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Fannie, Freddie and Trump

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FHFA Director Bill Pulte

Central Banking quoted me in Fannie, Freddie . . . and Donald. It reads, in part,

IIn a client note on May 13, investment management firm Pimco said any privatisation of Fannie and Freddie would be a solution in search of a problem.

“If the GSEs are released but the government remains accountable to come to their rescue, wouldn’t taxpayers ultimately be the biggest loser, once again, by seeing GSE gains privatised but losses socialised?” it said, adding: “Don’t fix what’s not broken.”

David Reiss, professor at Cornell Law School, says Pimco’s view reflects the fact that the mortgage market has been functioning “pretty smoothly” since Fannie and Freddie were nationalised. According to this viewpoint, there is “no need to release them from conservatorship”.

However, Reiss says he does not like to see so much power and influence concentrated in the GSEs, and he believes the private sector would do a better job of evaluating credit risk.

“Some people – mostly investors in Fannie and Freddie securities – think [privatisation] is the right thing to do because the conservatorships were supposed to be temporary and the companies should be returned to private control and investors should be able to get some kind of return on their investments,” he says.

Reiss adds that some members of the Trump administration think privatisation would generate hundreds of billions of dollars in revenue that could be used to help pay down the national debt, offset tax cuts and seed a sovereign wealth fund.

Joe Tracy, senior fellow with think-tank the American Enterprise Institute and a former official with the Federal Reserve banks of New York and Dallas, agrees with Reiss. “The problem is that they are in conservatorship limbo, so the government has effectively nationalised a large segment of mortgage finance,” he says. “This should be carried out by the private sector.”

    *     *     *

Lawrence White, professor at New York University and co-author of Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Debacle of Mortgage Finance, says the GSEs are unlikely to become boring unless they are broken down. He believes that if Fannie and Freddie are privatised in their current form, each enterprise will be likely to pose a systemic risk from a financial stability perspective.

“The implication is that their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency [FHFAI, will need to have strong powers of examination and supervision and will need to impose substantial, risk-adjusted capital requirements,” he says.

“It is unclear whether there will be implications for the Fed as lender of last resort, since the Fed’s lending function is currently limited to banks.”

Reiss agrees that the two lenders are systemically important. If they “had to significantly scale back their lending, it would likely cause a crisis in the financial markets”, he says. “If that crisis were not quickly addressed it would cause a crisis in the real economy as well, freezing up credit for new construction and resales.”

Given that the two GSEs issue more than 70% of the outstanding $9 trillion of mortgage-backed securities in the US and, if privatised, would be two of the country’s largest publicly traded companies, the financial stability risks are clear, he says.

Reiss adds that if the privatisations were poorly planned, and if this were priced in by the markets, it would lead to “higher mortgage rates, with all of the knock-on effects that would have”. This, he says, would “increase the magnitude of a financial crisis if the two companies were to report poor financial results down the line”

Reiss’s interpretation of the Fed’s role is different to that of White, and he believes history may end up repeating itself. He says that although the FHFA is Fannie and Freddie’s primary regulator, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 requires the Fed to be consulted about any federal government processes related to the companies.

“The Fed may also co-ordinate with other parts of the federal government in responding to a financial crisis, such as purchasing Fannie and Freddie securities, as they did during the financial crisis of 2007-08,” he says. “One could well imagine the Fed playing a similar role in future crises involving Fannie and Freddie.

What Happens if Fannie and Freddie Go Private?

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I was quoted in Fintech Nexus’ Home Invasion: What Happens if Fannie and Freddie Go Private. It reads, in part,

The Trump Administration has telegraphed significant changes to GSE mortgage lenders — with massive implications for the industry

Since his swearing in on March 14 as the fifth Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), construction mogul William J. Pulte has executed major policy and personnel changes. Among other moves, Pulte has named himself board chair of the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, removed 14 of the GSEs’ 25 sitting board members, fired most of the companies’ audit boards, generally slashed headcount, and rescinded several Biden-era oversight-related advisory bulletins.

