S&L Flexible Porfolio Lending

Bailey BrosDepositAccounts.com quoted me in Types of Institutions in the U.S. Banking System – Savings and Loan Associations. It opens,

When you think of a savings and loan, maybe you think of the Bailey Savings & Loan from the movie It’s a Wonderful Life or remember the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, when more than 1,000 savings and loans with over $500 billion in assets failed.

But there’s much more to the story. Savings and loan associations originally specialized in home-financing, be it a mortgage, home improvements or construction. According to Encyclopedia Britannica, Savings and loan associations originated with the building societies of Great Britain in the late 1700s. They consisted of groups of workmen who financed the building of their homes by paying fixed sums of money at regular intervals to the societies. When all members had homes, the societies disbanded. The societies began to borrow money from people who did not want to buy homes themselves and became permanent institutions. Building societies spread from Great Britain to other European countries and the United States. They are also found in parts of Central and South America. The Oxford Provident Building Association of Philadelphia, which began operating in 1831 with 40 members, was the first savings and loan association in the United States. By 1890 they had spread to all states and territories.

Today, explains, David Bakke, a financial columnist for MoneyCrashers.com, explains how S&Ls have evolved. “More recently, they have also expanded into areas such as car loans, commercial loans and even mutual fund investing. Currently, there isn’t much difference between them and other types of financial institutions.”

S&Ls are a type of thrift institution. Like all financial institutions they are bound to rules and regulations. They can have a state or federal charter. Those with a federal charter are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) used to be the regulator before it was merged with the OCC in 2011.

Another big change that impacted S&Ls was the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). It abolished the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, which had provided deposit insurance to savings and loans since 1934. It created two insurance funds, the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) and the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF), which were both administered by the FDIC. Those two funds were merged into the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) in 2006. In summary, your deposits at S&Ls today are insured by the FDIC.

If you’re wondering how S&Ls work, to put it simply, the money you deposit into your savings account, is used to fund the money the S&L doles out in loans.

Savings and loans have some advantages over other types of institutions. “Many S&Ls keep many of the loans that they originate in their own portfolio instead of selling them off for securitization.  This means that they often have more flexibility in their underwriting criteria than do those lenders that sell off their mortgages to Fannie, Freddie and Wall Street securitizers.  This means that borrowers with atypical profiles or borrowers interested in atypical properties might be more likely to find a lender open to a nontraditional deal in the S&L sector,” says David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School, that specializes in real estate.

P2P, Mortgage Market Messiah?

Monty Python's Life of Brian

As this is my last post of 2015, let me make a prediction about the 2016 mortgage market. Money’s Edge quoted me in Can P2P Lending Revive the Home Mortgage Market? It opens,

You just got turned down for a home mortgage – join the club. At one point the Mortgage Bankers Association estimated that about half of all applications were given the thumbs down. That was in the darkest housing days of 2008 but many still whisper that rejections remain plentiful as tougher qualifying rules – requiring more proof of income – stymie a lot of would be buyers.

And then there are the many millions who may not apply at all, out of fear of rejection.

Here’s the money question: is new-style P2P lending the solution for these would-be homeowners?

The question is easy, the answers are harder.

CPA Ravi Ramnarain pinpoints what’s going on: “Although it is well documented that banks and traditional mortgage lenders are extremely risk-averse in offering the average consumer an opportunity for a home loan, one must also consider that the recent Great Recession is still very fresh in the minds of a lot of people. Thus the fact that banks and traditional lenders are requiring regular customers to provide impeccable credit scores, low debt-to-income (DTI) ratios, and, in many cases, 20 percent down payments is not surprising. Person-to-person lending does indeed provide these potential customers with an alternate avenue to realize the ultimate dream of owning a home.”

Read that again: the CPA is saying that for some on whom traditional mortgage doors slammed shut there may be hope in the P2P, non-traditional route.

Meantime, David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law, sounded a downer note: “I am pretty skeptical of the ability of P2P lending to bring lots of new capital to residential real estate market in the short term. As opposed to sharing economy leaders Uber and Airbnb which ignore and fight local and state regulation of their businesses, residential lending is heavily regulated by the federal government. It is hard to imagine that an innovative and large stream of capital can just flow into this market without complying with the many, many federal regulations that govern residential mortgage lending. These regulations will increase costs and slow the rate of growth of such a new stream of capital. That being said, as the P2P industry matures, it may figure out a cost-effective way down the line to compete with traditional lenders.”

From the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to Fannie and Freddie, even the U.S. Treasury and the FDIC, a lot of federal fingers wrap around traditional mortgages. Much of it is well intended – the aims are heightened consumer protections while also controlling losses from defaults and foreclosures – but an upshot is a marketplace that is slow to embrace change.

