Tag Archives: regulation

Regulation and Housing Supply

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Gyourko and Molloy have posted Regulation and Housing Supply to SSRN.  Unfortunately, it is behind a paywall (although it is also available at NBER if your library has access and an earlier draft can be found here). The abstract of this book chapter states that it reviews the scholarly literature on the causes and effects of local government regulation that “influences the amount, location, and shape of residential development.” The abstract continues,

We begin with a discussion of how researchers measure regulation empirically, which highlights the variety of methods that are used to constrain development. Many theories have been developed to explain why regulation arises, including the role of homeowners in the local political process, the influence of historical density, and the fiscal and exclusionary motives for zoning. As for the effects of regulation, most studies have found substantial effects on the housing market. In particular, regulation appears to raise house prices, reduce construction, reduce the elasticity of housing supply, and alter urban form. Other research has found that regulation influences local labor markets, and household sorting across communities. Finally, we discuss the welfare implications of regulation. Although the large positive externalities of some specific rules are clear, the benefits of more general forms of regulation are very difficult to quantify. On balance, a few recent studies suggest that the overall efficiency losses from binding constraints on residential development could be quite large.
Land use geeks are familiar with Gyourko’s analysis of land use regulation, but many non-economists are not.  Even if they are, they often give it short shrift. I found the extension of their analysis beyond the borders of the U.S. interesting:
In theory, the availability of buildable land might not constrain the supply of housing units if housing could be constructed as densely as necessary to meet demand. But in most places in the U.S.—and indeed around the world—local land use policy imposes limits on residential development that restrict the size and type of housing units that can be built on a given amount of land. These restrictions add extra costs to a construction project, creating a wedge between the sales price of a house and the cost of buying the land and building the structure. (3)
As communities struggle with housing affordability, the link between land use regulation and housing costs is one that should not be ignored.

Performance-Based Consumer Law

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Lauren Willis has posted Performance-Based Consumer Law to SSRN. This article

makes the case for recognizing performance-based regulation as a distinct tool in the consumer-law regulatory toolbox and for employing this tool broadly. Performance-based consumer law has the potential to incentivize firms to educate rather than obfuscate, develop simple and intuitive product designs that align with rather than defy consumer expectations, and channel consumers to products that are suitable for the consumers’ circumstances. Moreover, the process of establishing performance standards would sharpen our understanding of our goals for consumer law, and the process of testing for compliance with those standards would produce data about how to meet those goals in a continually evolving marketplace. Even if performance-based regulation does not directly lead to dramatic gains in consumer comprehension or marked declines in unsuitable uses of consumer products, the process of establishing and implementing such regulation promises dividends for improving traditional forms of regulation. (1)
This seems like a pretty radical change from our current approaches to the regulation of consumer financial transactions. Willis argues that disclosure does not work (no argument there) and industry can easily circumvent bright line rules (no argument there). She claims that a suitability regime, like ones that exist in the brokerage industry, offer a superior alternatives.  She writes,
Suitability standards would be closer to traditional substantive regulation, but more flexible. Regulation might define suitable (or unsuitable) uses of types or features of products, or firms might define suitable uses of their products, provided that they did so publicly. Although suitability might be required of every transaction, testing every transaction for suitably would often be prohibitively expensive and ad hoc ex post enforcement would create only limited incentives for firm compliance. Better to set performance benchmarks for what proportion of the firm’s customers must use the products or features suitably (or not unsuitably) and use field-based testing of a sample of the firm’s customers to assess whether the benchmarks are met. Enforcement levers could include, e.g., fines, rewards, licensing consequences, regulator scrutiny, or unfair, deceptive, or abusive conduct liability. (4)
This is certainly intriguing. But just as certainly, one can see the consumer finance industry raising concerns about a lack of clear rules to guide their actions and the after-the-fact evaluations that this approach would subject them to. Willis is too quick to reject such concerns, but they are legitimate ones that would need to be addressed if performance-based consumer law was to be widely adopted. Nonetheless, this is an intriguing paper and its implications should be further explored.

Conservative Underwriting or Regulatory Uncertainty?

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Jordan Rappaport (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City) and Paul Willen (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston) have posted a Current Policy Perspectives,Tight Credit Conditions Continue to Constrain The Housing Recovery. They write,

Rather than cutting off access to mortgage credit for a subset of households, ongoing credit tightness more likely takes the form of strict underwriting procedures applied to all households. Lenders require conservative appraisals, meticulous documentation, and the curing of even the slightest questions of title. To the extent that these standards constitute sound lending practices, adhering to them is a positive development. But the level of vigilance suggests that regulatory uncertainty may also be playing a role.

Since the housing crisis, the FHA, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and other government and private organizations have been continually developing a new regulatory framework. Lenders fear that departures from the evolving standards will result in considerable costs, including the forced buyback of loans sold to Fannie and Freddie and the rescinding of FHA mortgage guarantees. The associated uncertainty has caused lenders to act as if strict interpretations of possible restrictive future standards will apply. (2-3)

The authors raise an important question: has the federal government distorted the mortgage market in its pursuit of past wrongdoing and its regulation of behavior going forward? Anecdotal reports such as those about Chase’s withdrawal from the FHA market seem to suggest that the answer is yes. But it appears to me that Rappaport and Willen may be jumping the gun based on the limited data that they analyze in their paper.