According to Professor David Reiss of Cornell Law School, a scholar of real estate finance and housing policy, Pulte’s simultaneous leadership of the FHFA in addition to roles at the GSEs, which have been under federal conservatorship since the 2008 financial crisis, is not normal.

“The whole point of regulation is you have somebody who’s overseeing an industry,” he told Fintech Nexus. “This is like the left hand [knowing] what the right hand is doing: You’re overseeing yourself, so it’s … kind of inconsistent with the notion of a supervisory regulator.”

Fintech Nexus contacted the FHFA, requesting that it comment on the impetus behind Pulte’s simultaneous self-appointments to Fannie and Freddie. The FHFA did not respond.

*     *    *

CAPITAL IDEAS

One idea percolating is for the Trump Administration to use Fannie and Freddie as a pool of capital to inject into a sovereign wealth fund. An op-ed in the Financial Times by Stifel CEO Ronald Kruszewski suggested this reconfiguration could provide “continued government backing,” “stabilize investor confidence,” and “pave the way for a $1 trillion sovereign wealth fund by 2040.”

However, in a letter to the editor in the Financial Times, Dini Ajmani, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury, suggested the idea would fail, as any privatization of the GSEs would require proper capitalization, taxpayer compensation, and adequate confidence of securities investors.

“I believe the difficulty in meeting all three conditions is why [the] status quo has persisted,” Ajmani told Fintech Nexus. “To build capital, Fannie/Freddie must retain earnings, which means the taxpayer is not compensated. If the taxpayer is compensated through dividend payments, private capital will be uninterested because the agencies will be undercapitalized.”

To this end, FHFA Director Pulte may continue to atrophy many forms of GSE oversight as a way to prime the pump: Pre-empting congressional activity by deregulating Fannie and Freddie can accelerate their transition toward open-market frameworks.

The Trump Administration may see it as its only viable short-term  avenue, as many members of Congress are uninterested in bringing Fannie and Freddie out of conservatorship; Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), member of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, called the move “Great for billionaires, terrible for hardworking people.”

Should the Trump Administration succeed in its quest, we may see states attempting to fill in the gaps on regulatory accountability, rhyming with blue-state attorneys-general’s litigiousness in the wake of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s de-clawing, though this is unlikely.

“State regulators do not generally play a role similar to the two companies (except to some small extent state Housing Finance Agencies),” Reiss of Cornell Law School said. “I could imagine state agencies trying to increase consumer protection for mortgage borrowers, if the federal regulatory environment changes, but we would have to see how that plays out to understand how the states would respond.”

Trump’s Plans to Privatize Fannie and Freddie

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from Cato Institute website, https://www.cato.org/people/mark-calabria

Mark Calabria, OMB Associate Director for Treasury, Housing, and Commerce

I was interviewed on  WBUR-FM’s On Point (distributed by American Public Radio), hosted by Meghna Chakrabarti for an episode on How Trump Plans To Get Government out of the Mortgage Business. The link has the recording of the show as well as a transcript.

The transcript of the interview starts,

CHAKRABARTI: Now that President Trump is back in the White House, it seems that he intends to get the job done this time around. Mark Calabria has returned to Trump’s administration, this time working on housing policy at the Office of Management and Budget. Bill Pulte is now director of FHFA, and he just made the highly unusual move of appointing himself chair of both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, making the regulator and the regulated basically the same.

Pulte also fired 14 of the 25 sitting board members at Fannie and Freddie. A shakeup many are suspecting is a first step in leading these two companies out of government control and into privatization. We’re talking about a huge part of the U.S. economy that underpins the housing market. So this hour, we want to explore what privatization of Fannie and Freddie actually means, what it should look like, and how it might have an impact on homeowners and the housing market.

