Delaying Trump’s Wall

photo by Jimmysalv

USA Today cited me in No, Cards Against Humanity Can’t Delay Trump’s Border Wall. It opens,

By now you’ve played a rousing game of Cards Against Humanity or at least heard the game makers want to buy land to block the construction of President Trump’s proposed border wall between the U.S. and Mexico.

The raunchy game, where people fill in the blank or complete sentences with terrible — but funny — things, pulls a holiday marketing stunt every year. Last year, Cards Against Humanity raised money to dig a hole. Before that, they mailed people boxes filled with actual bulls–t.

This year, they asked for $15 from customers to buy a large plot of land along the U.S./Mexico border for their “Cards Against Humanity Saves America” campaign. The promotion already sold out.

A marketing video implies they would separate acres of land into tiny pieces for each participant, in order to hold the government up in court for years. They want to make the push to build a wall time-consuming and expensive by hiring lawyers to keep the land tied up in court, according to the website.

The only problem is, that’s not how eminent domain works.

“This is a way for them to utilize their popularity with an audience most people assume are either indifferent toward political issues or at the very least unsophisticated about how things get done,” said Steve Silva, an eminent domain and land use attorney for Fennemore Craig law group in Reno. Silva has literally used eminent domain to build a wall.

“It’s got a lot of people literally buying into this issue of significant public importance,” he said.

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution allows the Federal Government to take property from people for “just compensation.” The amendment favors the government’s ability to take while also protecting an owner’s right to make money. Meaning, property owners must be paid fair-market value for the land.

Determining value is what usually ends up taking years in court, Silva said. TheCongre actual taking of the property takes very little time.

“It’s a two-step process: First thing is that the government has to prove it has the right to take the property,” he said. “Once it establishes that, it can take it immediately.”

The federal government need only establish the land will be used for the public, such as for a large wall owned by the government. Then it can basically take that acreage and start building the wall while fighting out the value in court.

“Congress can also just pass a special bill to take land,” Silva said. “They’ve done that for national parks before. Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted that the U.S. can just seize land summarily by occupying it and ousting the former owner.

“I suspect this sort of move would be really unpopular,” he added.

So, Cards Against Humanity may end up fighting the government for years after the wall is finished.

Even if Cards Against Humanity spreads the ownership of the land out to lots of people — say, thousands of them — the Federal Government can still take the land all at once. But now those individual owners will need to fight each other, Cards Against Humanity and the government for their just compensation.

Since people paid $15 for land, it’s likely they would establish land value and get that $15 back unless Cards Against Humanity somehow improves the land or plans to build a museum, monument or even a parking lot on that space.

But again, that would only increase its value, not slow down the wall’s construction.

In an interview on Mashable.com, law professors David Reiss and Richard Epstein argued the court would reject Cards Against Humanity’ claim over the land because they’re using it for political purposes. But attorneys Silva and Lynn Blais disagree. The game makers are using land as a protest, which should be respected by the court, so their protest shouldn’t matter in eminent domain proceedings.

Republicans and the Mortgage Interest Deduction

photo by Nick Youngson

There is a lot to hate in the Republican tax reform plan contained in the proposed Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. (click here for a summary and here for the text of the bill itself). Overall, the bill is extraordinarily regressive, heavily favoring the wealthy. There will, of course, be all sorts of compromises to this proposal as Republicans work to get it passed. But it is worth highlighting what is good about the bill as it would be a shame to lose sight of it while the sausage is being made in Congress.

The best real-estate related provision from a policy perspective is the reduction of the mortgage interest deduction. In a section of the summary with the Orwellian title, Preserving the Mortgage Interest Deduction, the Republicans outline how they will slice the deduction in half:

For so many Americans, buying a home is often the largest investment – and perhaps most important – investment they will make in their lifetime.

The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act will continue to support the American dream of homeownership by preserving the Mortgage Interest Deduction.

This ensures that hardworking families can continue to access this important tax relief as they buy, own, and maintain their home.

Policy Specifics

• Increasing the standard deduction means a simpler, fairer, and flatter tax code in which fewer taxpayers need to go through the trouble of determining whether they should itemize.

• Under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, taxpayers will still be able to deduct mortgage interest in excess of the standard deduction, in combination with other remaining itemized deductions, including charitable contributions and property taxes.

• The mortgage interest deduction would be available for interest paid on new mortgages for up to $500,000 in home acquisition indebtedness on principal residences.

