Tag Archives: financial crisis

Frannie Reps and Warranties Crisis Brewing

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The Inspector General of the Federal Housing Finance Agency released an audit, FHFA’s Representation and Warranty Framework. Reps and warranties are a risk-shifting device that sophisticated commercial parties use in transactions. If a party makes a representation or warranty that turns out to be false, they other party may have some remedy — maybe the ability to return something or to get some kind of payment to make up for the failure to live up to the promise.

For instance, a lender may sell a bunch of mortgages to a securitizer and represent that all of the borrowers have FICO (credit) scores of 620 or higher. If it turns out that some of the borrowers had scores of less than 620, the securitizer may be able to make the lender buy back those mortgages pursuant to a rep and warranty clause. The IG undertook this audit because of recent changes to the reps and warranties framework for Fannie and Freddie. Before these changes were implemented,

the Enterprises’ risk management model primarily relied on reviewing loans for underwriting deficiencies after they defaulted as the representations and warranties were effective for the life of the loans. In contrast, the new framework transfers responsibility to the Enterprises to review loans upfront for eligible representation and warranty deficiencies that may trigger repurchase requests. If the Enterprises fail to do so within the applicable period, their ability to pursue a repurchase request expires if it is based upon a representation and warranty that qualifies for repurchase relief. (2)

The IG’s findings are disturbing. It “found that FHFA mandated a new framework despite significant unresolved operational risks to the Enterprises.” (3) It also found that

FHFA mandated a 36-month sunset period for representation and warranty relief without validating the Enterprises’ analysis or performing sufficient additional analysis to determine whether financial risks were appropriately balanced between the Enterprises and sellers. Freddie Mac, in contrast to Fannie Mae which provided analysis limited to a 36-month period, provided FHFA with the results of an internal analysis of loans that indicated loans with a 48-month clean payment history were significantly less likely to exhibit repurchaseable defects than loans with a 36-month clean payment history. Thus, losses to the Enterprise could be less with a longer sunset period. Therefore, FHFA cannot support that the sunset period selected does not unduly benefit sellers at the Enterprises’ expense. (3)

This is all very technical stuff, obviously. But it is of great significance. Basically, the IG is warning that the FHFA has not properly evaluated the credit risk posed by changes to the agreements that Fannie and Freddie enter into with the lenders who convey mortgages to them. It also implies that this new framework “unduly” benefits the lenders.

The FHFA’s response is unsettling — it effectively rejects the IG’s concern without providing a reasoned basis for doing so. Its express rationale for doing so is to avoid “adverse market effects” and because addressing the IG’s concern “may not align with the FHFA objective of increased lending to consumes . . ..” (32)

Whenever federal regulators place increased lending as a priority over safety and soundness, warning bells should start ringing. Crises at Fannie and Freddie (and the FHA, for that matter) begin with this kind of thinking. Increased lending may be important today, but it should not be done at the expense of safety and soundness tomorrow. We are too close to our last housing finance crisis to forget that lesson.

Insuring Mortgages Through the Business Cycle

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Mark Zandi and Cristian deRitis of Moody’s, along with Jim Parrott of the Urban Institute, have posted Putting Mortgage Insurers on Solid Ground. They wrote this in response to the Private Mortgage Insurance Eligibility Requirements set forth by the FHFA. While generally approving of the requirements, they argue that

Several features of the rules as currently written, however, would likely
unnecessarily increase costs and cyclicality in the mortgage and housing markets.
With a few modest changes, these flaws can be remedied without sacrificing the
considerable benefits of the new standards. (1)

I would first start by reviewing their disclosure:  “Mark Zandi is a director of one mortgage insurance company, and Jim Parrott is an advisor to another. The authors do not believe that their analysis has been impacted by these relationships, however. Their work reflects the authors’ independent beliefs regarding the appropriate financial requirements for the industry.” While, I understand that the authors believe that their views are not impacted by their financial relationships with private mortgage insurers, readers will certainly want to take them into account when evaluating those views.

The authors argue that FHFA’s requirements are procyclical, that is they become more burdensome just as mortgage insurers are facing a distressed environment. This could contribute to a vicious cycle where mortgage credit tightens because of regulatory causes just when we might want credit to loosen up. This is certainly something we should look out for.

They also argue that the FHFA’s requirements will increase mortgage insurance premiums unnecessarily because they increase capital reserves too much. I find this argument less compelling. The Private Mortgage Insurance industry has typically done terribly in distressed environments from the Great Depression through the 2000s. Not only have there been failures but they have also reduced their underwriting of new insurance just when the market was most fragile.

But there are certain shaky assumptions built into this analysis. For instance, they argue that Private Mortgage Insurance companies will need to maintain their historical after-tax return on capital of 15%. But if the business model is shored up with higher capital reserves, investors should be satisfied with a lower return on capital because the companies are less likely to go bust. That is, instead of increasing premiums for homeowners, it is possible that higher capital requirements might just reduce profits.

