Tag Archives: Federal Housing Administration

Are The Stars Aligning For Fannie And Freddie Reform?

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Law360 published my op ed, Are The Stars Aligning For Fannie And Freddie Reform? It reads,

There has been a lot of talk of the closed-door discussions in the Senate about a reform plan for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two mammoth housing finance government-sponsored enterprises. There has long been a bipartisan push to get the two entities out of their conservatorships with some kind of permanent reform plan in place, but the stars never aligned properly. There was resistance on the right because of a concern about the increasing nationalization of the mortgage market and there was resistance on the left because of a concern that housing affordability would be unsupported in a new system. It looks like the leader of that right wing, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling, R-Texas, has indicated that he is willing to compromise in order to create a “sustainable housing finance system.” The question now is whether those on the left are also willing to compromise in order to put that system on a firm footing for the 21st century.

In a speech at the National Association of Realtors, Hensarling set forth a set of principles that he would be guided by:

  • Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac must be wound down and their charters repealed;
  • Securitizers need strong bank-like capital and community financial institutions must be able to compete on a level playing field;
  • Any new government affordable housing program needs to at least be on budget, be results-based and target actual homebuyers for the purpose of buying a home they can actually afford to keep;
  • The Federal Housing Administration must return to its traditional role of serving the first-time homebuyer and low- and moderate-income individuals.

I am not yet sure that all of the stars are now aligned for Congress to pass a GSE reform bill. But Hensarling’s change of heart is a welcome development for those of us who worry about some kind of slow-moving train wreck in our housing finance system. That system has been in limbo for nearly a decade since Fannie and Freddie were placed in conservatorship, with no end in sight for so long. Ten years is an awfully long time for employees, regulators and other stakeholders to play it by ear in a mortgage market measured in the trillions of dollars.

Even with a broad consensus on the need for (or even just the practical reality of) a federal role in housing finance, there are a lot of details that still need to be worked out. Should Fannie and Freddie be replaced with many mortgage-backed securities issuers whose securities are guaranteed by some arm of the federal government? Or should Fannie and Freddie become lender-owned mutual insurance entities with a government guarantee of the two companies? These are just two of the many options that have been proposed over the last 10 years.

Two housing finance reform leaders, Sens. Bob Corker, R-Tenn., and Mark Warner, D-Va., appear to favor some version of the former while Hensarling seems to favor the latter. And Hensarling stated his unequivocal opposition to some form of a “recap and release” plan, whereas Corker and Warner appear to be considering a plan that recapitalizes Fannie and Freddie and releases them back into private ownership, to the benefit of at least some of the companies’ shareholders. The bottom line is that there are still major differences among all of these important players, not to mention the competing concerns of Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., and other progressives. Warren and her allies will seek to ensure that the federal housing system continues to support meaningful affordable housing initiatives for both homeowners and renters.

Hensarling made it clear that he does not favor a return to the status quo — he said that the hybrid GSE model “cannot be saved, it cannot be salvaged, it must not be resurrected, and needs to be scrapped.” But Hensarling also made it clear that he will negotiate and compromise. This represents a true opening for a bipartisan bill. For everyone on the left and the right who are hoping to create a sustainable housing finance system for the 21st century, let’s hope that his willingness to compromise is widely shared in 2018.

I am now cautiously optimistic that Congress can find some common ground. With Hensarling on board, there is now broad support for a government role in the housing sector. There is also broad support for a housing finance infrastructure that does not favor large financial institutions over small ones. Spreading the risk of default to private investors — as Fannie and Freddie have been doing for some time now under the direction of their regulator — is also a positive development, one with many supporters. Risk sharing reduces the likelihood of a taxpayer bailout in all but the most extreme scenarios.

There are still some big sticking points. What should happen with the private investors in Fannie and Freddie? Will they own part of the new housing finance infrastructure? While the investors have allies in Congress, there does not seem to be a groundswell of support for them on the right or the left.

How much of a commitment should there be to affordable housing? Hensarling acknowledges that the Federal Housing Administration should serve first-time homebuyers and low- and moderate-income individuals, but he is silent as to how big a commitment that should be. Democrats are invested in generating significant resources for affordable housing construction and preservation through the Affordable Housing Trust Fund. Hensarling appears to accept this in principle, while cautioning that any “new government affordable housing program needs to at least be on budget, results based, and target actual homebuyers for the purpose of buying a home they can actually afford to keep.” Democrats can work with Hensarling’s principles, although the extent of the ultimate federal funding commitment will certainly be hotly contested between the parties.