So to do that, David Reiss joins us. He’s a clinical professor of law at Cornell Law School and Cornell Tech, an expert in housing finance and policy. Professor Reiss, welcome to On Point.

DAVID REISS: Meghna, thank you so much.

CHAKRABARTI: I have to tell you that I actually can’t believe that it’s been 17 years since the financial crisis of 2008.

Let’s dust off the memory banks professor and go back to before 2008 and start there. Can you just remind us like what Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were, what their purpose was, who owned them, et cetera?

REISS: I’m gonna go even a little bit further back than Fannie and Freddie’s creation, because I think it’s really gonna help people visualize what’s at stake here.

And if you think back to the 19th century and somebody was trying to buy a house, they didn’t have that many options. A house has always been a very expensive thing to buy, so they need to borrow some money to buy a house. And how could you do that?

Maybe if you’re rich, you could do it, or had a rich uncle, but otherwise you need to go to somebody who has capital and that you could borrow it and give them some interest in return. And pay them back over time, and be able to live in that house while you’re paying back the amount of money that you borrowed. And so if people think of It’s a Wonderful Life where there’s the Bailey Brothers building in loans and where they, people deposit their small savings into the buildings and loan.

And then some people are then able to borrow some money from the buildings and loan for mortgages. And there’s the famous scene where there’s a panic at the bank. And Jimmy Stewart says, Mrs. Kennedy, your money is in Mrs. Smith’s house. And Mrs. Smith, your money is in Ms. Macklin’s house.

And that’s the way it was done in the 19th century and the early 20th century. But there were real limitations to that. Sometimes communities didn’t have a lot of capital to lend people, so maybe in out west or in the Midwest there wasn’t a lot of capital, like there might’ve been back east in Boston or New York.

And so people who could have handled the mortgage just didn’t have access to it. It was like they were living in a dry area, and the fresh flowing credit didn’t reach their dry community. So during the Great Depression and the New Deal the government started to intervene, to spread credit out across the country in a way that kind of provided liquidity to all the communities where people wanted to borrow.

And Fannie Mae was a creature of the New Deal, but really took off in the ’70s along with its sibling Freddie Mac. And effectively, what those two companies were designed by Congress to do was to ensure that capital could go across state borders in a way that banks were typically not allowed to do. And they effectively created at first a national market for mortgage credit, and effectively when they access the global credit markets over time, an international global market for credit. So they’re really intermediaries.

Move Fast and Break the Mortgage Market

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Bill Pulte, FHFA Director and Chair of Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac

I was quoted in the American Prospect’s story, Move Fast and Break the Mortgage Market. It reads, in part,

This week, the Donald Trump–appointed chief regulator for the two quasi-governmental companies that own or control about half of the residential housing market anointed himself the board chair of both those companies. This maneuver could signal a host of shenanigans: the culmination of a 17-year hedge fund get-rich-quick scheme, a balance-sheet fiction to justify tax cuts, a new favor factory for apartment developers with ties to the president, a data transfer so Elon Musk’s everything app can learn how to sell mortgages, or something equally problematic.

But what gives former board members, market observers, and officials at the regulator greater concern is the distinct possibility that mucking around with the $7.7 trillion secondary mortgage market could lead to breaking it.

If that happens, homebuyers may not be able to get mortgages, homebuilders may be reluctant to break ground, and uncertainty would abound in a market that has brought down the economy on more than one occasion in U.S. history, most recently in 2008. “It could freeze sales, freeze refinances, stop people from forming households, cause people to be afraid of moving, freeze up developers of housing and the secondary market,” said David Reiss, a professor at Cornell Law School.

* * *

Multifamily Glad-Handing

The GSEs have a pretty sober business on the single-family side, and since the housing collapse really originated there, a lot of work was done to clean up that part of the business. But Fannie and Freddie also make loans in the multifamily market to support building of apartments and condos. A former official with one of the GSEs told me that business is a little looser, with ways to enhance those loans.