Banks Should Know Their Investment Risks

Nathaniel Zumbach

The latest issue of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Supervisory Insights (Devoted to Advancing the Practice of Bank Supervision) has an esoteric, but important article on Bank Investment in Securitizations: The New Regulatory Landscape in Brief (starting on page 13). The article opens,

The recent financial crisis provided a reminder of the risks that can be embedded in securitizations and other complex investment instruments. Many investment grade securitizations previously believed by many to be among the lowest risk investment alternatives suffered significant losses during the crisis. Prior to the crisis, the marketplace provided hints about the embedded risks in these securitizations, but many of these hints were ignored. For example, highly rated securitization tranches were yielding significantly greater returns than similarly rated non-securitization investments. Investors found highly rated, high yielding securitization structures to be “too good to pass up,” and many investors, including community banks, invested heavily in these instruments. Unfortunately, when the financial crisis hit, the credit ratings of these investments proved “too good to be true;” credit downgrades and financial losses ensued.

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, interest rates have remained at historic lows, and the allure of highly rated, high-yielding securitization structures remains. Much has been done to mitigate the problems experienced during the financial crisis with respect to securitizations. Congress responded with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), and regulators developed and issued regulations and other guidance designed to increase investment management standards and capital requirements.

The gist of these new requirements is simple: banks should understand the risks associated with the securities they buy and should have reasonable assurance of receiving scheduled payments of principal and interest. This article summarizes the most pertinent of these requirements and provides practical advice on how the investment decision process can be structured so the bank complies with the requirements.

The guidance and regulations applicable to bank investment activities reviewed in this article are: „

  • Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC): 12 CFR, Parts 1, 5, 16, 28, 60; Alternatives to the Use of External Credit Ratings in the Regulations of the OCC;
  • OCC: Guidance on Due Diligence Requirements to determine eligibility of an investment (OCC Guidance);
  • Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC): 12 CFR Part 362, Permissible Investments for Federal and State Savings Associations: Corporate Debt Securities;
  • FDIC: 12 CFR Part 324, Regulatory Capital Rules; Implementation of Basel III (Basel III); and  „
  • FDIC: 12 CFR Part 351, Prohibitions on certain investments (The Volcker Rule).

As financial institutions move into an investment world where relying on credit ratings from third party providers is not longer sufficient, the advice in this article is welcome. One wonders though what the consequences will be, if any, for those who do not follow it.

Bank Settlements and the Arc of Justice

Ron Cogswell

MLK Memorial in DC

Martin Luther King, Jr. said that the “arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice.” A recent report by SNL Financial (available here, but requires a lot of sign-up info) offers us a chance to evaluate that claim in the context of the financial crisis.

SNL reports that the six largest bank holding companies have paid over $132 billion to settle credit crisis and mortgage-related lawsuits brought by governments, investors and other financial institutions.

In the context of the litigation over the Fannie and Freddie conservatorships, I had considered whether it is efficient to respond to financial crises by allowing the government to do what it needs to do during the crisis and then “use litigation to make an accounting to all of the stakeholders once the situation has stabilized.” (121)

Given that the biggest bank settlements are now in the rear view window, we can now say that the accounting for the financial crisis comes in at around $132 billion give or take. Does that number do justice for the wrongs of the boom times?  I don’t think I have my own answer to that question yet, but it is certainly worth considering.

On the one hand, we should acknowledge that it is a humongous number, a number so big that that no one would have considered it a likely one at the beginning of the financial crisis. This crisis made nine and ten digit settlement numbers a routine event.

On the other hand, wrongdoing (along with good old-fashioned boom mentality) during the financial crisis almost sent the global economy into a depression.  It also wreaked havoc on so many individuals, directly and indirectly.

I look forward to seeing metrics that can make sense of this (ratio of settlement amounts to annual profits of Wall Street firms; ratio to bonus pools; ratio to home equity lost), but I will say that I am struck by the lack of individual accountability that has come out of all of this litigation.

Individuals who made six, seven and eight figure paychecks from this wrongdoing were able to move on relatively unscathed.  We should think about how to avoid that result the next time around. Otherwise the arc of justice will bend in the wrong direction.

 

Smoldering FIRREA

Jens Buurgaard Nielsen

American Banker quoted me in Banks Take Losses in MBS Case Appeals; Is Supreme Court Next? (behind a paywall) The story reads, in part,

Banks that sold faulty mortgage-backed securities right before the crisis have suffered a string of legal defeats over the timing of government lawsuits, but some experts believe the industry may still have a shot in the Supreme Court.

Since the crisis regulators have brought a slew of actions against big banks for assets they sold to acquirers that ultimately failed. But in some cases, the parties have tussled over whether the government missed the statutory deadline for bringing a claim.

