, with a focus on low- and moderate-income homeownership. Its key findings include:
- The bill, called the Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014 or S. 1217, lays a clear and thoughtful path forward for the nation’s housing finance system, including the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
- A new federal agency, modeled after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, would oversee the entire secondary mortgage market and establish a new system of government-insured mortgage-backed securities (MBS). In exchange for a fee, the agency would provide limited insurance against catastrophic losses on qualifying securities issued by private companies. Investors in the private companies would need to incur significant losses before the insurance pays out to holders of the MBS. The bill also winds down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the mortgage companies that were placed under government conservatorship in 2008.
- The bill includes several provisions to ensure that the new system adequately serves low- and moderate-income communities. First, it requires any issuer of government-insured securities to serve all eligible single-family and multifamily mortgages. Second, it preserves the GSEs’ current businesses for financing rental housing, while ensuring that those businesses continue to support apartments that are affordable to low-income families. Third, it requires issuers to contribute funding to programs that support the creation and preservation of affordable housing. Finally, it creates new market-based incentives to serve traditionally underserved segments of the housing market.
- Enterprise strongly supports the direction laid out in this bill and appreciates the inclusion of important multifamily provisions. At the same time, we suggest several proposals to further strengthen the bill. Among other things, we recommend that lawmakers promote a level playing field among eligible risk-sharing models; authorize the federal regulator to enforce the bill’s “equitable access” rule; expand the scope of the affordable housing fee; simplify the incentives for supporting underserved market segments; and establish separate insurance funds for single-family and multifamily securities. (1)
The left has criticized Johnson-Crapo for not doing enough for low- and moderate-income homeownership. The right has criticized it for leaving too much risk with the taxpayer. But it seems that a broad center finds that the outline provided by the bill provides a way forward from the zombie-state housing finance finds itself in, with a Fannie and Freddie neither fully alive nor fully dead. Nobody seems to think that a bill will pass this year. But hopefully Congress will keep attending to this issue and we can soon see a resurrected housing finance system, one that can take us through much of the 21st Century just as Fannie and Freddie got us through the 20th.
Reiss on Frannie Reform
Law360.com quoted me in Capital Rules To Spread Beyond Banks Under Housing Bill (behind a paywall). The story reads in part,
Mortgage servicers, aggregators and other actors in the U.S. housing finance market would for the first time be subject to the same capital requirements that apply to banks under a new bipartisan bill aimed at replacing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, potentially eliminating an advantage nonbank firms currently enjoy.
The elimination of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is the centerpiece of S. 1217, the Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014, introduced by Senate Banking Committee Chairman Tim Johnson, D-S.D., and the committee’s ranking Republican, Sen. Mike Crapo, R-Wyo. The government-sponsored entities would be replaced by a proposed Federal Mortgage Insurance Corp. that would backstop the housing finance market in a manner similar to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.’s backing of the banking system.
Among the details in the 442-page bill released Sunday are provisions that would allow the FMIC to impose capital standards and other “safety and soundness” rules to mortgage servicers, firms that package mortgages into securities and guarantors that provide the private capital backing to mortgage-backed securities. Compliance with these standards would be required for access to a government guarantee.
Previously those types of institutions have not been subject to safety and soundness rules, unless they were part of a bank. If the Johnson-Crapo bill moves forward as currently written, those firms could be in for a big change, said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.
“Historically, nonbanks have had a lot less regulation than banks. So, by giving them a safety and soundness regulator you are taking away a regulatory advantage – that is, less regulation – that they have had as financial institutions,” he said.
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“What it effectively does is create safety and soundness standards for guarantors, aggregators and servicers, as if they were banks. There’s been this long debate about what you do about the nondepository institutions, and this would empower FMIC to supervise private-party participants like banks,” said Laurence Platt, a partner with K&L Gates LLP.
Specifically, the potential rules would apply to aggregators, which serve to collect mortgages and pack them into securities, and guarantors, or firms that provide the private capital to back those securities. Mortgage servicers that process payments and provide other services to mortgages inside those securities would also be included under the FMIC’s regulatory umbrella, according to the bill.
The FMIC would also have the power to force the largest guarantors and aggregators to maintain higher capital standards than their smaller competitors as a way to mitigate the risk of any such market player becoming too big to fail, and will be able to limit such firms’ market share if they get too big, according to the bill.
Underwriting standards for mortgages that would be backed by the FMIC would match, as much as possible, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s qualified mortgage standards, which went into effect in January, according to the legislation.
Moreover, the FMIC would be able to write regulations for force-placed insurance that is applied to mortgages where borrowers do not purchase their own private mortgage insurance under the legislation. The CFPB and other regulators have tackled perceived problems in the force-placed insurance market in recent months.
Extending those capital and other safety and soundness requirements to nonbank firms would be akin to extending supervision authority of nonbank mortgage servicers and other firms to the CFPB, a power granted by the Dodd-Frank Act, Reiss said.
“It can be described as part of the effort since the passage of Dodd-Frank to regulate the breadth of the financial services industry instead of one part of it, the banking sector,” he said.
Qualified Mortgage Fair Lending Concerns Quashed
Federal regulators (the FRB, CFPB, FDIC, NCUA and OCC) announced that “a creditor’s decision to offer only Qualified Mortgages would, absent other factors, elevate a supervised institution’s fair lending risk.” This announcement was intended to address lenders’ concerns that they could be stuck between a rock (QM regulations) and a hard place (fair lending requirements pursuant to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Fair Housing Act). For instance, a lender might want to limit its risk of lawsuits relating to the mortgages it issues that could arise under a variety of state and federal consumer protection statutes by only issuing QMs only to find itself the defendant in a Fair Housing Act lawsuit that alleges that its lending practices had a disproportionate adverse impact on a protected class.
The five agencies issued an Interagency Statement on Fair Lending Compliance and the Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Rule that gives some context for this guidance:
the Agencies recognize that some creditors’ existing business models are such that all of the loans they originate will already satisfy the requirements for Qualified Mortgages. For instance, a creditor that has decided to restrict its mortgage lending only to loans that are purchasable on the secondary market might find that — in the current market — its loans are Qualified Mortgages under the transition provision that gives Qualified Mortgage status to most loans that are eligible for purchase, guarantee, or insurance by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or certain federal agency programs.
With respect to any fair lending risk, the situation here is not substantially different from what creditors have historically faced in developing product offerings or responding to regulatory or market changes. The decisions creditors will make about their product offerings in response to the Ability-to-Repay Rule are similar to the decisions that creditors have made in the past with regard to other significant regulatory changes affecting particular types of loans. Some creditors, for example, decided not to offer “higher-priced mortgage loans” after July 2008, following the adoption of various rules regulating these loans or previously decided not to offer loans subject to the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act after regulations to implement that statute were first adopted in 1995. We are unaware of any ECOA or Regulation B challenges to those decisions. Creditors should continue to evaluate fair lending risk as they would for other types of product selections, including by carefully monitoring their policies and practices and implementing effective compliance management systems. As with any other compliance matter, individual cases will be evaluated on their own merits. (2-3)
Lenders and their representatives have raised this issue as a significant obstacle to a vibrant residential mortgage market. This interagency statement should put this concern to rest.
