- Former Freddie Mac executives, who were accused of lying about Freddie’s exposure to subprime mortgages before the financial crisis, settled with the SEC.
- Citibank shareholders slam the Bank’s motion to dismiss a case over mortgage-backed securities worth more than $17 billion as NY federal courts have rejected similar arguments to dismiss similar cases.
- The Second Circuit dismisses a class action against Royal Bank of Scotland PLC finding that the bank did not lie about its exposure to residential mortgage-backed securities.
- DC federal judge certified a class action of evicted homeowners, with a lead representative who lost his home over a $134 unpaid tax bill. The court will decide whether district law creates a property interest in equity, if its tax-sale statutes effect a taking of the property and if class members were properly compensated.
Tag Archives: SEC
Monday’s Adjudication Roundup
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A New York bankruptcy judge denied several mortgage originators’ motions to dismiss for Residential Capital LLC’s claims that they sold billions of dollars in defective loans.
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A few weeks after settling with the SEC for $58 million for fraudulent ratings on commercial mortgage-backed securities, Standards & Poor settles with the U.S. Department of Justice for $1.38 billion for the same fraudulent ratings.
- After dismissing a suit against Royal Bank of Scotland, Deutsche Bank and others in 2011 over mortgage-backed securities and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals nixed her dismissal, U.S. District Court Judge Deborah A. Batts has permitted New Jersey Carpenters Health Fund to file a third amended complaint to revive the suit. This could end up costing the banks $7.7 billion if the suit is successful.
- Bank of America has defeated Prudential’s claims that it sold $2 billion of fraudulent residential mortgage-backed securities.
Monday’s Adjudication Roundup
- S&P agrees to settlement of $58 million for fraudulent ratings on commercial mortgage-backed securities.
- SEC order regarding violations of Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act, Section 15E(c)(3) of the Exchange Act, and Exchange Act Rules 17g-2(a)(2)(iii) and 17g-2(a)(6). $6.2 million disgorgement, plus $800,000 prejudgment interest, and $35 million civil money penalty for affirmatively claiming to use one method of rating when it was actually using another method.
- SEC order regarding violations of Section 17(a)(l) of the Securities Act and Exchange Act Rule 17g-2(a)(6). $15 million penalty for publishing “false and misleading article purporting to show that its new credit enhancement levels could withstand Great Depression-era levels of economic stress.”
- SEC order regarding violations of Section 15E(c)(3)(a) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rules 17g-2(a)(2)(iii) and 17g-2(a)(6). $1 million civil money penalty for failure in oversight of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) ratings.
- SEC order regarding a public hearing.
- Following the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau filing a complaint in the District Court for the District of Maryland, JP Morgan and Wells Fargo agreed to pay $37.5 million in penalties for a mortgage-kickback scheme with a title company.
- The Supreme Court heard oral arguments for disparate impact case on January 21st. (Whether disparate impact is a cognizable claim under the Fair Housing Act).
S&P’s Upbeat Outlook on Mortgage Market
S&P posted U.S. RMBS Roundtable: Mortgage Origination And Securitization In The Post-Qualified Mortgage/Ability-To-Repay Market. The roundtable discussion offers views on many aspects of the 2015 mortgage market, but I found this passage to be particularly interesting:
Originators agreed loans that fall outside of the safe harbor by virtue of interest-only (IO) features have been and will continue to be attractive non-QM lending products. These loans have been originated post-crisis, and originators expect to continue lending to high-quality borrowers with substantial equity in their properties. There was general consensus that IO loans should not have been automatically excluded from QM treatment.
However, large bank depository lenders have shown a desire to originate and hold larger balance IO loans on their balance sheets rather than including them in securitizations. One participant from a major depository institution indicated that, given the increasing IO concentration on those institutions’ balance sheets, there may be a desire to securitize these loans upon meeting balance sheet thresholds. (1)
After Dodd-Frank, there was a lot of concern that the Qualified Mortgage and Ability-to-Repay rules would shut down the mortgage markets. It seems pretty clear to me that lenders are figuring out how to navigate both the plain-vanilla world of the Qualified Mortgage and the exotic world of the non-Qualified Mortgage, with its interest-only and other non-prime products. Lenders are still figuring out how far afield they can roam from a plain-vanilla product, but that is to be expected during a major transition such as the one from the pre- to the post-Dodd-Frank world.
SEC Update on Rating Agency Industry
The staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has issued its Annual Report on Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations. The report documents some significant problems with the rating agency industry as it is currently structured. The report highlights competition, transparency and conflicts of interest as three important areas of concern.
