Tag Archives: housing prices

New Housing and Displacement

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Lsanburn

The Institute of Governmental Studies at UC Berkeley has issued a research brief, Housing Production, Filtering and Displacement: Untangling the Relationships. It opens,

Debate over the relative importance of subsidized and market-rate housing production in alleviating the current housing crisis continues to preoccupy policymakers, developers, and advocates. This research brief adds to the discussion by providing a nuanced analysis of the relationship between housing production, affordability, and displacement in the San Francisco Bay Area, finding that:

• At the regional level, both market-rate and subsidized housing reduce displacement pressures, but subsidized housing has over double the impact of market-rate units.

• Market-rate production is associated with higher housing cost burden for low-income households, but lower median rents in subsequent decades.

• At the local, block group level in San Francisco, neither market-rate nor subsidized housing production has the protective power they do at the regional scale, likely due to the extreme mismatch between demand and supply.

Although more detailed analysis is needed to clarify the complex relationship between development, affordability, and displacement at the local scale, this research implies the importance of not only increasing production of subsidized and market-rate housing in California’s coastal communities, but also investing in the preservation of housing affordability and stabilizing vulnerable communities. (1)

This brief takes on an important subject — the relationship between new housing and displacement — and concludes,

There is no denying the desperate need for housing in California’s coastal communities and similar housing markets around the U.S. Yet, while places like the Bay Area are suffering from ballooning housing prices that are affecting people at all income levels, the development of market-rate housing may not be the most effective tool to prevent the displacement of low-income residents from their neighborhoods, nor to increase affordability at the neighborhood scale.

Through our analysis, we found that both market-rate and subsidized housing development can reduce displacement pressures, but subsidized housing is twice as effective as market-rate development at the regional level. It is unclear, however, if subsidized housing production can have a protective effect on the neighborhood even for those not fortunate enough to live in the subsidized units themselves.

By looking at data from the region and drilling down to local case studies, we also see that the housing market dynamics and their impact on displacement operate differently at these different scales. Further research and more detailed data would be needed to better understand the mechanisms via which housing production affects neighborhood affordability and displacement pressures. We know that other neighborhood amenities such as parks, schools, and transit have a significant impact on housing demand and neighborhood change and it will take additional research to better untangle the various processes at the local level.

In overheated markets like San Francisco, addressing the displacement crisis will require aggressive preservation strategies in addition to the development of subsidized and market-rate housing, as building alone won’t protect specific vulnerable neighborhoods and households. This does not mean that we should not continue and even accelerate building. However, to help stabilize existing communities we need to look beyond housing development alone to strategies that protect tenants and help them stay in their homes. (10-11, footnote omitted)

The brief struggles with a paradox of housing — how come rents keep going up in neighborhoods with lots of new construction? The answer appears to be that the broad regional demand for housing in a market like the Bay Area or New York City overwhelms the local increase in housing supply. The new housing, then, just acts like a signal of gentrification in the neighborhoods in which it is located.

If I were to criticize this brief, I would say that it muddies the waters a bit as to what we need in hot markets like SF and NYC: first and foremost, far more housing units. In the absence of a major increase in supply, there will be intense market pressure to increase rents or convert units to condominiums. Local governments will have a really hard time overcoming that pressure and may just watch as area median income rises along with rents. New housing may not resolve the problem of large-scale displacement, but it will be hard to address displacement without it. Preservation policies should be pursued as well, but the only long-term solution is a lot more housing.

I would also say that the brief elides over the cost of building subsidized housing when it argues that subsidized housing has twice the impact of market-rate units on displacement. The question remains — at what cost? Subsidized housing is extremely expensive, often costing six figures per unit for new housing construction. The brief does not tackle the question of how many government dollars are needed to stop the displacement of one low-income household.

My bottom line: this brief begins to untangle the relationship between housing production and displacement, but there is more work to be done on this topic.

Silicon Valley’s Housing Crisis

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photo by Smitha Murthy

Drop in the Bucket?