Appeals courts lately have disagreed with banks that plaintiffs missed court filing deadlines imposed by state law and other regimes, which are stricter than deadlines in federal law. Most recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit ruled in favor of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. in the agency’s case against RBS Securities and other issuers related to the 2009 failure of Guaranty Bank.

Still, other cases are pending and some say banks may be emboldened after the Supreme Court last year favored state-mandated timelines in an environmental case.

“I would expect that [banks] would continue to try to pursue the issue and get relief from the Supreme Court,” said Paul Rugani, a partner at Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP based in Seattle.

The government has sought billions from MBS issuers that officials say misrepresented the quality of securities leading up to the crisis. The FDIC and National Credit Union Administration sued companies that had sold assets to institutions that ultimately failed, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency brought claims over securities sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

But many banks have fought the agencies over whether they could bring the suits in the first place. Defendants seemed to gain ground in the lower courts and when the Supreme Court handed down its decision last year in a North Carolina environmental case.

*     *     *

“The Supreme Court generally does not take a case where there isn’t a split among different circuit appeals courts, and the 5th and 10th circuits are in agreement,” said an attorney familiar with the situation.

But other decisions are still pending. Rulings have yet to come from the 9th circuit as well as a separate case still to be decided in the 2nd circuit. Both involve the FDIC’s extender statute related to MBS losses at the failed Colonial Bank.

“I would think that the parties that lost the case would wait for the 2nd and 9th circuits to decide and then hope that either of them disagrees with the 5th circuit before deciding to take the case up to the Supreme Court,” said Sanford “Sandy” Brown, a partner at Bracewell & Giuliani LLP.

Others said the extender statute in the law at issue in the Supreme Court’s environmental decision – the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act – is different enough from the extender statute in FIRREA that the justices on the high court may want to weigh in.

The 5th circuit decision “is a well-reasoned opinion, but there is no question that such an interpretation could be challenged in an appeal to the Supreme Court,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School. “While circuit courts have had a consistent interpretation of the FIRREA extender statute, there is enough interpretation going on that the Supreme Court could come up with a reasonable alternative to the courts of appeal that have ruled on this issue.”

Optimizing Mortgage Availability

"Barack Obama speaks to press in Diplomatic Reception Room 2-25-09" by Pete Souza - https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/09/02/25/Overhaul/. Licensed via ttps://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Barack_Obama_speaks_to_press_in_Diplomatic_Reception_Room_2-25-09.jpg#/media/File:Barack_Obama_speaks_to_press_in_Diplomatic_Reception_Room_2-25-09.jpg

The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued a report, Mortgage Reforms: Actions Needed to Help Assess Effects of New Regulations. The GAO did this study to predict the effects of the Qualified Mortgage (QM) and Qualified Residential Mortgage (QRM) regulations. The GAO found

Federal agency officials, market participants, and observers estimated that the qualified mortgage (QM) and qualified residential mortgage (QRM) regulations would have limited initial effects because most loans originated in recent years largely conformed with QM criteria.

  • The QM regulations, which address lenders’ responsibilities to determine a borrower’s ability to repay a loan, set forth standards that include prohibitions on risky loan features (such as interest-only or balloon payments) and limits on points and fees. Lenders that originate QM loans receive certain liability protections.
  • Securities collateralized exclusively by residential mortgages that are “qualified residential mortgages” are exempt from risk-retention requirements. The QRM regulations align the QRM definition with QM; thus, securities collateralized solely by QM loans are not subject to risk-retention requirements.

The analyses GAO reviewed estimated limited effects on the availability of mortgages for most borrowers and that any cost increases (for borrowers, lenders, and investors) would mostly stem from litigation and compliance issues. According to agency officials and observers, the QRM regulations were unlikely to have a significant initial effect on the availability or securitization of mortgages in the current market, largely because the majority of loans originated were expected to be QM loans. However, questions remain about the size and viability of the secondary market for non-QRM-backed securities.

This last bit — questions about the non-QRM-backed market — is very important.

Some consumer advocates believe that there should not be any non-QRM mortgages. I disagree. There should be some sort of market for mortgages that do not comply with the strict (and, in the main, beneficial) QRM limitations.

Some homeowners will not be eligible for a plain vanilla QM/QRM mortgage but could still handle a mortgage responsibly. The mortgage markets would not be healthy without some kind of non-QRM-backed securities market for those consumers.

So far, that non-QRM market has been very small, smaller than expected. Regulators should continue to study the effects of the new mortgage regulations to ensure that they incentivize making the socially optimal amount of non-QRM mortgage credit available to homeowners.

Monday’s Adjudication Roundup