Markets cycle from greed to fear, from boom to bust. The mortgage market is still in the fear part of the cycle and government interventions are undoubtedly fierce (just ask BoA). But the government should not chart its course based on short-term market conditions. Rather, it should identify fundamentals and stick to them. Its enforcement approach should reflect clear expectations about compliance with the law. And its regulatory approach should reflect an attempt to align incentives of market actors with government policies regarding appropriate underwriting and sustainable access to credit. The market will adapt to these constraints. These constraints should then help the market remain vibrant throughout the entire business cycle.

Risky Cash-Out Refis

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Anil Kumar of the Dallas Fed has posted Do Restrictions on Home Equity Extraction Contribute to Lower Mortgage Defaults? Evidence from a Policy Discontinuity at the Texas’ Border to SSRN.  The abstract reads

Given that excessive borrowing helped precipitate the housing crisis, a key component of a policy agenda to prevent future meltdowns is effective regulation to curb unaffordable mortgage debt. Texas is the only US state that limits home equity borrowing to 80 percent of home value. Anecdotal reports have long suggested that home equity restrictions shielded Texas homeowners from the worst of the subprime mortgage crisis. But there is, as yet, no formal empirical investigation of these restrictions’ role in curbing mortgage default. This paper is the first to empirically estimate the impact of Texas home equity restrictions on mortgage default using individual and loan level data from three different sources. The paper exploits the policy discontinuity around Texas’ interstate borders induced by the home equity restrictions to identify the causal effect of home equity extraction on mortgage default in a border discontinuity design framework. The paper finds that limits on home equity borrowing in Texas lowered the likelihood of mortgage default by about 2 percentage points with a significantly larger impact on mortgage borrowers in the bottom quartile of the credit score distribution. Estimated default hazards for mortgages within 50 to 100 miles of the Texas’ border decline sharply as one crosses into Texas. Overall, the paper finds evidence that Texas’ home equity restrictions exert a robust negative impact on mortgage default.

This is a really important paper asking a really important question.  If its findings are confirmed, it brings us back to that age-old question of paternalism in consumer financial protection: should we limit a consumer’s choice if that choice is consistently shown to have harmful effects?  I am not sure where I come down in this particular case, but I wonder if some version of Quercia et al.‘s benefit ratio could help measure the costs and benefits of such a rule. The benefit ratio compares “the percent reduction in the number of defaults to the percent reduction in the number of borrowers who would have access to [a certain type of] mortgages.” (20) I am not sure whether access to cash out refi mortgages is of the same import as purchase mortgages or even plain old refis, but the concept of the benefit ratio might still make sense in this context.

Promoting Affordable Housing, and the Winner Is . . .

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I had blogged about a competition to generate ideas to lower the cost of affordable housing, the Minnesota Challenge to Lower the Cost of Affordable Housing.  I was pretty excited about this challenge and was happy to see that a winner has been chosen:  the University of Minnesota’s Center for Urban and Regional Affairs (CURA).

CURA’s winning proposal is here.  Basically, they

propose a three-stage program for addressing the state and local regulatory cost driver. First, we will identify and summarize best practices at the state and local levels for reducing regulatory and permitting barriers to affordable housing. There is a significant national database of initiatives that can provide examples for possible implementation here, as well as the Affordable Housing Toolkit established by ULI Minnesota. Second, we will conduct an analysis of where a more complete adoption of best practices is likely to have the largest effect on the production of affordable housing, particularly those suburban cities with the largest future affordable housing goals. Finally, we will take advantage of the fact that the Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities is currently drafting a Regional Housing Policy plan, which is a vehicle that could implement regulatory reforms and create incentives for local governments to adopt practices and policies to reduce development costs. (1)
These are all valuable things to do, but I have to say that I am disappointed that this is as good as it gets when it comes to innovation regarding reducing the cost of affordable housing construction. Perhaps the takeaway lesson is that building affordable housing is expensive and that we can only cut costs a bit at the margins. I am hoping, however, that I am wrong about that and that some innovative ideas are still out there. Are there big ideas about inclusionary zoning?  About modular construction? About public/private partnerships? We’ll have to wait and see.

Paternalism or Consumer Protection?

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Adam Smith (not that one) and Todd Zywicki have posted Behavior, Paternalism, and Policy: Evaluating Consumer Financial Protection to SSRN. It opens,

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is one of the most powerful and least accountable regulatory agencies in American history. Immune from budgetary oversight by Congress and headed by a single director whom the president cannot remove except under special circumstances, the agency wields unconstrained, vaguely defined powers to regulate virtually every consumer and small business credit product in America In part, the CFPB has justified its ongoing intervention into financial credit markets based on a prior belief in the inability of consumers to competently weigh their decisions. This belief is founded on research conducted in the area of behavioral economics, which shows that people are prone to a variety of errors in their decision-making.