My cautious optimism feels a whole lot better than the fatalism I have felt for many years about the fate of our housing finance system. Let’s hope that soon departing Congressman Hensarling and Sen. Corker can help focus their colleagues on creating a housing finance system for the 21st century, one with broad enough support to survive the political winds that are buffeting so many other important policy areas today.

Taking Down Barriers to Homeownership

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Laurie Goodman and her colleagues at the Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center have released a report, Barriers to Accessing Homeownership Down Payment, Credit, and Affordability. The Executive Summary states that

Saving for a down payment is a considerable barrier to homeownership. With rising home prices, rising interest rates, and tight lending standards, the path to homeownership has become more challenging, especially for low-to-median-income borrowers and first-time homebuyers. Yet most potential homebuyers are largely unaware that there are low–down payment and no–down payment assistance programs available at the local, state, and federal levels to help eligible borrowers secure an appropriate down payment. This report provides charts and commentary to articulate the challenges families face saving for down payments as well as the options available to help them. This report is accompanied by an interactive map.

Barrier 1. Down Payments

• Consumers often think they need to put more down than lenders actually require. Survey results show that 53 percent of renters cite saving for a down payment as an obstacle to homeownership. Eighty percent of consumers either are unaware of how much lenders require for a down payment or believe all lenders require a down payment above 5 percent. Fifteen percent believe lenders require a 20 percent down payment, and 30 percent believe lenders expect a 20 percent down payment.

• Contrary to consumer perceptions, borrowers are not actually putting down 20 percent. The national median loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is 93 percent. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) typically offer lower down payment options than the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), from 0 to 3.5 percent. As the share of FHA and VA lending has increased considerably in the post-crisis period (since 2008), the median LTV ratio has increased as well.

*    *    *

Barrier 2. The Credit Box

• Access to homeownership is not limited by down payments alone. Credit access is tight by historical standards. Accordingly, the median credit score of new purchase mortgage originations has increased considerably in the post-crisis period. The median credit score for purchase mortgages is 779, compared with the pre-crisis median of 692. Credit scores of FHA borrowers have historically been lower; the current median credit score is 671.

*    *    *

Barrier 3. Affordability

• Because of home price appreciation in the past five years, national home price affordability has declined. Low interest rates have aided affordability. If interest rates reach 4.75 percent, national affordability will return to historical average affordability.

*    *    *

Access to Down Payment Assistance

• Low–down payment mortgages and other down payment assistance programs provide grants or loans to potential homeowners all over the country. There are 2,144 active programs across the country, and 1,295 agencies and housing finance agencies offering them at the local, state, and national levels. One of the major challenges of the offerings in each state is that they are not standard, eligibility requirements vary, and not all lenders offer the programs. Pricing for the programs also vary, so counseling and consumer education about the programs is necessary to ensure consumers understand how the program works and any additional costs that may be incurred.

*    *    *

• Eligibility for down payment assistance programs is determined by such factors as loan amount, homebuyer status, borrower income, and family size. Assistance is available for many loan types including conventional, FHA, VA, and US Department of Agriculture (USDA) loans. The share of people eligible for assistance in select MSAs ranges from 30 to 52 percent, and the eligible borrowers could qualify for 3 to 12 programs with down payment assistance ranging from $2,000 to more than $30,000.

Because of the tight credit environment, many borrowers have been shut out of the market and have not been able to take advantage of low interest rates and affordable home prices. As the credit box opens, educating consumers about low–down payment mortgages and down payment assistance is critical to ensuring homeownership is available to more families. (V-VI, emphasis removed)

Buying after Bankruptcy

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Realtor.com quoted me in Buying a House After Bankruptcy? How Long to Wait and What to Do. It opens,

Buying a house after bankruptcy may sound like an impossible feat. Blame it on all those Monopoly games, but bankruptcy has a very bad rap, painting the filer as someone who should never be loaned money. The reality is that of the 800,000 Americans who file for bankruptcy every year, most are well-intentioned, responsible people to whom life threw a curveball that made them struggle to pay off past debts.

