Tag Archives: mortgage

The Next Taxpayer Bailout for the Mortgage Market?

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The HUD Office of the Inspector General issued an audit on Nonbank Oversight by Ginnie Mae. This audit is one of those dry government documents that contain whispers of crises to come. The worrisome sentence is buried at the end of the audit: “If disruption in servicing occurs, Ginnie Mae may need to request additional funds from the U.S. Treasury to pay investors.” (8) To understand what is at stake, it is worth reviewing the background of the audit:

The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 created the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), a wholly owned U.S. Government corporation within the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, to pursue the creation of a mortgage-backed security market for government-insured loans. Through its mortgage-backed securities programs, Ginnie Mae guarantees securities backed by pools of mortgages and issued by mortgage lenders approved by Ginnie Mae. Ginnie Mae refers to these mortgage lenders as Ginnie Mae issuers.

Ginnie Mae depends on its issuers to take full responsibility for servicing, remitting, and reporting activities for the mortgages in every pool. If the borrower fails to make a timely payment on its mortgage, the issuer must use its own funds to ensure that the investors receive timely payment. If an issuer cannot ensure the timely payment of principal and interest to investors, Ginnie Mae, in accordance with its guaranty, defaults the issuer, acquires the servicing of the loans, and uses its own funds to manage the portfolio and make any necessary advances to investors. Ginnie Mae’s risk for loss occurs almost entirely at the point of issuer default, when Ginnie Mae must step in and exercise its guaranty. Counterparty risk refers to the risk of issuer default.

Following the financial crisis, the demand for government-insured loans increased, which created an increased demand for Ginnie Mae’s product. Ginnie Mae’s total remaining principal outstanding increased from $427.6 billion in 2007 to $1.7 trillion in 2016. This represents a 300 percent increase. The chart below shows the growth of the outstanding remaining principal balance of Ginnie Mae’s mortgage-backed securities programs from 2007 to 2016.

In addition to an increase in demand for Ginnie Mae’s products, Ginnie Mae’s issuer base had shifted dramatically since the financial crisis. Banks retreated from mortgage lending, causing a shift in Ginnie Mae’s issuer base from banks to nonbanks. For the purpose of this report, a bank refers to an institution licensed to receive deposits and make loans, whereas a nonbank refers to institutions that offer only mortgage-related services. In 2014, Ginnie Mae reported that 6 of its top 10 issuers were nonbanks. The chart below illustrates the shift in Ginnie Mae’s issuer base since 2010.

When banks dominated Ginnie Mae’s issuer base, Ginnie Mae outsourced a significant portion of its risk management to bank regulators, such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the National Credit Union Association. While the Consumer Financial Protections Bureau regulates nonbanks for consumerrelated issues, nonbanks are not subject to the same safety and soundness regulation as banks. No equivalent regulator exists for nonbanks. Therefore, Ginnie Mae must function as the first line of defense to evaluate nonbank institutions for financial and operational soundness. Ginnie Mae’s Office of Issuer and Portfolio Management is responsible for overseeing Ginnie Mae issuers concerning all matters related to participation in its mortgage-backed security programs, including monitoring issuer participation and executing issuer defaults.

Unlike banking institutions, nonbanks tend to have complex financial and operating structures and frequently use subservicers instead of servicing the loans in their portfolios. Additionally, nonbanks rely on credit lines for funding, which may limit a nonbank’s access to liquidity to meet the financial obligations of being a Ginnie Mae issuer. Banking institutions have standardized corporate ownership and lines of business, substantial liquidity, and the ability to service the loans in their portfolios.

Our audit objective was to determine whether Ginnie Mae responded adequately to changes in its issuer base. (3-4, charts omitted)

Unfortunately, the audit found that Ginnie Mae has come up short in dealing with the risks that it now faces. Time will tell whether it meaningfully responds to these deficiencies.

Rethinking FHA Insurance

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The Congressional Budget Office issued a report on Options to Manage FHA’s Exposure to Risk from Guaranteeing Single-Family Mortgages. FHA insurance stands out from other forms of mortgage insurance because it guarantees all of a lender’s loss, rather than just a portion of it. It is certainly a useful exercise to determine whether the FHA could reduce its exposure to those potential credit losses while also making home loans available to people who would otherwise have difficulty accessing them. This report evaluates the options available to the FHA:

The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insures the mortgages of people who might otherwise have trouble getting a loan, particularly first-time homebuyers and low-income borrowers seeking to purchase or refinance a home. During and just after the 2007–2009 recession, the share of mortgages insured by FHA grew rapidly as private lenders became more reluctant to provide home loans without an FHA guarantee of repayment. FHA’s expanded role in the mortgage insurance market ensured that borrowers could continue to have access to credit. However, like most other mortgage insurers, FHA experienced a spike in delinquencies and defaults by borrowers.

