Tag Archives: financial institutions

S&L Flexible Porfolio Lending

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Bailey BrosDepositAccounts.com quoted me in Types of Institutions in the U.S. Banking System – Savings and Loan Associations. It opens,

When you think of a savings and loan, maybe you think of the Bailey Savings & Loan from the movie It’s a Wonderful Life or remember the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, when more than 1,000 savings and loans with over $500 billion in assets failed.

But there’s much more to the story. Savings and loan associations originally specialized in home-financing, be it a mortgage, home improvements or construction. According to Encyclopedia Britannica, Savings and loan associations originated with the building societies of Great Britain in the late 1700s. They consisted of groups of workmen who financed the building of their homes by paying fixed sums of money at regular intervals to the societies. When all members had homes, the societies disbanded. The societies began to borrow money from people who did not want to buy homes themselves and became permanent institutions. Building societies spread from Great Britain to other European countries and the United States. They are also found in parts of Central and South America. The Oxford Provident Building Association of Philadelphia, which began operating in 1831 with 40 members, was the first savings and loan association in the United States. By 1890 they had spread to all states and territories.

Today, explains, David Bakke, a financial columnist for MoneyCrashers.com, explains how S&Ls have evolved. “More recently, they have also expanded into areas such as car loans, commercial loans and even mutual fund investing. Currently, there isn’t much difference between them and other types of financial institutions.”

S&Ls are a type of thrift institution. Like all financial institutions they are bound to rules and regulations. They can have a state or federal charter. Those with a federal charter are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) used to be the regulator before it was merged with the OCC in 2011.

Another big change that impacted S&Ls was the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). It abolished the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, which had provided deposit insurance to savings and loans since 1934. It created two insurance funds, the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) and the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF), which were both administered by the FDIC. Those two funds were merged into the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) in 2006. In summary, your deposits at S&Ls today are insured by the FDIC.

If you’re wondering how S&Ls work, to put it simply, the money you deposit into your savings account, is used to fund the money the S&L doles out in loans.

Savings and loans have some advantages over other types of institutions. “Many S&Ls keep many of the loans that they originate in their own portfolio instead of selling them off for securitization.  This means that they often have more flexibility in their underwriting criteria than do those lenders that sell off their mortgages to Fannie, Freddie and Wall Street securitizers.  This means that borrowers with atypical profiles or borrowers interested in atypical properties might be more likely to find a lender open to a nontraditional deal in the S&L sector,” says David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School, that specializes in real estate.

Protecting Seniors’ Home Equity

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photo by Ethan Prater

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has issued and Advisory and Report for Financial Institutions on Preventing Elder Financial Abuse. The Report defines elder financial exploitation as

the illegal or improper use of an older person’s funds, property or assets. Studies suggest that financial exploitation is the most common form of elder abuse and yet only a small fraction of incidents are reported. Estimates of annual losses range from $2.9 billion to $36.48 billion. Perpetrators who target older consumers include, among others, family members, caregivers, scam artists, financial advisers, home repair contractors, and fiduciaries (such as agents under power of attorney and guardians of property).

Older people are attractive targets because they may have accumulated assets or equity in their homes and usually have a regular source of income such as Social Security or a pension. In 2011, the net worth of households headed by a consumer age 65 and older was approximately $17.2 trillion, and the median net worth was $170,500. These consumers may be especially vulnerable due to isolation, cognitive decline, physical disability, health problems, and/or the recent loss of a partner, family member, or friend.

Cognitive impairment is a key factor in why older adults are targeted and why perpetrators succeed in victimizing them. Even mild cognitive impairment (MCI) can significantly impact the capacity of older people to manage their finances and to judge whether something is a scam or a fraud. Mild cognitive impairment is an intermediate stage between the expected cognitive decline of normal aging and the more serious decline of dementia. Studies indicate that 22 percent of Americans over age 70 have MCI and about one third of Americans age 85 and over have Alzheimer’s disease. (8-9, footnotes omitted)

The CFPB recommends that financial institutions consider

  • training staff to recognize abuse;
  • using fraud detection technologies;
  • offering age-friendly services; and
  • reporting suspicious activities to authorities.

These recommendations are a step in the right direction, although they offer no panacea. As the Report acknowledges, even if financial institutions report suspicious activities to government authorities, there is no guarantee that they will be acted on. But if these recommendations are publicized, they may deter some predators who think that they can act freely within the fog of their victims’ cognitive decline. And a few well-publicized prosecutions of relatives, caregivers and advisors who violate the trust that was placed in them would help to spread the message that ripping off senior citizens is no easy path to riches.