Competition. There are some of the interesting insights to be culled from the report. It notes that “some of the smaller NRSROs [Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations] had built significant market share in the asset-backed securities rating category.” (16) That being said, the report also finds that despite “the notable progress made by smaller NRSROs in gaining market share in some of the ratings classes . . . , economic and regulatory barriers to entry continue to exist in the credit ratings industry, making it difficult for the smaller NRSROs to compete with the larger NRSROs.” (21)
Transparency. The report also notes that “there is a trend of NRSROs issuing unsolicited commentaries on solicited ratings issued by other NRSROs, which has increased the level of transparency within the credit ratings industry. The commentaries highlight differences in opinions and ratings criteria among rating agencies regarding certain structured finance transactions, concerning matters such as the sufficiency of the credit enhancement for the transactions. Such commentaries can serve to enhance investors’ understanding of the ratings criteria and differences in ratings approaches used by the different NRSROs.” (23) The report acknowledges that this is no cure-all for what ails the rating industry, it is a positive development.
Conflicts of Interest.Conflicts of interest have been central to the problems in the ratings industry, and were one of the factors that led to the subprime bubble and then bust of the 2000s. The report notes that the “potential for conflicts of interest involving an NRSRO may continue to be particularly acute in structured finance products, where issuers are created and operated by a relatively concentrated group of sponsors, underwriters and managers, and rating fees are particularly lucrative.” (25) There is no easy solution to this problem and it is important to carefully study it on an ongoing basis.
The staff report is valuable because it offers an annual overview of structural changes in the ratings industry. This year’s report continues to highlight that the structure of the industry is far from ideal. As the business cycle heats up, it is important to keep an eye on this critical component of the financial system to ensure that rating agencies are not being driven by short term profits for themselves at the expense of long-term systemic stability for the rest of us.
Does Morningstar Speak with Forked Tongue?
Morningstar Credit Ratings, a small Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (albeit a subsidiary of Morningstar, the large investment research firm), has issued a Structured Credit Ratings Commentary on Rating Shopping in Asset Securitization Markets. It finds that
Rating shopping is alive and well in the U.S. securitization markets notwithstanding the implementation of regulatory and legislative actions intended to curb the practice and promote competition among credit rating agencies, or CRAs. It is important to note, however, that the rating shopping following the financial crisis has not led to a “race to the bottom” scenario with respect to rating standards that some congressional lawmakers and other critics of the issuer-paid model believe was prevalent during the years leading up to the crisis. (1)
I have to say that I find Morningstar’s analysis perplexing. The commentary highlights a number of structural problems in the ratings agency industry. It then goes on to say that everything is fine and that there is no race to the bottom to worry about, to lead us into another financial crisis.
The commentary goes on to state that while
it is rational for issuers and arrangers to choose the CRA with the least onerous terms, CRAs generally have held their ground by adhering to their analytical methodologies notwithstanding the constant threat of losing business. . . . The CRAs’ unwillingness to lower their standards in the midst of reviewing a transaction is attributable in part to strong regulatory oversight from the SEC, which has focused heavily on holding nationally recognized statistical rating organizations, or NRSROs, accountable for following their published methodologies. (1-2)
I find it odd that the commentary does not consider where we are in the business cycle as part of the explanation. Once the market becomes sufficiently frothy, rating agencies will be more tempted to compromise their standards in order to win market share. I wouldn’t accuse Morningstar of speaking with a forked tongue, but its explanation of the current state of affairs seems self-serving: move on folks, we rating agencies have everything under control for we have tamed the profit motive once and for all!
Reiss on $17 Billion BoA Settlement
Law360 quoted me in BofA Deal Shows Pragmatism At Work On Both Sides (behind a paywall). It reads in part,
Bank of America Corp.’s $16.65 billion global settlement over its alleged faulty lending practices in the run-up to the financial crisis may have made bigger waves than recent payouts by JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup Inc., but attorneys say the deal still represents the best possible outcome for the bank and for federal prosecutors, who can now put their resources elsewhere.
The settlement, inked with the U.S. Department of Justice, Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., the Federal Housing Administration and the states of California, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland and New York, released most of the significant claims related to subprime mortgage practices at Countrywide Financial Corp. and investment bank Merrill Lynch, both of which Bank of America picked up during the crisis.
Although the hefty price tag, which includes $7 billion in consumer relief payments and a record $5 billion in civil penalties, is nothing to balk at, the settlement will help Bank of America avoid a series of piecemeal deals that could stretch out over a much longer period without the prospect of closure, according to Ben Diehl of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP.
“They want to start being looked at and considered by the market, their customers and regulators based on what they are doing today, in 2014, and not have everything continue to be looked at through the perspective of alleged accountability for conduct related to the financial crisis,” said Diehl, who formerly oversaw civil prosecutions brought by the California attorney general’s mortgage fraud strike force.
And the bank isn’t the only one looking for closure, according to Diehl.
“It’s in a regulator’s interest as well to be able to look at what is currently being offered to consumers and have a dialogue with companies about that, as opposed to talking about practices that allegedly happened six or more years prior,” he said.
The government also saw great value in getting a big dollar number out to a public that has expressed frustration over a perceived lack of accountability of financial institutions for their role in the financial crisis.
“The executive branch get a big news story, particularly with the eye-poppingly large settlements that have been agreed to recently,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School, who added that the federal government also has an interest in global settlements that keep the markets running more predictably.
