Reiss on Privatization of Fannie and Freddie

BadCredit.org profiled an article of mine in Brooklaw Professor Pushes for Privatization of Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac. The profile opens,

Since the end of the Great Recession, policymakers, academics and economists have been struggling with a very difficult question — what should we do with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac? Should the government continue its role in providing mortgage credit to millions of American?

Fordham University Associate Professor of Law and Ethics Brent J. Horton made a proposal in his forthcoming paper “For the Protection of Investors and the Public: Why Fannie Mae’s Mortgage-Backed Securities Should Be Subject to the Disclosure Requirements of the Securities Act of 1933“:

“The best way to reduce risk taking at Fannie Mae is to subject its MBS offerings to the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of 1933,” Horton writes.

However, Brooklyn Law School Professor of Law David Reiss believes “the problems inherent in Fannie Mae’s structure are greater than those that increased disclosure can address.”

In his response, titled “Who Should Be Providing Mortgage Credit to American Households?” Reiss points to increased privatization as one way to address the question of what to do with Fannie Mae and Freddi Mac.

Reiss on Who Should Be Providing Mortgage Credit to American Households?

I have posted a short Response, Who Should Be Providing Mortgage Credit to American Households?, to SSRN (as well as to BePress).  The abstract reads,

Who should be providing mortgage credit to American households? Given that the residential mortgage market is a ten-trillion-dollar one, the answer we come up with had better be right, or we may suffer another brutal financial crisis sooner than we would like. Indeed, the stakes are as high as they were in the Great Depression when the foundation of our current system was first laid down. Unfortunately, the housing finance experts of the 1930s seemed to have a greater clarity of purpose when designing their housing finance system. Part of the problem today is that debates over the housing finance system have been muddled by broader ideological battles and entrenched special interests, as well as by plain old inertia and the fear of change. It is worth taking a step back to evaluate the full range of options available to us, as the course we decide upon will shape the housing market for generations to come. This is a Response to Brent Horton, For the Protection of Investors and the Public: Why Fannie Mae’s Mortgage-Backed Securities Should Be Subject to the Disclosure Requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, 89 Tulane L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2014-2015).

Reiss on The Future of the Private Label Securities Market

I have posted The Future of the Private Label Securities Market to SSRN (as well as to BePress). I wrote this in response to the Department of Treasury’s request for input on this topic. The abstract reads,

The PLS market, like all markets, cycles from greed to fear, from boom to bust. The mortgage market is still in the fear part of the cycle and recent government interventions in it have, undoubtedly, added to that fear. In recent days, there has been a lot of industry pushback against the government’s approach, including threats to pull out of various sectors. But the government should not chart its course based on today’s news reports. Rather, it should identify fundamentals and stick to them. In particular, its regulatory approach should reflect an attempt to align incentives of market actors with government policies regarding appropriate underwriting and sustainable access to credit. The market will adapt to these constraints. These constraints should then help the market remain healthy throughout the entire business cycle.

Good Data Makes Good Mortgages

The CFPB issued a proposed rule about increasing the quality of information that lenders report about mortgage applications. The press release regarding the proposed rule states that these changes will ease the reporting burden on lenders, and that may very well be true. But the contested part of these rules relate to the type of information to be collected:

  • Improving market information: In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress directed the Bureau to update HMDA regulations by having lenders report specific new information that could help identify potential discriminatory lending practices and other issues in the marketplace. This new information includes, for example: the property value; term of the loan; total points and fees; the duration of any teaser or introductory interest rates; and the applicant’s or borrower’s age and credit score.
  • Monitoring access to credit: The Bureau is proposing that financial institutions provide more information about underwriting and pricing, such as an applicant’s debt-to-income ratio, the interest rate of the loan, and the total discount points charged for the loan. This information would help regulators determine how the Ability-to-Repay rule is impacting the market, and would also help the Bureau monitor developments in specific markets such as multi-family housing, affordable housing, and manufactured housing. The proposed rule would also require that covered lenders report, with some exceptions, all loans related to dwellings, including reverse mortgages and open-end lines of credit.

Lenders are not going to like this, because this new information may be used against them in a variety of ways — in Fair Housing lawsuits, by the CFPB in enforcement actions, by members of Congress seeking to increase credit access to various constituencies.

I like this because regulators and academic researchers have been hamstrung by limited and stale data on the fast-moving mortgage market. The mortgage market is often driven by the short-term profit-seeking of private actors and by special interests pushing their agendas with the Executive and Legislative Branches.  Good data can inform good decision-making that can ensure that the housing finance system is vibrant and provides sustainable credit for households over the long term.