• For existing mortgages, the plan allows for current law deduction on indebtedness of up to $1,000,000 and up to $100,000 in home equity to help taxpayers who may have relied on the current mortgage-interest deduction.

How This Policy Helps the American People

Preserving the home mortgage – and the deduction for state and local property taxes – will help more Americans of all income levels achieve the American dream of homeownership. (15-16)

This plan would cut the principal amount of a mortgage that would be eligible for the mortgage interest deduction from the current maximum of $1,000,000 to $500,000. Given that wealthy households generally take the mortgage interest deduction more often and get more bang for their buck from it, it is a regressive aspect of the tax code.

It is striking that a provision with such broad support such as the mortgage interest deduction is actually on the table. It will be interesting to see how special interests in the real estate industry will respond. My bet is that at the end of day the deduction will remain mostly untouched, even though this particular Republican proposal makes good policy sense.

Evolution of the CFPB?

image by Vector Open Stock

The Mortgage Bankers Association has issued a white paper, CFPB 2.0: Advancing Consumer Protection. The Executive Summary reads, in part,

In its first years, the Bureau’s regulatory expertise was largely consumed by the need to meet deadlines on specific rules required under the Dodd-Frank Act, and its supervision program took time to stand up. In its first years, the Bureau spent relatively little time providing guidance to industry on its expectations.

The combination of aggressive enforcement and the absence of regulatory guidance evolved into a regime of “regulation by enforcement.” Director Richard Cordray has argued that the Bureau’s enforcement regime provides “detailed guidance for compliance officers” and that it “would be ‘compliance malpractice’ for the industry not to take careful bearings from [consent] orders about how to comply with the law.” Unfortunately, the reality is that the Bureau’s enforcement program offers only fragmentary glimpses of how the Bureau interprets the laws and regulations it enforces.

This paper explains why authoritative guidance is still needed. Rather than seeking to provide the equivalent of “detailed guidance” through enforcement, the Bureau should simply provide detailed guidance. Such guidance can be provided in a host of forms, including advisory opinions, bulletins, no-action letters, statements of policy, and answers to frequently asked questions. In contrast to enforcement orders, such guidance can be proactive, efficient, clear and comprehensive, and can allow for stakeholder input and revision when facts and circumstances warrant. (v)

It is hard to argue with the MBA that it is better to regulate by supervision than by enforcement as that allows regulated companies to design policies that meet with their regulatory requirements. As the CFPB matures, I would expect that this would happen naturally. Indeed, the white paper acknowledges the challenges of standing up the CFPB in its first few years of existence that led to the early emphasis on enforcement.

I wonder a bit about the timing of this report. The MBA describes the CFPB as being at a “crossroads.” (19) That crossroads may refer to the Republican control of Congress and the Executive Branch, it may refer to the soon-to-be ending term of Director Cordray, or it may refer to both of those developments. So I wonder if this report is meant to provide some intellectual cover to bigger changes that would reduce the CFPB’s role as America’s consumer protection sheriff. Let’s see where the MBA comes down on those bigger changes once their floated in the coming months. Are they advocating tweaks to the way the CFPB does business or are they looking for some kind of revolution in the regulation of consumer protection?

 

FHFA’s Strategic Plan for Fannie and Freddie

The Federal Housing Finance Agency released its Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2018-2022 for public input. As discussed in yesterday’s post, Director Watt is very focused on maintaining the health of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The Strategic Plan reiterates that focus:

As conservator of the Enterprises, FHFA will also promote stability by working to preserve and conserve the Enterprises’ assets and business operations. Additionally, FHFA will encourage the Enterprises and the housing industry to adopt standards and practices that promote market and stakeholder confidence. (8)

The Plan goes into depth to describe the FHFA’s role as conservator:

The Enterprises were placed into conservatorships in September 2008 in the midst of a severe financial crisis. Their ongoing participation in the housing finance market has been an important factor in maintaining market liquidity and stability. Conservatorship permitted the U.S. Government to take greater control over management of the Enterprises and gave investors in the Enterprises’ debt and MBS confidence that the Enterprises would have the capacity to honor their financial obligations. As conservator, FHFA establishes restrictions and expectations for the Enterprises’ boards and for their managements while authorizing them to conduct the Enterprises’ day-to-day operations.

As detailed earlier, FHFA’s authority as both regulator and conservator of the Enterprises is based upon statutory mandates. FHFA, acting as regulator and conservator, must follow the mandates assigned to it by statute and the missions assigned to the Enterprises by their charters. Congress may choose to revise the statutory mandates governing the Enterprises at any time.

