The Future of Homeownership

Brooklyn Law Notes - Fall 2018I wrote a short article, Restoring The American Dream, for Brooklyn Law Notes. It is based on my forthcoming book on federal housing finance policy. It opens,

Two movie scenes can bookend the last hundred years of housing finance. In Frank Capra’s It’s a Wonderful Life (1946), George Bailey speaks to panicked depositors who are demanding their money back from Bailey Bros. Building and Loan. This tiny thrift in the little town of Bedford Falls had closed its doors after it had to repay a large loan and temporarily ran out of money to return to its depositors. George tells them:

You’re thinking of this place all wrong. As if I had the money back in a safe. The money’s not here. Your money’s in Joe’s house…right next to yours. And in the Kennedy house, and Mrs. Macklin’s house, and a hundred others. Why, you’re lending them the money to build, and then, they’re going to pay it back to you as best they can.

Local lenders lent locally, and local conditions caused local problems. And in the early 20th century, that was largely how Americans bought homes.

In Adam McKay’s movie The Big Short (2015), the character Jared Vennett is based on Greg Lippmann, a former Deutsche Bank trader who made well over a billion dollars for his employer betting against subprime mortgages before the market collapse. Vennett demonstrates with a set of stacked wooden blocks how the modern housing finance market has been built on a shaky foundation:

This is a basic mortgage bond. The original ones were simple, thousands of AAA mortgages bundled together and sold with a guarantee from the U.S. government. But the modern-day ones are private and are made up of layers of tranches, with the AAA highest-rated getting paid first and the lowest, B-rated getting paid last and taking on defaults first.

Obviously if you’re buying B-levels you can get paid more. Hey, they’re risky, so sometimes they fail…

Somewhere along the line these B and BB level tranches went from risky to dog shit. I’m talking rock-bottom FICO scores, no income verification, adjustable rates…Dog shit. Default rates are already up from 1 to 4 percent. If they rise to 8 percent—and they will—a lot of these BBBs are going to zero.

After the whole set of blocks comes crashing down, someone watching Vennett’s presentation asks, “What’s that?” He responds, “That is America’s housing market.” Global lenders lent globally, and global conditions caused global and local problems. And in the early 21st century, that was largely how Americans bought homes.

 

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The Mortgage Servicing Collaborative

The Urban institute’s Laurie Goodman et al. have announced The Mortgage Servicing Collaborative:

All mortgage market participants share the same goal: successful homeownership. Failure to achieve that goal hurts not only consumers and neighborhoods, but investors, insurers, guarantors, and servicers. Successful homeownership hinges on several factors. Consumers need access to a range of mortgage products when buying a home and need effective mortgage servicing. Servicing is the critical work that begins after the mortgage loan is closed and includes collecting and transferring mortgage payments from borrowers to investors, managing escrow, assisting borrowers who fall behind on their payments, and administering the foreclosure process. If closing the loan is the birth of the mortgage, servicing is its day-to-day care.

Despite its importance, mortgage servicing is frequently overlooked in major policy conversations, including the housing finance reform debate. That is a mistake. The servicing industry has changed dramatically since the 2008 mortgage default and foreclosure crisis and subsequent Great Recession. Overlooking servicing while implementing changes to the housing finance system has resulted in some unintended and unwanted consequences, including significant increases in the cost of servicing, a suboptimal servicing system, reduced access to credit for consumers, and an exodus from the industry by depository servicers.

To address this policy oversight, the Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center (HFPC) has convened the Mortgage Servicing Collaborative (MSC) to elevate the mortgage servicing discussion and facilitate evidence-based policymaking by bringing more data and evidence to the table. The MSC has convened key industry stakeholders—lenders, servicers, consumer groups, civil rights leaders, researchers, and government—and tasked them with developing a common understanding of the biggest issues in mortgage servicing, their implications, and possible solutions and policy options that can advance the debate. And with the mortgage industry no longer operating in crisis mode, we believe now is the right time for this effort.

