Author Archives: David Reiss

The State of the Nation’s Sustainable Housing

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Harvard University Widener Library

The Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University released its The State of the Nation’s Housing 2015 report. I typically focus on the discussion of the mortgage market in this excellent annual report.  Here are some of the mortgage highlights:

  • mortgage delinquency rates nationwide have fallen by half since the foreclosure crisis peaked. But the remaining loans that are seriously delinquent (90 or more days past due or in foreclosure) are concentrated in relatively few neighborhoods; (6)
  • According to CoreLogic, 10.8 percent of homeowners with mortgages were still underwater on their loans in the fourth quarter of 2014; (8)
  • Despite rising prices, homebuying in most parts of the country remained more affordable in 2014 than at any time in the previous two decades except right after the housing crash. In 110 of the 113 largest metros for which at least 20 years of price data are available, payment-to-income ratios for the median-priced home were still below long-run averages. And in nearly a third of these metros, ratios were 20 percent or more below those averages. (22)

The Joint Center believes that “Looser mortgage lending criteria would help. Given that a substantial majority of US households desire to own homes, the challenge is not whether they have the will to become homeowners but whether they will have the means.” (6) I am not sure what to make of that statement.  It seems to me that the right question is whether looser mortgage lending criteria would result in long-term housing tenure for new homeowners. In other words, looser mortgage lending criteria that result in future defaults and foreclosures are of no benefit to potential homebuyers. Too few commentators tie mortgage availability to mortgage sustainability. The Joint Center should take a lead role in making that connection.

One last comment, a repetition from my past discussions of Joint Center reports. The State of the Nation’s Housing acknowledges sources of funding for the report but does not directly identify the members of its Policy Advisory Board, which provides “principal funding” for it along with the Ford Foundation. (front matter) The Board includes companies such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac which are directly discussed in the report. In the spirit of transparency, the Joint Center should identify all of its funders in the State of the Nation’s Housing report itself. Mainstream journalists would undoubtedly do this. I see no reason why an academic center should not.

Possession of Note Confers Standing to Foreclose

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Dale Whitman posted this discussion of Aurora Loan Services, LLC v. Taylor, 2015 WL 3616293 (N.Y. Ct. App., June 11, 2015) on the DIRT listserv:

There is nothing even slightly surprising about this decision, except that it sweeps away a lot of confused and irrelevant language found in decisions of the Appellate Division over the years. The court held simply holds (like nearly all courts that have considered the issue in recent years) that standing to foreclose a mortgage is conferred by having possession of the promissory note. Neither possession of the mortgage itself nor any assignment of the mortgage is necessary. “[T]he note was transferred to [the servicer] before the commencement of the foreclosure action — that is what matters.” And once a note is transferred, … “the mortgage passes as an incident to the note.” Here, there was a mortgage assignment, the validity of which the borrower attacked, but the attack made no difference; “The validity of the August 2009 assignment of the mortgage is irrelevant to [the servicer’s] standing.”

The opinion in Aurora makes it clear that prior Appellate Division statements are simply incorrect and confused when they suggest that standing would be conferred by an assignment of the mortgage without delivery of the note. See, e.g., GRP Loan LLC v. Taylor 95 A.D.3d at 1174, 945 N.Y.S.2d 336; Deutsche Bank Trust Co. v. Codio, 94 A.D.3d 1040, 1041, 943 N.Y.S.2d 545 [2d Dept 2012].) For an excellent analysis of why these decisions are wrong, see Bank of New York Mellon v. Deane, 970 N.Y.S.2d 427  (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013).

The Aurora decision implicitly rejects such cases as Erobobo, which suppose that the failure to comply with a Pooling and Servicing Agreement would somehow prevent the servicer from foreclosing. In the present case, the loan was securitized in 2006, but the note was delivered to the servicer on May 20, 2010, only four days before filing the foreclosure action. This presented no problem at all the court. If the servicer had possession at the time of the filing of the case (as it did), it had standing. (I must concede, however, that the rejection is only implicit, since the Erobobo theory was not argued in Aurora.)

If there is a weakness in the Aurora decision, it is its failure to determine whether the note was negotiable, and (assuming it was) to analyze the application UCC Article 3’s “person entitled to enforce” language. But this is not much of a criticism, since it is very likely that under New York law, the right to enforce would be transferred by delivery of the note to the servicer even if the note were nonnegotiable.

It has taken the Court of Appeals a long time to get around to cleaning up this area of the law, but its work is exactly on target.