Sometimes filing for bankruptcy is the only way out of a crushing financial situation, and taking this step can really help these cash-strapped individuals get back on their feet. And yes, many go on to eventually buy a home. Only how?

Being aware of what a lender expects post-bankruptcy will help you navigate the mortgage application process efficiently and effectively. Here are the steps on buying a house after bankruptcy, and the top things you need to know.

Types of bankruptcy: The best and the worst

There are two ways to file for bankruptcy: Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. With Chapter 7, filers are typically released from their obligation to pay back unsecured debt—think credit cards, medical bills, or loans extended without collateral. Chapter 13 filers have to pay back their debt, only it’s reorganized to come up with a new repayment schedule that makes monthly payments more affordable.

Since Chapter 13 filers are still paying back their debts, mortgage lenders generally look more favorably on these consumers than those who file for Chapter 7, says David Carey, vice president and residential lending manager at New York’s Tompkins Mahopac Bank.

How long after bankruptcy should you wait before buying a house?

Most people applying for a loan will need to wait two years after bankruptcy before lenders will consider their application. That said, it could be up to a four-year ban, depending on the individual and type of loan. This is because lenders have different “seasoning” requirements, which is a specified amount of time that needs to pass.

Fannie Mae, for example, has a minimum two-year ban on borrowers who have filed for bankruptcy, says David Reiss, professor of law and academic programs director at the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship at Brooklyn Law School. The FHA, on the other hand, has a minimum one-year ban in place after a bankruptcy. The time is measured starting from the date of discharge or dismissal of the bankruptcy action. Generally the more time that passes, the less risky a once-bankrupt borrower looks in the eyes of a lender.

Net Losses in FHA’s Annual Management Report

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The Federal Housing Administration released its Annual Management Report for Fiscal Year 2017. As always, it is good to review what the FHA has accomplished and the challenges it faces:

FHA is the largest provider of mortgage insurance in the world. Since its inception, FHA has insured over 47.5 million single family homes and 48 thousand multifamily and healthcare project mortgages. Through its insurance programs, FHA supports the homeownership goals of qualified individuals and families, and enables multifamily and hospital production that meets the needs of communities across the country. Over the course of its history, FHA has been a critical player in the U.S. housing market, including serving millions of first-time and low-to-moderate income homebuyers; stepping in as a countercyclical backstop during times of economic stress; and providing relief to borrowers affected by disasters. In addition, through housing counseling programs, FHA also offers assistance to individuals and families to help them make independent financial decisions that can lead to greater long-term financial success. (5)

Some of the data highlights from the report include the following:

  • The FHA has over $1.38 trillion in insurance-in-force
  • In fiscal year 2017, FHA endorsed 1,246,440 single family forward mortgages totaling $251 billion.
  • 82.2 percent of FHA purchase-loan endorsements were for first-time homebuyers.
  • 33.7 percent of all borrowers (both home purchase and refinance) were minority borrowers.
  • The number of FHA forward mortgage borrowers in fiscal year 2017 classified as low or moderate-income households represented 56.4 percent of all such households purchasing or refinancing their homes nationwide.
  • Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (also known as reverse mortgage) endorsements increased from 48,868 to 55,291.

I was confused by the following passage and would love to hear from FHA nerds who can explain it to me:

In fiscal year 2017, FHA reported a net loss. The most important facet of FHA’s cost and revenue activity is the treatment of loan guarantee subsidy cost. Loan guarantee subsidy cost is the estimated long-term cost to FHA of a loan guarantee calculated on a net present value basis, excluding administrative costs. The cost of a loan guarantee is the net present value of the estimated cash flows paid by FHA to cover claims, interest subsidies, and other requirements as well as payments made to FHA, including premiums, penalties, and recoveries also included in the calculation.

FHA had a net program loss in fiscal year 2017. Single Family and HECM Gross Costs with the Public increased by $17,845 million and $22,213 million, respectively. The program cost difference is primarily due to the increases in the re-estimates and interest expenses relating to Single Family and HECM. Re-estimates are the recalculation of subsidy costs and are performed annually. The increases in re-estimate and interest expenses were the primary drivers for the over-all program cost increase in fiscal year 2017, compared to fiscal year 2016. (49)

I am not sure how serious of a problem this is and have not heard about it from any news outlets. If any readers can shed some light on it, it would be much appreciated.