*      *     *

The Enterprises are also parties to PSPAs with the Treasury Department. Under the PSPAs, the Enterprises are provided U.S. taxpayer backing with explicit dollar limits. The PSPA commitment still available to Fannie Mae is $117.6 billion and the commitment still available to Freddie Mac is $140.5 billion. Additional draws would reduce these commitments, and dividend payments do not replenish or increase the commitments under the terms of the PSPAs. Starting in 2013, the PSPAs provided each Enterprise with a capital buffer of $3 billion to protect each Enterprise against making additional draws of taxpayer support in the event of an operating loss in any quarter, and the PSPAs provide mandated declines of $600 million each year to these capital buffers. On January 1, 2017, each Enterprise’s capital buffer declined to $600 million and the capital buffer is scheduled to decline to zero on January 1, 2018.

FHFA continues to encourage Congress to complete the important work of housing finance reform. FHFA has reiterated the urgency of reform and that it is up to Congress to determine what future, if any, the Enterprises will have in the future housing finance system. (16-17)

Reading between the lines, I see the FHFA under Watt doing whatever it has to in order to maintain stability and liquidity in the mortgage markets. If Congress does not act, if the Treasury does not act, I think that Director Watt will go it alone and do what it takes to maintain Fannie and Freddie’s reputation with mortgage lenders and MBS investors.

Watt’s Happening with Fannie and Freddie?

FHFA Director Watt

Federal Housing Finance Agency Director Watt testified before the House Committee on Financial Services today and gave a good overview of the decade-long conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie.  He also gave some sense of the urgency of coming up with at least a stopgap measure before the two companies’ capital buffer drops to zero at the end of the year pursuant to the terms of the Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (PSPAs) that govern the two companies’ relationship with the Treasury. He stated that it would

be a serious misconception for members of this Committee, or for anyone else, to consider any actions FHFA may take as conservator to avoid additional draws of taxpayer support either as interference with the prerogatives of Congress, as an effort to influence the outcome of housing finance reform, or as a step toward recap and release. FHFA’s actions would be taken solely to avoid a draw during conservatorship.

This signifies to me that he is planning on doing something other than reducing the capital buffer to $0.  As far as I can tell, Watt is playing a game of chicken with Congress — if you do not act, I will.

It is not clear to me clear how much authority Watt has or thinks he has to change the rules relating to the capital buffer. Does he think that he could act inconsistent with the PSPAa and withhold capital?  I have not seen a legal argument that says he could.  Is he willing to do it and be sued by Treasury?  These are speculative questions, but I do think that he has laid the groundwork for taking action if Congress and Treasury do not.

It does not seem to me that he was much wiggle room according to the terms of the PSPAs themselves, except perhaps to delay making the net worth sweep at the end of this year by converting it to an annual sweep or by some other mechanism.  That will be a short-term fix.

Given his strong language — “FHFA’s actions would be taken solely to avoid a draw during conservatorship” — I think he might be prepared to take an action that is inconsistent with the plain language of the PSPAs in order to act in a way that he thinks is consistent with his duty as the conservator.  This is less risky than it sounds because the only party that would seem to have standing to sue would be the Treasury, the counter-party to the PSPAs.  One could imagine that the Treasury would prefer to negotiate a response with the FHFA or await Watt’s departure rather than to have a judge decide the issue.  One could also imagine that Treasury would go along with the FHFA without explicitly condoning its actions, particularly if its actions soothed a turbulent market for Fannie and Freddie mortgage-backed securities.

Watt has consistently signaled that he will act if no other responsible party does and he emphasized that again today.

The CFPB Makes Its Case

CFPB Director Cordray

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau released its Semi-Annual Report. Given that the Bureau is under attack by Republicans in Congress and in the Trump Administration, one can read this as a defense (a strong defense, I might editorialize) for the work that the Bureau has done on behalf of consumers. The core of the Bureau’s argument is that it levels the playing field for consumers when they deal with financial services companies:

The Bureau has continued to expand its efforts to serve and protect consumers in the financial marketplace. The Bureau seeks to serve as a resource on the macro level, by writing clear rules of the road and enforcing consumer financial protection laws in ways that improve the consumer financial marketplace, and on the micro level, by helping individual consumers get responses to their complaints about issues with financial products and services. While the various divisions of the Bureau play different roles in carrying out the Bureau’s mission, they all work together to protect and educate consumers, help level the playing field for participants, and fulfill the Bureau’s statutory obligations and mission under the Dodd-Frank Act. In all of its work, the Bureau strives to act in ways that are fair, reasonable, and transparent.