JFK on Independence Day

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JFK profile

Here is an excerpt from Some Elements of the American Character, Independence Day Oration by John Fitzgerald Kennedy, Candidate for Congress from the 11th Congressional District, July 4, 1946:

The American character has been not only religious, idealistic, and patriotic, but because of these it has been essentially individual.

The right of the individual against the State has ever been one of our most cherished political principles.

The American Constitution has set down for all men to see the essentially Christian and American principle that there are certain rights held by every man which no government and no majority, however powerful, can deny.

Conceived in Grecian thought, strengthened by Christian morality, and stamped indelibly into American political philosophy, the right of the individual against the State is the keystone of our Constitution. Each man is free.

He is free in thought.

He is free in expression.

He is free in worship.

To us, who have been reared in the American tradition, these rights have become part of our very being. They have become so much a part of our being that most of us are prone to feel that they are rights universally recognized and universally exercised. But the sad fact is that this is not true. They were dearly won for us only a few short centuries ago and they were dearly preserved for us in the days just past. And there are large sections of the world today where these rights are denied as a matter of philosophy and as a matter of government.

We cannot assume that the struggle is ended. It is never-ending.

Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. It was the price yesterday. It is the price today, and it will ever be the price.

The characteristics of the American people have ever been a deep sense of religion, a deep sense of idealism, a deep sense of patriotism, and a deep sense of individualism.

Let us not blink the fact that the days which lie ahead of us are bitter ones.

May God grant that, at some distant date, on this day, and on this platform, the orator may be able to say that these are still the great qualities of the American character and that they have prevailed.

The Importance of Understanding G-Fees

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The Federal Housing Finance Agency has released Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Single-Family Guarantee Fees in 2014. Ok, ok, this is some really technical stuff. But it gives us a lot of important information about what goes into the cost of a home mortgage.

The executive summary opens, “The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) requires the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to submit reports to Congress annually on the guarantee fees charged by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the Enterprises).” (2, footnotes omitted) The report finds that “the average level of guarantee fees charged has increased since 2009. The guarantee fees are currently two-and-a-half times their previous level; from 2009 to 2014, average fees increased from 22 basis points to 58 basis points. From 2013 to 2014, average fees increased from 51 basis points to 58 basis points.” (2, footnote omitted)

For all of you non-experts out there, a basis point is 1/100th of a percentage point. So a guarantee fee (or g-fee in the lingo) of 58 basis points increases the interest rate paid by more than half a percentage point (for instance, from 4.5% to 5.08%).  So homeowners should want to understand why g-fees have more than doubled since 2009.

The report breaks down how g-fees gradually increased in response to Congressional and FHFA requirements, some of which are not tied to housing finance goals at all. For instance, Congress added ten basis points to fund an extension of a tax cut.

Many have argued that g-fees should be kept as low as possible in order to help out the housing market. I do not take that position, in large part because cheap credit does not necessarily lower the cost of housing; sellers may just be able to raise the price of their homes in a cheap credit environment. I also believe that the housing market and the mortgage market need to achieve some sort of equilibrium and unnaturally low g-fees will distort such an equilibrium.

The price of the g-fee should reflect the real costs of the g-fee. For instance, it should cover the cost of losses that result from borrower default. It should not be used to fund programs unrelated to housing. G-fees that are unnaturally high distort the housing finance market and make homeowners subsidize other constituencies. Federal housing finance policy tends to get screwed up if it veers too much from its fundamentals, so we should not ask too much of the g-fee.

Fannie and Freddie have been in limbo ever since they entered conservatorship in 2008. The longer they are in that limbo, the more likely it is that Congress will use them to do all sorts of things that do not relate to maintaining a liquid housing finance market. This study outlines how the g-fee has morphed over time and is a wake-up call to homeowners and policy makers alike to set Fannie and Freddie on a healthy course for the long term, starting with that obscure and technical g-fee.

The Road to Rent-To-Own

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Rent To Own Sign

TheStreet.com quoted me in Rent-to-Own Homes Can Be a Risky Option for Buyers. It opens,

Instead of shelling out thousands of dollars to rent a home each month, some landlords give their tenants the option to buy the home while they are leasing it — using the rent they’ve paid as a credit toward their mortgage downpayment.

But while rent-to-own options appear like a winning proposition for potential homeowners who have not been able to save up enough money for a down payment or lack a good credit score, these deals can be fraught with many setbacks.

Each state is governed by different laws, and some of them protect homeowners in case they fall behind on payments, said David Reiss, a law professor at Brooklyn Law School. This is a crucial point that needs to be addressed with a lawyer before the contract is signed, because a consumer could end up “losing everything” that he had paid toward the house if he loses his job, Reiss added.