Comments on the proposed rule are due by October 22, 2014.

 

Financial Literacy Rehash

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau released its second Financial Literacy Annual Report. In blogging about last year’s report, I noted that the CFPB assumed that financial education worked more than research had shown it to work. Unfortunately, this report seems to be mostly a rehash (in many cases an extensive word-for-word rehash) of last year’s (pace Senator Walsh). From what I could tell, the only significant new financial education research that the CFPB has undertaken since last year is its “rules of thumb” project.

“Rules of thumb” are a decision-making and education technique that uses practical, easily-implemented guidelines for making decisions. Existing research has found rules of thumb to be a successful technique for improving decision making in many areas, and more successful than comprehensive education in some instances. Thus, rules of thumb could be a cost-effective method to improve consumer decision making. However, little research exists examining the effectiveness of rules of thumb for financial decision making.

Accordingly, in 2014 the Bureau began a research project to study the effectiveness of rules-of-thumb-based approaches aimed at helping consumers decrease their credit card debt. Rules-of-thumb-based education may be particularly appropriate for improving consumer literacy about credit card use, as credit card decisions are repetitive and frequent. We have finished the first phase of the project to understand how to create rules of thumb, when they are most useful, and how they can be implemented to ensure maximum success. The second phase of the project will test a set of rules of thumb aimed at helping consumers decrease their credit card debt. When we release the final results, which are expected in 2015, we expect that this project will increase knowledge of the efficacy of a rules-of-thumb approach to financial education both within the CFPB and among a range of external stakeholders who serve consumers. (72-73, footnote omitted)

This seems like a great project for the CFPB to undertake. But the rest of its efforts to improve its understanding about the efficacy of financial literacy leaves me under, underwhelmed, particularly because the rule-of-thumb project is limited to just one consumer financial product, credit cards.

Armed, Unarmed or Harmed by Knowledge?

I posted Armed, Unarmed or Harmed by Knowledge? A Comment on the FHA’s Housing Counseling Pilot Program to SSRN (and to BePress). The abstract reads,

The FHA has requested input on its Homeowners Armed with Knowledge (HAWK) for New Homebuyers pilot program. This comment letter argues that housing counseling is not a proven solution to the problem it is meant to solve, excessive defaults by FHA borrowers. HAWK is a traditional housing counseling program but the scholarly literature casts into doubt the efficacy of such programs. It would be better to take time to research which counseling strategies, if any, are proven to be effective. This is true for the FHA but also for other government agencies, such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, that have devoted significant resources to unproven financial counseling programs.

This comment was submitted to the FHA in response to its request for input on its Homeowners Armed with Knowledge (HAWK) for New Homebuyers program.

Regular readers of this blog will be familiar with my take on this topic as the comment is adapted from blog posts that have addressed various financial education topics.

Servicer Safety & Soundness and Consumer Protection

The FHFA’s Inspector General issued an audit, FHFA Actions to Manage Enterprise Risks from Nonbank Servicers Specializing in Troubled Mortgages. The audit identified two major risks in the current environment:

  • Using short-term financing to buy servicing rights for troubled mortgage loans that may only begin to pay out after long-term work to resolve their difficulties. This practice can jeopardize the companies’ operations and also the Enterprises’ timely payment guarantees and reputation for loans they back; and
  • Assuming responsibilities for servicing large volumes of mortgage loans that may be beyond what their infrastructures can handle. For example, of the 30 largest mortgage servicers, those that were not banks held a 17% share of the mortgage servicing market at the end of 2013, up from 9% at the end of 2012, and 6% at the end of 2011. This rise in nonbank special servicers has been accompanied by consumer complaints, lawsuits, and other regulatory actions as the servicers’ workload outstrips their processing capacity. (1-2)

The audit notes that “nonbank special servicers do not have a prudential safety and soundness regulator at the federal level for their mortgage servicing operations.” (6)

I think the important story here is more about consumer protection than it is about safety and soundness regulation. That is not to say that the Inspector General’s audit ignored consumer protection. Indeed, it it does spend a significant amount of time addressing that topic, noting that other federal regulators such as the CFPB have also zeroed in on the impact that non-bank servicers have on consumers.

But the safety and soundness risks may a bit overblown. A significant number of consumers, on the other hand, continue to be treated poorly, poorly, poorly by servicers.