Recently, mortgage borrowers with good credit scores, large down payments, or low ratios of debt to income have started to see more options in the private market. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the share of FHA-insured mortgages going to such borrowers is likely to keep shrinking as credit standards in the private market continue to ease. That change would leave FHA with a riskier pool of borrowers, creating risk-management challenges similar to the ones that contributed to the agency’s high levels of insurance claims and losses during the recession.

This report analyzes policy options to reduce FHA’s exposure to risk from its program to guarantee single-family mortgages, including creating a larger role for private lenders and restricting the availability of FHA’s guarantees. The options are designed to let FHA continue to fulfill its primary mission of ensuring access to credit for first-time homebuyers and low-income borrowers.

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What Policy Options Did CBO Analyze?

Many changes have been proposed to reduce the cost of risk to the federal government from FHA’s single-family mortgage guarantees. CBO analyzed illustrative versions of seven policy options, which generally represent the range of approaches that policymakers and others have proposed:

■ Guaranteeing some rather than all of the lender’s losses on a defaulted mortgage;

■ Increasing FHA’s use of risk-based pricing to tailor up-front fees to the riskiness of specific borrowers;

■ Adding a residual-income test to the requirements for an FHA-insured mortgage to better measure borrowers’ ability to repay the loan (as the Department of Veterans Affairs does in its mortgage guarantee program);

■ Reducing the limit on the size of a mortgage that FHA can guarantee;

■ Restricting eligibility for FHA-insured mortgages only to first-time homebuyers and low- to moderate-income borrowers;

■ Requiring some borrowers to receive mortgage counseling to help them better understand their financial obligations; and

■ Providing a grant to help borrowers with their down payment, in exchange for which FHA would receive part of the increase in their home’s value when it was sold.

Although some of those approaches would require action by lawmakers, several of the options could be implemented by FHA without legislation. In addition, certain options could be combined to change the nature of FHA’s risk exposure or the composition of its guarantees. CBO did not examine the results of combining options.

What Effects Would the Policy Options Have?

Making one or more of those policy changes would affect FHA’s financial position, its role in the broader mortgage market, and the federal budget. All of the options would improve the agency’s financial position by reducing its exposure to the risk of losses on the mortgages it insures (see Table 1). The main reason for that reduction would be a decrease in the amount of mortgages guaranteed by FHA. CBO projects that under current law, FHA would insure $220 billion in new single-family mortgages in 2018. The options would lower that amount by anywhere from $15 billion to $77 billion (see Figure 1). Some options would also reduce FHA’s risk exposure by decreasing insurance losses as a percentage of the value of the guaranteed mortgages. (1-2)

Treasury’s Overreach on Securitization Reform

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Treasury Secretary Mnuchin Being Sworn in by Vice President Pence

The Department of the Treasury released its report, A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities Capital Markets. I will leave it to others to dissect the broader implications of this important document and will just highlight what it has to say about the future of securitization:

Problems related to certain types of securitized products, primarily those backed by subprime mortgage loans, contributed to the financial crisis that precipitated the Great Recession. As a result, the securitization market has acquired a popular reputation as an inherently high-risk asset class and has been regulated as such through numerous post-crisis statutory and rulemaking changes. Such treatment of this market is counterproductive, as securitization, when undertaken in an appropriate manner, can be a vital financial tool to facilitate growth in our domestic economy. Securitization has the potential to help financial intermediaries better manage risk, enhance access to credit, and lower funding costs for both American businesses and consumers. Rather than restrict securitization through regulations, policymakers and regulators should view this component of our capital markets as a byproduct of, and safeguard to, America’s global financial leadership. (91-92, citations omitted)

This analysis of securitization veers toward the incoherent. It acknowledges that relatively unregulated subprime MBS contributed to the Great Recession but it argues that stripping away the regulations that were implemented in response to the financial crisis will safeguard our global financial leadership. How’s that? A full deregulatory push would return us to the pre-crisis environment where mortgage market players will act in their short-term interests, while exposing counter-parties and consumers to greater risks.

Notwithstanding that overreach, the report has some specific recommendations that could make securitization more attractive. These include aligning U.S. regulations with the Basel recommendations that govern the global securitization market; fine-tuning risk retention requirements; and rationalizing the multi-agency rulemaking process.