This president, of course, is a multifamily real estate developer himself, who has friends in multifamily real estate development. Hamara, one of the new board members, is a vice president at Tri Pointe Homes, a major homebuilder. You could imagine these relationships leading to the GSEs pushing risk limits, loosening credit standards, or raising loan-to-value ratios for favored borrowers. There is a secret mortgage blacklist at Fannie Mae for condos without enough property insurance or in need of repairs; controlling the board could make that blacklist go away, at least for certain developers.

This kind of setup resembles the opportunity zones that were a feature of the 2017 Trump tax cuts. They gave significant tax breaks to investors in certain communities deemed in need of development. Trump administration officials credit opportunity zones with increasing housing construction, but critics argue that the investments were rife with corruption and favor-trading.

That could also be the case here: New criteria guiding the new boards might lead to more multifamily housing, but with uneven results, favors to friends, and idiosyncratic deals that would be more about boosting allies than building housing. And as Calabria has pointed out, Fannie and Freddie are likely under Trump to cancel affordable-housing initiatives, meaning that sweetheart deals might only extend to the developers, rather than the public. Plus, there is the potential for dramatic losses if lending standards erode.

Reiss, of Cornell, agreed that this was all a possibility. “If someone gets to one of the directors, and they are there not acting as a fiduciary for the company, it opens the door to political favoritism,” he said.

* * *

What If It Breaks

Pulte is expected to force job cuts at the GSEs, which employ roughly 15,000 people. He has already been making familiar noises about DEI and remote work. One possibility on the table at the GSEs is merging Fannie and Freddie; you don’t usually have the same person chair the boards of two direct competitors. The regulatory agency is also likely to see cuts; already at FHFA, according to one source, fair lending and consumer protection groups have been put on administrative leave, along with employees at the Division of Research and Statistics.

Controlling the boards would limit dissent about these actions. But cuts in the name of efficiency could strain or even rupture the numerous functions the GSEs carry out, with consequences for the entire housing market.

Due to the conservatorship, the GSEs are limited in what they can pay their employees, which has led to a talent drain. Some systems have not been integrated, and others are not up to industry standards. Fannie and Freddie have a cautious internal culture that doesn’t move quickly. Hacking away at their already weakened structure could easily create operational harm.

But Reiss explained that nothing has to overtly break to lose the confidence of the markets; even a lack of workforce to move the paper around could create that impression, and disrupt the flow of credit. “If there is any kind of uncertainty, the spread between Fannie and Freddie securities and Treasury bonds will increase,” he said. “Investors will ask if the government will make good on Fannie and Freddie bonds. This uncertainty and direction could increase costs over time for all borrowers.”

Structured Finance Journal Launch

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I am excited to be part of the launch of the Structured Finance Journal (SFJ), a double-blind, peer-reviewed publication dedicated to advancing the practices within the structured fixed-income markets. The press release continues,

SFJ is more than just a platform for publishing research—it is a collaborative effort led by an esteemed editorial board and guided by a distinguished advisory council, ensuring the highest quality and relevance of the work we publish.

In tribute to the highly respected but now defunct Journal of Structured Finance, formerly edited by Mark Adelson, we believe in the power of original research to drive practical applications and foster innovation in the field. SFJ is designed for professionals who are dedicated to contributing valuable insights that will help shape the industry’s future.

We invite submissions from industry experts and academics alike. If you have research that offers fresh insights and practical implications, we want to hear from you. Manuscripts should be between 2,500 and 3,500 words, excluding abstracts and references, and must be original work that has not been previously published or is under consideration elsewhere.

In line with our commitment to integrity and transparency, any use of AI tools in your manuscript should be limited to mechanical tasks like editing or citation management, with full disclosure required. Our strict guidelines ensure that only high-quality, relevant, and ethically produced research is featured in the journal.