*     *     *

When Federal consumer financial protection law is violated, the Bureau’s Supervision, Enforcement, and Fair Lending Division are committed to holding the responsible parties accountable. In the six months covered by this report, our supervisory actions resulted in financial institutions providing approximately $6.2 million in redress to over 16,549 consumers. During that timeframe, we also have announced enforcement actions that resulted in orders for approximately $200 million in total relief for consumers who fell victim to various violations of consumer financial protection laws, along with over $43 million in civil money penalties. We brought numerous enforcement actions for various violations of the Dodd-Frank Act and other laws, including actions against Mastercard and UniRush for breakdowns that left tens of thousands of economically vulnerable RushCard users unable to access their own money to pay for basic necessities; two separate actions against CitiFinancial and CitiMortgage for keeping consumers in the dark about options to avoid foreclosure; and against three reverse mortgage companies for deceptive advertisements, including claiming that consumers who obtained reverse mortgages could not lose their homes. We also brought two separate actions against credit reporting agencies Equifax and TransUnion for deceiving consumers about the usefulness and actual cost of credit scores they sold to consumers, and for luring consumers into costly recurring payments for credit products; and an action against creditor reporting agency Experian for deceiving consumers about the usefulness of credit scores it sold to consumers. The Bureau also continued to develop and refine its nationwide supervisory program for depository and nondepository financial institutions, through which those institutions are examined for compliance with Federal consumer financial protection law. (10-11, footnotes omitted)

Anyone who was around during the late 1990s and early 2000s would know that consumers are much better off with the Bureau than without it. This report provides some of the reasons why that is the case.

The Financial Meltdown and Consumer Protection

photo by HTO

Larry Kirsch and Gregory D. Squires have published Meltdown: The Financial Crisis, Consumer Protection, and the Road Forward. According to the promotional material,

Meltdown reveals how the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was able to curb important unsafe and unfair practices that led to the recent financial crisis. In interviews with key government, industry, and advocacy groups along with deep archival research, Kirsch and Squires show where the CFPB was able to overcome many abusive practices, where it was less able to do so, and why.

Open for business in 2011, the CFPB was Congress’s response to the financial catastrophe that shattered millions of middle-class and lower-income households and threatened the stability of the global economy. But only a few years later, with U.S. economic conditions on a path to recovery, there are already disturbing signs of the (re)emergence of the high-risk, high-reward credit practices that the CFPB was designed to curb. This book profiles how the Bureau has attempted to stop abusive and discriminatory lending practices in the mortgage and automobile lending sectors and documents the multilayered challenges faced by an untested new regulatory agency in its efforts to transform the broken—but lucrative—business practices of the financial services industry.

Authors Kirsch and Squires raise the question of whether the consumer protection approach to financial services reform will succeed over the long term in light of political and business efforts to scuttle it. Case studies of mortgage and automobile lending reforms highlight the key contextual and structural conditions that explain the CFPB’s ability to transform financial service industry business models and practices. Meltdown: The Financial Crisis, Consumer Protection, and the Road Forward is essential reading for a wide audience, including anyone involved in the provision of financial services, staff of financial services and consumer protection regulatory agencies, and fair lending and consumer protection advocates. Its accessible presentation of financial information will also serve students and general readers.

Features

  • Presents the first comprehensive examination of the CFPB that identifies its successes during its first five years of operation and addresses the challenges the bureau now faces
  • Exposes the alarming possibility that as the economy recovers, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s efforts to protect consumers could be derailed by political and industry pressure
  • Offers provisional assessment of the effectiveness of the CFPB and consumer protection regulation
  • Gives readers unique access to insightful perspectives via on-the-record interviews with a cross-section of stakeholders, ranging from Richard Cordray (director of the CFPB) to public policy leaders, congressional staffers, advocates, scholars, and members of the press
  • Documents the historical and analytic narrative with more than 40 pages of end notes that will assist scholars, students, and practitioners

I would not describe the book as objective, given that Senator Elizabeth Warren wrote the forward and the President Obama’s point man on Dodd-Frank, Michael Barr, wrote the afterward. Indeed, it reads more like a panegyric. Nonetheless, the book has a lot to offer to scholars of the CFPB who are interested in hearing from the people who helped to stand up the Bureau.