But it is disturbing when a government report contains a passage like the following, without evaluating whether it is true or not:  “issuers have stated that the increased cost and compliance burdens, lack of standardized definitions, and sometimes ambiguous regulatory guidance has had a negative impact on the issuance of new public securitizations.” (104) The report segues from these complaints right to a set of recommendations to reduce the disclosure requirements for securitizers. It is incumbent on Treasury to evaluate whether those complaints are valid are not, before making recommendations based upon them.

Securitization is here to stay and can meaningfully lower borrowing costs. But the financial crisis has demonstrated that it must be regulated to protect the financial system and the public. There is certainly room to revise the regulations that govern the securitization sector, but a wholesale push to deregulate would be foolish given the events of the 2000s.

Foreclosure Alternatives

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Realtor.com quoted me in 3 Foreclosure Alternatives: What to Do Before Your Mortgage Goes Underwater. It opens,

Maybe you’ve missed a couple of monthly mortgage payments. Maybe a notice of default from your lender is looming right now. You understand the severity of the situation, but what most homeowners don’t know is that foreclosure is not the only option you have when you’re no longer able to afford your house.

The first step for anyone in risk of foreclosure is to get in contact with your lender. This shows that you are aware of the problem and committed to finding a solution—and trust us, that will go a long way. The earlier you reach out, the greater shot you have of amicably rectifying the problem.

After you speak with your lender, your lender will lay out your options, including the foreclosure alternatives that you might be able to take advantage of. Let’s take a closer look at some of the alternatives so you—and your credit history—don’t suffer the ultimate blow.

1. Standard sale or rental

If your home is currently valued at more than you owe and if you are up to date on your mortgage payments (but you anticipate that paying your mortgage could become a problem), you can hold out as long as possible for a buyer.

You can also try to rent out the home to cover the mortgage payments until the house sells, says Carolyn Rae Cole, a Realtor® with Nourmand & Associates. In the end, virtually all homes eventually sell—it’s just about pricing.

2. Short sale

When a home has fallen in value and is priced so low that there isn’t enough equity to cover the mortgage, you might have the option to conduct a short sale. It’s also known as going “underwater.” This means the lender agrees to accept less than the amount the borrower owes through a sale of the property to a third party.

A short sale works like this: A specialist brokers a deal with the mortgage lender to sell the home for whatever the market will bear. If the amount of the sale is for less than what’s owed on the mortgage, the lender gets the money from the sale and relinquishes the remaining debt. (This means you won’t owe anything else.) In a short sale, the lender usually pays for the seller’s closing costs. A traditional sale takes about 30 to 45 days to close after the offer is accepted, whereas a short sale can take 90 to 120 days, sometimes even longer.

Sellers will need to prove hardship—like a loss of primary income or death of a spouse—to their lender. In addition to explaining why they’re unable to make mortgage payments, sellers will have to provide supporting financial documents to the lender to consider for a short sale.

3. Deed in lieu of foreclosure agreement

A deed in lieu of foreclosure is a transaction between a lender and borrower that effectively ends a home loan. Essentially both parties agree to avoid a lengthy foreclosure proceeding by the borrower voluntarily turning over the home’s deed to a lender, says professor David Reiss of Brooklyn Law School
. The lender then releases the borrower from any further liability relating to the mortgage. However, if the property is worth significantly less than the outstanding mortgage, the lender may require the borrower to pay a portion of the remaining loan balance.

You might be eligible for a deed in lieu if you’re experiencing financial hardship, can’t afford your current mortgage payment, and were unable to sell your property at fair market value for at least 90 days.

Bottom line: This agreement is a negotiated solution to a bad situation—borrowers who have fallen behind on their payments are going to lose their house and the lender is not getting paid back in full.

Equifax and Your Mortgage

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image by Mark Warner

HouseLoan.com quoted me in How Will The Equifax Data Breach Affect Your Ability To Get A Mortgage? It opens,

Like throwing a stone into a pond, the Equifax data breach has long-lasting repercussions. Already, because of what’s being considered one of the largest data breaches in recent history, 143 million consumers may be affected. Data compromised in the breach has the potential to impact any form of credit taken out in the U.S. — including mortgages, credit cards, and car loans.

WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE EQUIFAX DATA BREACH?

The credit-reporting agency Equifax recently revealed that a data breach lasting from mid-May through July 2017 gave hackers access to their consumers’ names, Social Security numbers, addresses, birth dates, and, for some, driver’s license numbers. The Federal Trade Commission confirms that credit card numbers were stolen from an estimated 209,000 people and documents with personally identifying information for roughly 182,000 others. Hackers also accessed personal data for customers in the UK and Canada. Equifax says their agency didn’t discover the breach until July 29, 2017, after most of the damage was done.