In this brief, the first in a series prepared by HFPC researchers with the collaboration of the MSC, we review how we arrived at the present state of affairs in mortgage servicing and explain why it is important to institute mortgage servicing reforms now. (1-2, footnote omitted)

The report provides a short but useful history of servicing, which at the best of times is a dark corner of the mortgage market. It also provides an overview of the risks inherent in a poorly constructed system of servicing for consumers and other players in that market. The Collaborative will certainly be taking deeper dives into these risks in future releases.

As with much of the Housing Finance Policy Center’s work, this collaborative is very forward-looking. Hopefully, it will help us prepare for the next downturn in the housing market.

A Shortage of Short Sales

Calvin Zhang of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has posted A Shortage of Short Sales: Explaining the Under-Utilization of a Foreclosure Alternative to SSRN. The abstract reads,

The Great Recession led to widespread mortgage defaults, with borrowers resorting to both foreclosures and short sales to resolve their defaults. I first quantify the economic impact of foreclosures relative to short sales by comparing the home price implications of both. After accounting for omitted variable bias, I find that homes selling as a short sale transact at 8.5% higher prices on average than those that sell after foreclosure. Short sales also exert smaller negative externalities than foreclosures, with one short sale decreasing nearby property values by one percentage point less than a foreclosure. So why weren’t short sales more prevalent? These home-price benefits did not increase the prevalence of short sales because free rents during foreclosures caused more borrowers to select foreclosures, even though higher advances led servicers to prefer more short sales. In states with longer foreclosure timelines, the benefits from foreclosures increased for borrowers, so short sales were less utilized. I find that one standard deviation increase in the average length of the foreclosure process decreased the short sale share by 0.35-0.45 standard deviation. My results suggest that policies that increase the relative attractiveness of short sales could help stabilize distressed housing markets.

The paper highlights the importance of aligning incentives in the mortgage market among lenders, investors, servicers and borrowers. Zhang makes this clear in his conclusion:

While these individual results seem small in magnitude, the total economic impact is big because of how large the real estate market is. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that having 5% more short sales than foreclosures would have saved up to $5.8 billion in housing wealth between 2007 and 2011. Thus, there needs to be more incentives for short sales to be done. The government and GSEs already began encouraging short sales by offering programs like HAFA [Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives] starting in 2009 to increase the benefits of short sales for both the borrower and the servicer, but more could be done such as decreasing foreclosure timelines. If we can continue to increase the incentives to do short sales so that they become more popular than foreclosures, future housing downturns may not be as extreme or last as long. (29)

The Financial Meltdown and Consumer Protection

photo by HTO

Larry Kirsch and Gregory D. Squires have published Meltdown: The Financial Crisis, Consumer Protection, and the Road Forward. According to the promotional material,

Meltdown reveals how the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was able to curb important unsafe and unfair practices that led to the recent financial crisis. In interviews with key government, industry, and advocacy groups along with deep archival research, Kirsch and Squires show where the CFPB was able to overcome many abusive practices, where it was less able to do so, and why.

Open for business in 2011, the CFPB was Congress’s response to the financial catastrophe that shattered millions of middle-class and lower-income households and threatened the stability of the global economy. But only a few years later, with U.S. economic conditions on a path to recovery, there are already disturbing signs of the (re)emergence of the high-risk, high-reward credit practices that the CFPB was designed to curb. This book profiles how the Bureau has attempted to stop abusive and discriminatory lending practices in the mortgage and automobile lending sectors and documents the multilayered challenges faced by an untested new regulatory agency in its efforts to transform the broken—but lucrative—business practices of the financial services industry.

Authors Kirsch and Squires raise the question of whether the consumer protection approach to financial services reform will succeed over the long term in light of political and business efforts to scuttle it. Case studies of mortgage and automobile lending reforms highlight the key contextual and structural conditions that explain the CFPB’s ability to transform financial service industry business models and practices. Meltdown: The Financial Crisis, Consumer Protection, and the Road Forward is essential reading for a wide audience, including anyone involved in the provision of financial services, staff of financial services and consumer protection regulatory agencies, and fair lending and consumer protection advocates. Its accessible presentation of financial information will also serve students and general readers.