The authors write that while “the increase in capital requirements is clearly warranted, there are certain features of the requirements as currently drafted that will increase mortgage insurance premiums unnecessarily, running counter to the aim of policymakers, including the FHFA, to encourage greater use of private capital in housing finance.” (2-4) Policymakers have lots of goals for private mortgage insurance, including having it not implode during down markets. An unthinking reliance on private capital is not what we should be after. Rather, we should seek to promote a thoughtful reliance on private capital, taking into account how we it can best help us maintain a healthy mortgage market throughout the business cycle.

Regulating Fannie and Freddie With The Deal

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Steven Davidoff Solomon and David T. Zaring have posted After the Deal: Fannie, Freddie and the Financial Crisis Aftermath to SSRN. The abstract reads,

The dramatic events of the financial crisis led the government to respond with a new form of regulation. Regulation by deal bent the rule of law to rescue financial institutions through transactions and forced investments; it may have helped to save the economy, but it failed to observe a laundry list of basic principles of corporate and administrative law. We examine the aftermath of this kind of regulation through the lens of the current litigation between shareholders and the government over the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. We conclude that while regulation by deal has a place in the government’s financial crisis toolkit, there must come a time when the law again takes firm hold. The shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, who have sought damages from the government because its decision to eliminate dividends paid by the institutions, should be entitled to review of their claims for entire fairness under the Administrative Procedure Act – a solution that blends corporate law and administrative law. Our approach will discipline the government’s use of regulation by deal in future economic crises, and provide some ground rules for its exercise at the end of this one – without providing activist investors, whom we contend are becoming increasingly important players in regulation, with an unwarranted windfall.

Reading the briefs in the various GSE lawsuits, one feels lost in the details of the legal arguments and one thinks that the judges hearing these matters might feel the same way.  This article is an attempt to see the big picture, encompassing the administrative, corporate and takings law aspects of the dispute. However the judges decide these cases, one would assume that they will need to do something similar to come up with a result that they find just.

I also found plenty to argue with in this article.  For instance, it characterizes the Federal Housing Finance Administration as the lapdog of Treasury. (26) But there is a lot of evidence that the FHFA charted its own course away from the Executive Branch on many occasions, for instance when it rejected calls by various government officials for principal reductions for homeowners with Fannie and Freddie mortgages. Notwithstanding these disagreements, I think the article makes a real contribution in its attempt to make sense of an extraordinarily muddled situation.

Reiss on $17 Billion BoA Settlement

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Law360 quoted me in BofA Deal Shows Pragmatism At Work On Both Sides (behind a paywall). It reads in part,

Bank of America Corp.’s $16.65 billion global settlement over its alleged faulty lending practices in the run-up to the financial crisis may have made bigger waves than recent payouts by JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup Inc., but attorneys say the deal still represents the best possible outcome for the bank and for federal prosecutors, who can now put their resources elsewhere.

The settlement, inked with the U.S. Department of Justice, Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., the Federal Housing Administration and the states of California, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland and New York, released most of the significant claims related to subprime mortgage practices at Countrywide Financial Corp. and investment bank Merrill Lynch, both of which Bank of America picked up during the crisis.

Although the hefty price tag, which includes $7 billion in consumer relief payments and a record $5 billion in civil penalties, is nothing to balk at, the settlement will help Bank of America avoid a series of piecemeal deals that could stretch out over a much longer period without the prospect of closure, according to Ben Diehl of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP.

“They want to start being looked at and considered by the market, their customers and regulators based on what they are doing today, in 2014, and not have everything continue to be looked at through the perspective of alleged accountability for conduct related to the financial crisis,” said Diehl, who formerly oversaw civil prosecutions brought by the California attorney general’s mortgage fraud strike force.

And the bank isn’t the only one looking for closure, according to Diehl.

“It’s in a regulator’s interest as well to be able to look at what is currently being offered to consumers and have a dialogue with companies about that, as opposed to talking about practices that allegedly happened six or more years prior,” he said.

The government also saw great value in getting a big dollar number out to a public that has expressed frustration over a perceived lack of accountability of financial institutions for their role in the financial crisis.

“The executive branch get a big news story, particularly with the eye-poppingly large settlements that have been agreed to recently,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School, who added that the federal government also has an interest in global settlements that keep the markets running more predictably.

Offering Opinions About MBS Exposure

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The Tenth Circuit issued an opinion in MHC Mutual Conversion Fund, L.P. v. Sandler O’Neill & Partners, L.P. et al. (No. 13-1016 Aug. 1, 2014). The case concerns a 2009 stock offering by Bancorp. Bancorp was significantly exposed to mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and said as much in its securities filings. It also predicted that the market for MBS would rebound soon.