Realtor.com quoted me in Could There Really Be Relief Ahead for Silicon Valley’s Housing Crisis? It opens,

Finally! A glimmer of hope has appeared in Silicon Valley’s housing crisis. Amid gloomy and downright terrifying stories about astronomical home prices and tighter-than-tight inventories forcing well-paid tech workers to live in vans, pay $2 million for a tear-down shack, or ponder commuting to work from Las Vegas, there seems to be some good news for a change: City Council members in Mountain View, CA, approved plans to build 10,250 new homes in the area.

Given that Mountain View has only about 32,000 homes total, this will increase its housing inventory by a whopping 32%—all purportedly within “walking distance” (possibly a bit of a long walk) of tech giant Google, which has long been lobbying on this front and will no doubt break out the Champagne once developers break ground. Sure, it may be years before these homes become a reality, but even the idea of them may have many locals (or those moving there) daring to dream. Might this new influx of housing cause home prices to drop within reasonable reach?

As logical as this renewed optimism about Silicon Valley’s housing market might seem, experts aren’t so sure home prices will budge all that much.

“This news in itself will not drive down prices much,” says David Reiss, research director at the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship at Brooklyn Law School. “While a 10,000-unit commitment is significant, Silicon Valley as a whole has about 3 million people living there.”

So if you consider the population of the entire area—many of whom would likely kill to move to Mountain View—10,000 new houses would house only 0.3% of these people. For you math-challenged, that’s less than a measly half-percent! 

And even though the number of homes may be edging upward, so are the number of people moving there.

“Silicon Valley remains a booming economy, so it’s likely that the population will continue to grow, further driving up prices,” Reiss continues.

As further evidence that more homes doesn’t necessarily lead to cheaper home prices, Florida Realtor® Cara Ameer points to another historically hot market: New York City.

“In New York, more new buildings has had no impact on housing prices or rents,” she says. If anything, the only change New Yorkers noticed is their neighborhood got a lot more cramped. The same will likely be true for picture-perfect Mountain View.

“The biggest thing people will see is increased congestion,” says Amer, “with many more residents, cars, and the need for schools and additional services.”

In fact, fears of overcrowding might even galvanize current homeowners in the area to show up en force at future City Council meetings to fight the greenlighting of additional developments—that is, unless they’re out-muscled by employee-hungry firms such as Google.

“As key businesses realize that the lack of housing is hurting their ability to recruit and retain good employees, it is possible that Mountain View’s decision is a harbinger for more pro-development decisions throughout Silicon Valley,” Reiss explains. “Current homeowners, called ‘homevoters,’ tend to make their anti-growth views known to local officials, but once the interests of local businesses focus on the lack of workforce housing, it can change the dynamics.

“These are powerful companies. The result is that those decisions can become more pro-growth than is typical for suburban communities.”

Economic Factors That Affect Housing Prices

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photo by TaxRebate.org.uk

S&P has posted a paper on Economic Factors That Affect Housing Prices. This is, of course, an important topic, albeit one that is an art as well as a science. While S&P undertook this analysis more for mortgage-backed securities investors than for anyone else, it certainly is of use to the rest of us. The paper opens,

The U.S. domestic housing market has experienced a 23% price increase since the beginning of the housing recovery in 2011. Many local housing markets are now close to or above their peak levels of 2006, which leads us to investigate whether the pace of home price appreciation (HPA) can continue at its current pace. In this paper, we (1) examine the economic factors that influence HPA and (2) forecast HPA for numerous geographic regions assuming various economic conditions over the next five years. While the aggregate national pattern in housing prices is an important reference, we need to examine housing prices at a more granular geographic level in order to understand regional housing market dynamics and learn how these are affected by local macroeconomic factors. This paper demonstrates that several economic variables are needed to predict average home price movements for each of 48 different U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).