“Rent-to-own transactions can be very complicated and there are fewer consumer protections available, so interested buyers should beware,” he said. “There are a lot of shady operators out there.”

The Silent Housing Crisis

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J. Ronald Terwilliger

J. Ronald Terwilliger

The J. Ronald Terwilliger Foundation for Housing America’s Families, a new entity, has issued its first white paper on the Silent Housing Crisis: A Snapshot of Current and Future Conditions. The paper covers some of the same ground as another recent Urban Institute report that I had recently blogged about (and, indeed, it is informed by the work of those UI researchers, as can be seen in the endnotes), but it raises some interesting issues of its own.

The white paper opens with a quotation from President Truman’s Statement upon signing the Housing Act of 1949, which

establishes as a national objective the achievement as soon as feasible of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family, and sets forth the policies to be followed in advancing toward that goal. These policies are thoroughly consistent with American ideals and traditions. They recognize and preserve local responsibility, and the primary role of private enterprise, in meeting the Nation’s housing needs. But they also recognize clearly the necessity for appropriate Federal aid to supplement the resources of communities and private enterprise. (3)

The white paper argues that the United States

is unprepared for the tremendous challenges that a rapidly expanding renter population will pose to the already strained housing system. Absent a comprehensive and sustained policy response, it is likely that rental cost burdens will only grow in intensity and scope, undermining the stability and dampening the hopes of millions of American families. These conditions, in turn, will exacerbate income inequality, diminish the prospects of social mobility for countless individuals, make us less competitive in the global marketplace, and ultimately hinder America’s economic growth. (6)

While the white paper has a lot to offer in diagnosing problems in the American housing sector, I was surprised to find that it failed to discuss the role of restrictive zoning in increasing the cost of housing, particularly in the vibrant communities that are the main engines of job creation. Any serious effort to address the lack of decent and affordable housing has to tackle the problem of restrictive zoning.

The Terwilliger Foundation was founded in 2014 and “seeks to recalibrate federal housing policy so that it more effectively addresses our nation’s critical affordable housing challenges and meets the housing needs of future generations. The Foundation will offer a set of practical suggestions for tax, spending, and mortgage finance reform that is responsive to the ongoing crisis in housing and the profound demographic changes now transforming America. ” (2) It is good to have another voice in the mix on these important issues. The foundation’s namesake is the Chairman of Terwilliger Pappas Multifamily Properties and is the Chairman Emeritus of Trammell Crow Residential Company, the largest multifamily developer in the U.S. for many years.

CFPB Mortgage Highlights

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Richard Cordray 2010

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued its most recent Supervisory Highlights. The CFPB is “committed to transparency in its supervisory program by sharing key findings in order to help industry limit risks to consumers and comply with Federal consumer financial law.” (3)

There were a lot of interesting highlights relating to mortgage origination and servicing, including,

  • one or more instances of failure to ensure that the HUD-1 settlement statement accurately reflects the actual settlement charges paid by the borrower.
  • at least one servicer sent borrowers loss mitigation acknowledgment notices requesting documents, sometimes dozens in number, inapplicable to their circumstances and which it did not need to evaluate the borrower for loss mitigation.
  • one or more servicers failed to send any loss mitigation acknowledgment notices. At least one servicer did not send notices after a loss mitigation processing platform malfunctioned repeatedly over a significant period of time. . . . the breakdown caused delays in converting trial modifications to permanent modifications, resulting in harm to borrowers, and may have caused other harm.
  • At least one other servicer did not send loss mitigation acknowledgment notices to borrowers who had requested payment relief on their mortgage payments. One or more servicers treated certain requests as requests for short-term payment relief instead of requests for loss mitigation under Regulation X.
  • At least one servicer sent notices of intent to foreclose to borrowers already approved for a trial modification and before the trial modification’s first payment was due without verifying whether borrowers had a pending loss mitigation plan before sending its notice. As the notice could deter borrowers from carrying out trial modifications, it likely causes substantial injury . . .
  • at least one servicer sent notices warning borrowers who were current on their loans that foreclosure would be imminent. (14-18, emphasis added)

All of these highlights are interesting because they reflect the types of problems the CFPB is finding and it thus helps the industry comply with federal law. But from a public policy perspective, the CFPB’s approach is lacking. By repeating that each failure was found at “one or more” company, a reader of these Highlights cannot determine how widespread these problems are throughout the industry. And because the Highlights do not say how many borrowers were affected by each company’s failure, it is hard to say whether these problems are isolated and technical or endemic and intentional.

Future Supervisory Highlights should include more information about the number of institutions and the number of consumers who were affected by these violations.