Storm-Induced Delinquencies

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The Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center has released its November 2017 Housing Finance at a Glance Chartbook. The Introduction looks out how this summer’s big storms have pushed up delinquency rates:

The Mortgage Bankers Association recently released the results of its National Delinquency Survey (NDS) for Q3 2017. The non-seasonally adjusted NDS data for Q3 2017 showed a significant increase in delinquency rates across all past due categories (30-59 days, 60-89 days and 90 days and over). The increase was largest–and most noteworthy–for the 30-59 day category, spiking by 57 basis points from 2.27 percent in Q2 2017 to 2.84 percent in Q3. The D60 rate increased by a much smaller 12 basis points, from 0.74 to 0.86 percent, while the D90 rate increased the least, by 9 basis points, from 1.20 to 1.29 percent. The rise in delinquencies was broad based, affecting FHA, VA and Conventional channels with FHA D30 seeing the largest increase (4.57 to 5.92 percent).
While early payment delinquency rates were expected to increase in the wake of the storms Harvey, Irma and Maria for the affected states, the magnitude of increase in the D30 rate is quite remarkable. The reported Q3 2017 D30 rate is the highest in nearly four years. The 57 basis points increase in a single quarter was also the largest in recent history. The last time D30 rate increased by more than 50 bps in one quarter was in Q4 2000, when it rose by 61 bps. In comparison, both D60 and D90 rates, while slightly higher in Q3, are well within their recent range.
MBA’s state level NDS data confirms that storms were a major driver behind the increase. For Florida, the non-seasonally adjusted D30 rate more than doubled from 2.12 to 4.64 percent, the highest ever D30 rate recorded. The D30 rate for Puerto Rico also nearly doubled from 4.98 to 9.12 percent, while Texas D30 rate increased from 5.05 to 7.38 percent. The increase in FL and PR was larger than in TX because of the statewide impact of hurricanes Irma and Maria. In contrast Harvey’s impact was limited to Houston and surrounding areas. The increase in the D90 rate is not storm-related as not enough time has elapsed since the storms made landfall (Harvey made landfall in Houston on August 25, Irma made landfall in Florida on September 9, and Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico on September 20).
Besides storms, there are other factors that are driving the D30 rate higher. As the figure shows, there is a very strong seasonal pattern associated with 30 day delinquencies. The D30 rate typically witnesses an uptick in the second half of each calendar year after declining in the first half because of tax refunds. Another reason for the Q3 increase is that the last day of September was a Saturday, which means that payments received on this day were not processed until Monday Oct 2nd and were identified as past due (mortgage payments are due on the 1st of the month; D30 rate is based on mortgages unpaid as of 30th of the month).
There is one more thing worth pointing out. Many borrowers affected by recent storms have received forbearance plans that allow them to defer mortgage payments for a few months. Under the NDS methodology, these borrowers are considered delinquent. Many will likely resume making monthly payments once they regain their financial footing or after forbearance ends. Others unable to afford payments could get a loan modification. Therefore, although it will take several quarters before the eventual impact of storms on delinquency rates becomes clear, many borrowers who are currently 30-days delinquent might not enter D60 or D90 status.
While the Chartbook does not look at the longer term impact of climate change on mortgage markets, it is clear that policy makers need to account for it in terms of mortgage servicing, flood insurance, land use and building code regulation.

FHA Annual Check-up

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The Department of Housing and Urban Development released its Annual Report to Congress Regarding the Financial Status of the FHA Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund. The MMIF fund is the FHA’s main vehicle for insuring mortgages. As we saw last week, FHA reverse mortgage (formally known as “Home Equity Conversion Mortgage” or “HECM”) portfolio is not doing so well. FHA standard (sometimes referred to as “forward”) mortgages are doing better, although their performance is also slipping.

The MMIF declined from its 2.35 percent FY 2016 Capital Ratio to 2.09 percent. This still exceeds its statutorily-required level of 2.00 percent.  The Economic Net Worth of the MMIF was $25.6 billion while the MMIF Insurance-in-Force was approximately $1.23 trillion at the end of FY 2017. The decline was driven by the negative Economic Net Worth of the reverse mortgage portfolio, as the capital ratio for the forward mortgage portfolio on its own was 3.33%.