Features

  • Presents the first comprehensive examination of the CFPB that identifies its successes during its first five years of operation and addresses the challenges the bureau now faces
  • Exposes the alarming possibility that as the economy recovers, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s efforts to protect consumers could be derailed by political and industry pressure
  • Offers provisional assessment of the effectiveness of the CFPB and consumer protection regulation
  • Gives readers unique access to insightful perspectives via on-the-record interviews with a cross-section of stakeholders, ranging from Richard Cordray (director of the CFPB) to public policy leaders, congressional staffers, advocates, scholars, and members of the press
  • Documents the historical and analytic narrative with more than 40 pages of end notes that will assist scholars, students, and practitioners

I would not describe the book as objective, given that Senator Elizabeth Warren wrote the forward and the President Obama’s point man on Dodd-Frank, Michael Barr, wrote the afterward. Indeed, it reads more like a panegyric. Nonetheless, the book has a lot to offer to scholars of the CFPB who are interested in hearing from the people who helped to stand up the Bureau.

The Lowdown on Blockchain & Real Estate

There is a lot of hype out there about the impact that blockchain technology will have on the real estate industry. There is no doubt that blockchain will be revolutionary over the long term, but its impact in the short term is much more limited. Spencer Compton and Diane Schottenstein have written an article for Law360 (unfortunately, behind a paywall), How Blockchain Can Be Applied To Real Estate Law, that provides a nice overview of where blockchain stands today in the real estate industry. It opens,

Real estate transactions are steeped in traditions that have hardly changed over hundreds of years. Today, as computer-based property recording systems are prevalent in our cities but roll out at a snail’s pace in rural areas (often hindered by strained municipal budgets), and e-signatures are little used (due to legitimate fears of fraud), arguably the real estate closing process has lagged in its use of computer aided technology. Yet other aspects of real estate ownership have been transformed by the internet: smart home technology to remotely control heating and lighting and monitor security; Airbnb which increases the value of real estate ownership and disrupts the hotel industry; and the real estate brokerage community’s design/photographic/communication technology to list and virtually show properties. Now add to our brave new world blockchain, a cloud-based decentralized ledger system that could offer speed, economy and improved security for real estate transactions. Will the real estate transaction industry avoid or embrace it?

What is blockchain?

Blockchain is best-known as the technology behind bitcoin, however bitcoin is not blockchain. Bitcoin is an implementation of blockchain technology. Blockchain is a data structure that allows for a digital ledger of transactions to be shared among a distributed network of computers. It uses cryptography to allow each participant on the network to manipulate the ledger in a secure way without the need for a central authority such as a bank or trade association. Using algorithms, the system can verify if a transaction will be approved and added to the blockchain and once it is on the blockchain it is extremely difficult to change or remove that transaction. A blockchain can be an open system or a system restricted to permissive users. There can be private blockchains (for ownership records or business transactions, for instance) and public blockchains (for public municipal data, real estate records etc.). Funds can be transferred by wires automatically authorized by the blockchain or via bitcoin or other virtual currency. Transparent, secure, frictionless payment is touted as one of blockchain’s many benefits.

The article goes on to answer the following questions:

  • How does a blockchain differ from a record kept by a financing institution or a government agency?
  • How is a blockchain transaction more secure than any other transaction?
  • How widely is blockchain used?
  • How blockchain is being used to record real property instruments?
  • How might blockchain affect the role of title insurance companies?

If the impact of blockchain on the real estate industry has mystified you, this primer will give you an overview of where things stand today and maybe tomorrow too.

 

Patenaude To Help Lead HUD

photo: J. Ronald Terwilliger Foundation for Housing America’s Families

Pamela Hughes Patenaude

Realtor.com quoted me in ‘Ultimate Housing Insider’: Pam Patenaude Nominated as HUD Deputy Secretary. It reads,

Pam Patenaude was nominated by President Donald Trump to become deputy secretary of Housing and Urban Development, according to a White House statement released on Friday. The move has been met with resounding applause by industry insiders who think her background could serve as the perfect complement to HUD Secretary Ben Carson, who entered his role without experience in housing or government.