*     *      *

Factors that influence HPA can be difficult to predict. Therefore, residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) investors frequently use a range of HPA projections to estimate their potential bond returns. With that in mind, for each MSA, we considered five separate hypothetical economic scenarios, ranging from an “Upside” forecast to an extreme “Stress 3” case. Interestingly, our Stress 3 case forecasts a 28% decline in HPI at the national level over the next five years, which corresponds roughly to the decline experienced in the last recession. Our “base case” scenario leads to forecasts at the national level of a 26% increase in HPI over five years. This represents what we believe to be the most likely economic forecast. (1-2)

S&P’s key findings include:

  • Movement in HPA is primarily influenced by up to five variables, depending on the MSA: housing affordability, changes in shadow inventory, the unemployment rate, the TED spread [a measure of distress in the credit markets], and population growth.
  • HPA in many MSAs has momentum, meaning that it depends on its level in the previous quarter of observation.
  • The mortgage rate generally appears to have little predictive power in connection with home prices.
  • Chicago, Houston, Boston, and San Francisco are projected to appreciate at a greater pace (45%, 40%, 27%, and 36%, respectively) than the 26% forecast for the nation as a whole over the next five years, and New York at a slower pace (21%). Columbus led all MSAs with a projected five-year HPA of 50%.
  • Under our most pessimistic (Stress 3) scenario, Chicago is forecast to experience a greater decline in HPI (34%) over the next five years than the nation as a whole (29%), while New York, Boston, Houston, and San Francisco are projected to experience declines that are less severe than that of the nation (19%, 3%, 17%, and 16%, respectively). Markets that have been vulnerable in the past (Las Vegas, Phoenix, and Riverside) are projected to experience the greatest five-year declines under our Stress 3 scenario (66%, 68%, and 68%). The markets that show the greatest movements are the most sensitive to the five factors and frequently show the greatest upside and downside. (2-3, emphasis in the original)

I found the first and third bullet points to be the most interesting, as many pundits weigh in on the factors that affect housing prices. It will be interesting to see if further research confirms S&P’s findings.

Principal-ed Reduction

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Torn Dollar

 

The Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center has issued a report, Principal Reduction and the GSEs: The Moment for a Big Impact Has Passed. It opens,

The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) prohibits Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs) from unilaterally reducing the principal balance of loans that they guarantee, known as principal reduction. When director Ed DeMarco established the prohibition, he was concerned that reducing principal would cost the GSEs too much, not only in setting up the systems required to implement it, but also— and to him more important — in encouraging borrowers to default in order to receive the benefit. DeMarco’s position generated significant controversy, as advocates viewed principal reduction as a critical tool for reducing borrower distress and pointed out that the program the Obama administration had put forward to provide the relief had largely eliminated the cost to the GSEs, including the moral hazard. We believe that at the time the advocates had the better side of the argument.

The FHFA is now revisiting that prohibition, though in a very different economic environment than the one faced by Director DeMarco. Home prices are up 35.4 percent since the trough in 2011, adding $5 trillion in home equity and reducing the number of underwater homeowners from a peak of 25 percent to 10 percent. This means that far fewer borrowers would likely benefit under a GSE principal reduction program today. (1, footnote omitted)

Principal reduction was highly disfavored at the start of the financial crisis as it was perceived as a sort of giveaway to irresponsible borrowers. Some academics have disputed this characterization, but it probably remains a political reality.

In any event, I think this report has the analysis of the current situation right — the time for principal reduction has passed. But it is worth considering the conditions under which it might be appropriate in the future (for that next crisis, or the one after that). The authors make four  assumptions for a politically feasible principal reduction program:

  1. borrowers must be delinquent at the time the program is announced, in order to avoid the moral hazard of encouraging borrowers to default;
  2. borrowers must be underwater;
  3. the house must be owner-occupied; and
  4. the principal reduction is in the economic interest of Fannie and Freddie.

It is worth noting that during the Great Depression, the federal government figured out ways to reduce the burden of rapidly dropping house prices on lenders and borrowers alike without resorting to principal reduction much. Borrowers benefited from longer repayment terms and lower interest rates. Below-market interest rates are similar to principal reduction because they also reduce monthly costs for borrowers. They are also politically more feasible. It would be great to have a Plan B stored away at the FHFA, the FHA and the VA that outlines a systematic response to a nation-wide drop in housing prices. It could involve principal reduction but it does not need to.

Wednesday’s Academic Roundup

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Wednesday’s Academic Roundup

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Wednesday’s Academic Roundup

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