Beginning with the seminal work of Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman and his coauthor Amos Tversky, behavioral economics has identified numerous purported behavioral “anomalies” through extensive laboratory investigation. Anomalies (or behavioral biases) are defined as observed behavioral deviations from the predictions of neoclassical economic theory, where it is assumed that people rationally optimize according to a given set of information and constraints. Behavioral economists have sought to explain the sources of such anomalous choices by identifying and cataloging a variety of cognitive limitations and psychological biases.

Building on these findings, behavioral theorists have exported their research into the policy realm. This program, led by such luminaries as Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein—and known as behavioral law and economics (BLE)—applies the insights gleaned from studies of human behavior to improve existing institutions by designing rules to compensate for (or take advantage of) behavioral biases. Starting from the premise that observed choices are inconsistent with neoclassical theory, behavioral economists argue that intervention is necessary to generate desirable outcomes for consumers who would otherwise make poor choices. (3-4, citation omitted)

As regular readers of this blog know, I am generally a fan of the CFPB. I recommend this paper to those who want the CFPB to be an effective tool of government. The paper critiques the CFPB in a variety of ways. I find a number of them convincing and one key one to be incredibly wrongheaded.

Convincing

  • The CFPB must avoid “confirmation bias” in its decision-making and its evidence-based analyses. (7)
  • The CFPB’s behavioral law and economics approach needs “a complementary behavioral political economy framework” to apply to the CFPB itself as a political actor. (39)
  • The CFPB should account for the ways that its actions might drive consumers to worse choices than they would face in the absence of heavy regulation of the credit markets. The paper gives illegal loan sharking as an example of a possible worse choice.
  • The CFPB would benefit from “‘adversarial review’ by a body of experts housed elsewhere in the Federal Reserve.” (40) This seems like a reasonable way to ensure that the CFPB both maintains its independence and avoids the echo chamber effect that an agency with one director (as opposed to an agency led by a bipartisan commission) might suffer from.

Wrongheaded

It amazes me that in 2014, commentators could say — “autonomous consumer choice should receive greater priority. Regulatory bodies inevitably will have an effect on the services firms choose to offer” — without addressing the negative impact of the unfettered consumer choices of the Subprime Boom that were a factor in the Subprime Bust. (39) We have not even finished with the foreclosure crisis that was the inevitable result of that boom and bust cycle. Yet law and economics scholars are already bemoaning the reduction of consumer choice caused by the regulatorily-favored Qualified Mortgage without also considering the Wild West atmosphere that characterized the mortgage market in the early 2000s. The regulatory state may not be able to craft a perfect credit market but the unfettered market failed to do so as well.

This paper does not take the full range of possible market structures (from heavy regulation to no regulation) seriously and so it is seriously flawed. It also cherry picks its facts and scholarly support at points. That being said, it does offer some trenchant comments and criticisms about the CFPB as currently structured and is therefore worth a read.

Republicans Issue Report Critical of CFPB’s Regulation of Mortgage Markets

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The staff of the House’s Committee on Oversight and Government Reform issued a report that argues that the CFPB is “predisposed to limit access to credit;”  “will increase regulatory burdens and reduce credit availability;” and has inadequate mechanisms to “detect access to credit impediments.”  As to mortgage markets in particular, it argues that

Lenders are reportedly requiring the highest credit scores in a decade to approve home mortgages, with an average credit score of 737 for borrowers approved for a home loan in 2011.22. The international capital guidelines outlined in the Basel III capital accords have also made mortgage loans less worthwhile for banks. An April 2012 Federal Reserve survey found that 83 percent of banks were less likely to originate a GSE-eligible 30-year fixed-rate mortgage for a borrower with a credit score of 620 and a 10 percent down payment than they were in 2006. Roughly 70 percent of those banks surveyed blamed regulatory and legislative changes for restricting lending. (3-4, footnotes omitted)

It continues,

youth4media.eu/lists/files/

the CFPB is currently considering a mortgage rule that would require a lender to verify a borrower’s ability to repay a mortgage unless the loan satisfies the definition of a “qualified mortgage.” According to Frank Keating, CEO of the American Bankers Association, the rule could “make borrowing more expensive and credit less available. Some lenders may leave the market altogether.” The rule could also increase the cost of mortgage lending, reduce consumer choice, and make it harder for consumers to compare mortgage options. If the CFPB is not careful, these rules could make it more difficult – if not impossible – for millions of Americans to purchase homes. (11, footnotes omitted)

The analysis in this staff report strikes me as fundamentally unsophisticated as it does not draw a distinction between sustainable credit and unsustainable credit.  The last bubble was driven by credit that was extended to people who could not repay it.  There is no reason we would want to see a return to those practices.

The question should be — what regulations allow for a healthy mortgage market where careful lenders make loans to creditworthy borrowers?