Patenaude, currently president of the J. Ronald Terwilliger Foundation for America’s Families, was formerly an assistant secretary for community, planning, and development at HUD, under President George W. Bush. She also served as director of housing policy at the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Housing Commission. Patenaude’s nomination must be confirmed by the Senate.

“She’s the ultimate housing insider,” says David Reiss, research director for the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship at Brooklyn Law School. “She’s connected and has a lot of respect within the housing field.”

Real estate industry organizations hailed the choice, including the National Association of Realtors®. In a statement, NAR President William E. Brown said, “Pam’s extensive and strong background in real estate and housing will be an asset. … Pam is an ideal candidate for the position; she understands the issues that impact the industry.”

David Stevens, president and CEO of the Mortgage Bankers Association, also offered his thumbs-up.

“Pam is an exceptional choice for the position,” Stevens said in a statement. “Personally, I have worked with her for a number of years and she is exactly the kind of leader who will help support the secretary and also address the critical issues ahead for HUD. She has a well-informed understanding of the agency, and essential technical knowledge of the real-estate finance industry. I would encourage the Senate to move swiftly in confirming her nomination.”

This depth of experience, Reiss says, serves as the perfect foil for Carson. As HUD secretary, Carson serves as the public face of this department, while Patenaude will handle the daily duties of running the organization.

“The big criticism of Carson is that he has no experience or background in housing,” Reiss continues. “So to have a No. 2 who’s really responsible for the day-to-day responsibility of the agency is a plus.”

What Patenaude’s appointment could mean for housing

In November, rumors were swirling that the Trump administration was considering Patenaude as HUD secretary, but then Carson got the nod instead, and then the Trump administration released a budget calling for $6 billion in cuts to the department. Patenaude’s nomination has many hopeful that HUD’s core initiatives—like affordable housing—will remain a priority.

“Trump’s ‘skinny budget’ decimated HUD,” Reiss continues. “Trump has made lots of appointments who’ve expressly said they want to destroy the agencies that they’re running. But Patenaude is an insider with HUD. So my hope is she sees the value it provides, and be an advocate for many HUD programs.”

Is $321 Billion The Right Amount?

Whipping Post and Stocks

The Boston Consulting Group has released its Global Risk 2017 report, Staying the Course in Banking. Buried in the report is Boston Consulting’s calculation of the amount of penalties paid by banks since the financial crisis:  $321,000,000,000. The report states,

Strict regulatory enforcement has now been place for several years, with cumulative financial penalties of about $321 billion assessed since the 2007-2008 financial crisis through the end of 2016.

About $42 billion in fines were assessed in 2016 alone, levied on the basis of past behavior. While postcrisis regulatory fines and penalties appear to have stabilized a lower level in 2105, with US regulators remaining the most active, we expect fines and penalties by regulators in Europe and Asia to rise in coming years.

As conduct-based regulations evolve, fines and penalties, along with related legal and litigation expenses, will remain a cost of doing business.  Managing these costs will continue to e a major task for banks. They will have to create a strong non-financial framework around the first, second, and third lines of defense — business units, independent risk function, and internal audit — to avoid continued fallout from past behavior.

*     *     *

[C]onduct risk and the prevention of financial crime remain high on regulators’ agendas. (16-17, references omitted)

Readers of this blog know that I have called for aggressive enforcement of wrongdoing in the consumer financial services sector. But I have also have trouble figuring out if the penalties assessed were properly scaled to the wrongdoing. Now that ten and eleven figure settlements have become routine, we may have forgotten that they were unheard of before the financial crisis. Many of these settlements were negotiated by federal prosecutors who were constrained only by their own judgment and the possibility that a defendant would call the government’s bluff and go to trial.  Now that post-crisis litigation is winding down, it makes sense to study how to make sure that the financial penalty fits the financial crime.