Submissions must adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style (CMS) for formatting, with specific requirements for typography and content organization. We encourage authors to carefully structure their work, starting with a clear and concise title and abstract, followed by a compelling introduction, organized headings, and a well-rounded conclusion. Exhibits should be properly sourced, and permissions obtained for any previously published material. Details may be found on our online submissions platform.

Join us in advancing the structured finance industry by sharing your expertise and research. Submit your manuscript today and contribute to the growing body of knowledge that SFJ proudly supports. Please contact Elen Callahan at elen.callahan@structuredfinance.org with your questions and interest.

I am excited to join Elen Callahan and the other members of the Editorial Board in this venture:

Mark Adelson, Independent Consultant Content Director, Portfolio Management Research

William Black, Founder and Principal, Black Analytics

Nicole Byrns, Founder and Principal, Dumar Capital

Chun Lin, Managing Director and Head of U.S. Residential Mortgage Modeling, Bank of America

Debra Lofano, Partner, Alston & Bird LLP

Phillip Millman, Advisor, Federal Housing Finance Agency

Tim O’Neil, Managing Director and Head of Canadian Structured Finance, Morningstar DBRS

David Reiss, Clinical Professor of Law & Research Director of the Blassberg-Rice Center for Entrepreneurship Law, Cornell Law School & Cornell Tech

Jeff Schwartz, CFA, Securitized Products Investor

The Wayward Mission of the Federal Home Loan Bank System

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Adam Fagen CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

I recently submitted this comment to the Federal Housing Finance Agency in response to its request for input about the mission of the Federal Home Loan Bank System. It opens,

The Federal Housing Finance Agency (the “FHFA”) has requested Input regarding the regulatory statement of the Federal Home Loan Bank System’s (the “System”) mission to better reflect its appropriate role in the housing finance system. I commend the FHFA for being realistic about the System in its Request for Input; it acknowledges that there is a mismatch between its mission and its current operations.

The System’s operations do not do nearly enough to support the System’s stated mission of supporting the financing of housing. The System should recommit to that goal in measurable ways or its name and/or mission should be changed to better reflect its current operations.

While the System was originally designed to support homeownership, it has morphed into a provider of liquidity for large financial institutions. Banks like JPMorgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp., Citibank NA and Wells Fargo & Co. are among its biggest beneficiaries and homeownership is only incidentally supported by their involvement with it.

As part of the comprehensive review of the System, we should give thought to at least changing the name of the System so that it cannot trade on its history as a supporter of affordable homeownership. Or we should go even farther and give some thought to spinning off its functions into other parts of the federal financial infrastructure as its functions are redundant with theirs. But best of all would be a recommitment by the System to the measurable support of financing for housing.

This comment draws from a column (paywall) I had published when the FHFA first embarked on its reevaluation of the FLBLS.

Rethinking The Federal Home Loan Bank System

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photo by Tony Webster

Law360 published my column, Time To Rethink The Federal Home Loan Bank System. It opens,

The Federal Housing Finance Agency is commencing a comprehensive review of an esoteric but important part of our financial infrastructure this month. The review is called “Federal Home Loan Bank System at 100: Focusing on the Future.”

It is a bit of misnomer, as the system is only 90 years old. Congress brought it into existence in 1932 as one of the first major legislative responses to the Great Depression. But the name of the review also signals that the next 10 years should be a period of reflection regarding the proper role of the system in our broader financial infrastructure.

Just as the name of the review process is a bit misleading, so is the name of the Federal Home Loan Bank system itself. While it was originally designed to support homeownership, it has morphed into a provider of liquidity for large financial institutions.

Banks like JPMorgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp., Citibank NA and Wells Fargo & Co. are among its biggest beneficiaries and homeownership is only incidentally supported by their involvement with it.

As part of the comprehensive review of the system, we should give thought to at least changing the name of the system so that it cannot trade on its history as a supporter of affordable homeownership. But we should go even farther and give some thought to spinning off its functions into other parts of the federal financial infrastructure as its functions are redundant with theirs.