The highly readable opinion asks,

When does section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 impose liability on issuers who offer opinions about future events? The statute prohibits companies from making statements that are false or misleading. Establishing that an opinion about the future failed to pan out in the end may go some way to meeting that standard but it doesn’t go all the way. After all, few of us would label a deeply studied, carefully expressed, and earnestly held opinion about the future as false or misleading at the time it’s made simply because later events proved it wrong. To establish liability for an opinion about the future more is required. But what? Answering that question is the challenge posed by this case.

The opinion provides a clear overview of what differentiates opinion from fact in securities offering statements. The Court does this by carefully walking through three theories of opinion liability under section 11:

  1. “no one should depend on the puffery of salesmen . . . especially when the salesman’s offering a guess about the future” (5-6)
  2. “an opinion can qualify as a factual claim by the speaker regarding his current state of mind.” (7)
  3. “some subset of opinions about future events contain within them an implicit factual warranty that they rest on an objectively reasonable basis” (13)

In this case, the Court found that the plaintiffs could not establish liability under any theory.

The opinion provides a nice, clean framework for understanding section 11 liability claims.  This framework should apply to offering statements for MBS that set forth opinions about future events as well as those for any other type of security that does the same.

Risky Cash-Out Refis

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Anil Kumar of the Dallas Fed has posted Do Restrictions on Home Equity Extraction Contribute to Lower Mortgage Defaults? Evidence from a Policy Discontinuity at the Texas’ Border to SSRN.  The abstract reads

Given that excessive borrowing helped precipitate the housing crisis, a key component of a policy agenda to prevent future meltdowns is effective regulation to curb unaffordable mortgage debt. Texas is the only US state that limits home equity borrowing to 80 percent of home value. Anecdotal reports have long suggested that home equity restrictions shielded Texas homeowners from the worst of the subprime mortgage crisis. But there is, as yet, no formal empirical investigation of these restrictions’ role in curbing mortgage default. This paper is the first to empirically estimate the impact of Texas home equity restrictions on mortgage default using individual and loan level data from three different sources. The paper exploits the policy discontinuity around Texas’ interstate borders induced by the home equity restrictions to identify the causal effect of home equity extraction on mortgage default in a border discontinuity design framework. The paper finds that limits on home equity borrowing in Texas lowered the likelihood of mortgage default by about 2 percentage points with a significantly larger impact on mortgage borrowers in the bottom quartile of the credit score distribution. Estimated default hazards for mortgages within 50 to 100 miles of the Texas’ border decline sharply as one crosses into Texas. Overall, the paper finds evidence that Texas’ home equity restrictions exert a robust negative impact on mortgage default.

This is a really important paper asking a really important question.  If its findings are confirmed, it brings us back to that age-old question of paternalism in consumer financial protection: should we limit a consumer’s choice if that choice is consistently shown to have harmful effects?  I am not sure where I come down in this particular case, but I wonder if some version of Quercia et al.‘s benefit ratio could help measure the costs and benefits of such a rule. The benefit ratio compares “the percent reduction in the number of defaults to the percent reduction in the number of borrowers who would have access to [a certain type of] mortgages.” (20) I am not sure whether access to cash out refi mortgages is of the same import as purchase mortgages or even plain old refis, but the concept of the benefit ratio might still make sense in this context.

Reiss on Mortgage Insurance Proposal

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Law360 quoted me in FHFA Capital Rules Will Squeeze Older Mortgage Insurers (behind a paywall). It opens,

The Federal Housing Finance Agency on Thursday released proposals that would impose higher capital requirements on private mortgage insurers doing business with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but experts say insurers with bubble-era mortgages in their portfolios may find it tough to meet the new mandates.

The new standards will force mortgage insurers to determine the amount of cash and other liquid assets they retain to cover potential payouts using more of a risk-based formula than they have up to this point, meaning that the riskier the mortgage, the more capital will be required.

Because of that, mortgage insurers that were in business during the housing bubble era and have older loans on their books will be hit harder than insurers that have only post-financial crisis loans on their books, said Paul Hastings LLP partner Kevin Petrasic.

“The older vintage mortgages have more challenging issues than the newer mortgages,” he said.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are barred from backing mortgages where the borrower has contributed less than a 20 percent down payment without getting private mortgage insurance to make up the difference. The insurance on those mortgages absorbs any losses before Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do in the case of default, in essence putting private money before taxpayer money.

During the financial crisis, private mortgage insurers paid out billions of dollars on bad mortgages even as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac took on over $180 billion in federal bailout money in the fall of 2008, when they were put under the FHFA’s conservatorship.

However, the financial crisis also saw many of the larger mortgage insurers fail under the weight of the huge number of claims they had to cover, contributing to Fannie and Freddie’s collapses.

“The history of the mortgage insurance industry is a history of good profits during good times and catastrophic losses in bad times,” said Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss. “It seems like what the FHFA is doing is saying we don’t want the taxpayer on the hook during the next period of catastrophic losses.”

That is exactly what the FHFA says it intends with its new regulations, part of a so-called strategic plan to strengthen Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and to bring more private money into the mortgage market.