Anyone who may be affected by the breach is encouraged to act fast, Lisa Lindsay, executive director of the collaborative group Private Risk Management Association (PRMA), which aims to raise awareness and educate agents and brokers, says. “Consumers will need to evaluate what they want to do next with regards to protection and what risk management options they want to take. Such as purchasing cyber and fraud insurance. Those impacted by the breach could be at risk for additional attacks.”

HOW WILL THE DATA BREACH AFFECT GETTING A MORTGAGE?

Buying a house may be the biggest financial decision you make. The last thing that you need is a credit setback — or disaster. Megan Zavieh, a Georgia attorney-at-law, explains that the full ramifications of the data breach have yet to be known because we don’t know who accessed private data or what they may ultimately do with it. But, she says, it could impact homebuyers significantly.

“If someone uses personal data to open new credit lines or take other typical identity theft actions, homebuyers could be in for a terrible surprise when they complete their home loan applications. Often, credit report correction following identity theft is a long process. And it could well prevent loans from closing if borrowers had identities stolen after the Equifax breach,” Zavieh says.

ADDING TO THE POST-EQUIFAX FRENZY, MANY PEOPLE ARE SEEKING TO FREEZE THEIR CREDIT IN THE WAKE OF THE BREACH.

David Reiss, Professor of Law and Academic Program Director of CUBE, The Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship at Brooklyn Law School, says, “Those who are looking to refinance their mortgage or purchase a new home should be aware of how a credit freeze affects them. When they are ready to take the plunge and apply, they will need to contact the credit rating agencies where they had placed a freeze and lift the freeze temporarily.” Just as importantly, Reiss reminds buyers to put the freeze back in place after completing the mortgage process.

During the time when you’re buying a home and the freeze is lifted, you can place a 90-day fraud alert on your credit. Reiss explains that this should limit lenders from granting credit under your name without first verifying that you are the one who applied for the loan.

The CFPB Makes Its Case

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CFPB Director Cordray

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau released its Semi-Annual Report. Given that the Bureau is under attack by Republicans in Congress and in the Trump Administration, one can read this as a defense (a strong defense, I might editorialize) for the work that the Bureau has done on behalf of consumers. The core of the Bureau’s argument is that it levels the playing field for consumers when they deal with financial services companies:

The Bureau has continued to expand its efforts to serve and protect consumers in the financial marketplace. The Bureau seeks to serve as a resource on the macro level, by writing clear rules of the road and enforcing consumer financial protection laws in ways that improve the consumer financial marketplace, and on the micro level, by helping individual consumers get responses to their complaints about issues with financial products and services. While the various divisions of the Bureau play different roles in carrying out the Bureau’s mission, they all work together to protect and educate consumers, help level the playing field for participants, and fulfill the Bureau’s statutory obligations and mission under the Dodd-Frank Act. In all of its work, the Bureau strives to act in ways that are fair, reasonable, and transparent.

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When Federal consumer financial protection law is violated, the Bureau’s Supervision, Enforcement, and Fair Lending Division are committed to holding the responsible parties accountable. In the six months covered by this report, our supervisory actions resulted in financial institutions providing approximately $6.2 million in redress to over 16,549 consumers. During that timeframe, we also have announced enforcement actions that resulted in orders for approximately $200 million in total relief for consumers who fell victim to various violations of consumer financial protection laws, along with over $43 million in civil money penalties. We brought numerous enforcement actions for various violations of the Dodd-Frank Act and other laws, including actions against Mastercard and UniRush for breakdowns that left tens of thousands of economically vulnerable RushCard users unable to access their own money to pay for basic necessities; two separate actions against CitiFinancial and CitiMortgage for keeping consumers in the dark about options to avoid foreclosure; and against three reverse mortgage companies for deceptive advertisements, including claiming that consumers who obtained reverse mortgages could not lose their homes. We also brought two separate actions against credit reporting agencies Equifax and TransUnion for deceiving consumers about the usefulness and actual cost of credit scores they sold to consumers, and for luring consumers into costly recurring payments for credit products; and an action against creditor reporting agency Experian for deceiving consumers about the usefulness of credit scores it sold to consumers. The Bureau also continued to develop and refine its nationwide supervisory program for depository and nondepository financial institutions, through which those institutions are examined for compliance with Federal consumer financial protection law. (10-11, footnotes omitted)

Anyone who was around during the late 1990s and early 2000s would know that consumers are much better off with the Bureau than without it. This report provides some of the reasons why that is the case.