The report contains a multitude of useful tables and charts about the FHA’s mortgage portfolio. The FHA has an 18 percent share of the mortgage market, which is pretty high. (Table A-2) Indeed, it is in the same range of its market share during the financial crisis years (2008-2010). The FHA remains a strong force in the first-time homebuyer market, with an 82.2 percent share. (Table B-2)

The FHA’s objectives for FY 2018 are worth reviewing:

Play a Significant Role in Disaster Recovery. In the wake of Hurricanes Irma, Harvey, and Maria, and wildfires in California, in FY 2017 and the first part of FY 2018, FHA has played a significant role in relief and recovery efforts in affected areas, while taking immediate actions to protect its Single Family assets and financial exposure. (78)

Make Necessary Changes to the Home Equity Conversion Program (HECM). During FY 2017, FHA revised the HECM initial and annual Mortgage Insurance Premiums (MIPs), and Principal Limit Factors (PLFs). These revisions were necessary to enable FHA to continue to endorse HECM loans in FY 2018, protect the program for seniors, and balance serving FHA’s mission with taxpayer protection. (79)

No less important than these objectives is the FHA’s second-to-last one, Technology Modernization:

FHA is working to update its systems over the coming years to allow the Agency to work more effectively with lenders participating in the program, while operating FHA with greater efficiency and control. The technology systems that support FHA’s Single Family business have an average age of more than 18 years, with the Computerized Homes Underwriting Management System (CHUMS) exceeding 40 years. Similarly, the systems supporting the servicing, default, claims and REO areas have an average age of 14 years. FHA’s systems have been maintained, modified and enhanced over the years, but it has become fundamentally difficult and exceedingly expensive to maintain systems beyond their usable life. FHA’s outdated systems make it more difficult to work with lenders and to collect and manage important data. FHA remains a largely paper-processing entity while the rest of the industry has increasingly migrated to digital processes. FHA needs systems that can capture and effectively process the extensive volumes of data now in use, with enhanced storage and processing capabilities to handle the migration from paper forms to digital ones. Additionally, FHA requires the ability to analyze and manage insured loans comprehensively over the many phases of the mortgage life cycle. (80)

When you stop and think about how bad the state of the FHA’s technology is, you think that maybe this should be their top priority.

The FHA’s Ailing Reverse Mortgage Program

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photo by aag.com

The Fiscal Year 2017 Independent Actuarial Review of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund: Cash Flow Net Present Value from Home Equity Conversion Mortgage Insurance in Force has been released. It has some bad news:

FHA provides reverse mortgage insurance through the HECM program. HECMs enable senior homeowners to access the value of their homes. The program began as a pilot program in 1989 and became permanent in 1998. Between 2003 and 2008, the number of HECM endorsements grew because of increasingly widespread product awareness, lower interest rates, higher home values and higher FHA mortgage limits. Prior to fiscal year 2009, the HECM program was part of the General Insurance (GI) Fund. The FHA Modernization Act within the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) moved all new HECM program endorsements into the MMIF effective October 1, 2008.

The Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act (NAHA), enacted in 1990, introduced a minimum capital requirement for MMIF. By 1992, the capital ratio was to be at least 1.25%, and by 2000 the capital ratio was to be no less than 2.0%. The capital ratio is defined by NAHA as the ratio of capital plus Cash Flow NPV to unamortized insurance‐in-force (IIF). NAHA also implemented the requirement that an independent actuarial study of the MMIF be completed annually. HERA also amended 12 USC 1708(a)(4) to include the requirement for the annual actuarial study. Accordingly, an actuarial review must be conducted on HECM mortgages within the MMIF. In this report, we analyze the HECM portion of the MMIF, which is mortgages endorsed in fiscal year 2009 and later.

Pinnacle projects that, as of the end of fiscal year 2017, the HECM Cash Flow NPV is negative $14.2 billion. (4, citation omitted, emphasis in the original)

With the housing market on the mend, Congress should ensure that essential infrastructure of the housing finance market is on solid footing. The HECM program should not have a negative cash flow (net present value) while the housing market is healthy as that will compound the bad news when the market takes a turn for the worse.