Final Accounting for National Mortgage Settlement

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Attributed to Jacopo de' Barbari

Luca Pacioli, A Founding Father of Accounting

Joseph Smith, the Monitor of the National Mortgage Settlement, has issued his Final Compliance Update. He writes,

I have filed a set of five compliance reports with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia as Monitor of the National Mortgage Settlement (NMS or Settlement). The following report summarizes these reports, which detail my review of each servicer’s performance on the Settlement’s servicing reforms. This report includes:

• An overview of the process through which my team and I have reviewed the servicers’ work.

• Summaries of each servicer’s performance for the third quarter 2015.

Pursuant to the Settlement, the requirement to comply with the servicing standards ended for Bank of America, Chase, Citi, Ditech and Wells Fargo as of the end of the third quarter 2015. Accordingly, this is my last report under the NMS for these servicers. Like all mortgage servicers, they are still required to follow servicing-related rules issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). (2)

Smith concludes,

The Settlement has improved the way these servicers treat distressed borrowers, and, under its consumer relief requirements, the banks provided more than 640,000 borrowers with $51 billion in debt forgiveness, loan modifications, short sale assistance and refinancing at a time when families and the market were subject to distress and uncertainty.

I believe the Settlement has contributed towards the rebuilding of public trust and confidence in the mortgage market and hope that it will inform future regulation of financial institutions and markets. I look forward to further discussions on these topics among policymakers, consumer advocates and mortgage servicers. (13)

I have blogged about the Monitor’s earlier reports and have been somewhat unhappy with them. Of course, his primary audience is the District Court to which he is submitting these reports. But I do not believe that the the reports have “contributed towards the rebuilding of public trust and confidence in the mortgage market” all that much. The final accounting should be accurate, but it should also be understandable to more than a select few.

The reports have been opaque and have not give the public (even the pretty well-informed members of the public, like me) much information with which to contextualize their findings. I hope that future settlements like this take into account the need to explain the findings of decision makers and court-appointed monitors so that the public can have a better sense of whether justice was truly done.

Tough Edge for Financial Services

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Maria T. Vullo %>

Maria Vullo

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Law360 quoted me in Cuomo’s DFS Nominee Likely To Keep Tough Edge (behind a paywall). It reads, in part,

Although New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo turned to a longtime BigLaw attorney to lead the New York State Department of Financial Services, observers say the agency is likely to continue taking the aggressive regulatory and enforcement stance that has become its calling card.

The governor tapped Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP’s Maria T. Vullo to lead the DFS, completing a monthslong search to replace former New York Superintendent of Financial Services Benjamin M. Lawsky. In turning to Vullo, Cuomo brings on a litigator and former prosecutor with 25 years of experience in the law, including two decades of representing banks.

But given the reputation that the DFS has built up since it burst onto the scene with its $340 million sanctions violation settlement with the U.K.’s Standard Chartered PLC in 2012, advocates and observers believe that if confirmed, Vullo will continue to push for tough enforcement and big penalties against the banks, insurers and other financial firms that the DFS oversees.

 *     *     *

However, because Vullo comes from a BigLaw background with extensive experience representing financial firms, some have raised concerns that the agency will become less aggressive in enforcing New York state’s financial regulations.But observers who spoke to Law360 said her noncorporate experience gives a clearer picture of how she might run the DFS.

Vullo has been an advocate for women in the legal profession and represented women who sued for damages after being raped during the war in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995, helping secure a $745 million verdict in that case.

And in her work for Cuomo during his tenure as New York’s attorney general, Vullo oversaw a staff of around 200 that worked in the office’s investor protection, antitrust, real estate finance, consumer fraud and Internet bureaus.

In that position, she took action against Ezra Merkin and Ivy Asset Management for their roles in defrauding investors in Bernard L. Madoff’s $65 billion Ponzi scheme, as well as launching an investigation and action against Ernst & Young for investor losses in Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.’s 2008 bankruptcy.

Those past experiences should allay any fears that Wall Street’s critics might have, said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

“I thought that Governor Cuomo would seek an aggressive replacement for Lawsky,” Reiss said. “Vullo fits the bill.”

To that point, financial reform and other advocates said in interviews that they knew little about her, but were encouraged by what they did know.

“What we’re hoping is that the reputation that the department has established will continue through the new leadership,” said Andy Morrison of the New Economy Project, a New York-based advocacy group.

Indeed, Cuomo has an interest in maintaining an aggressive DFS.

The billions of dollars in fines it collected from banks have gone to fund state infrastructure projects, including the construction of a new Tappan Zee Bridge across the Hudson River north of New York City.

And that get-tough approach has also been a way to attract voters.

“My sense is he benefits from the halo effects of an aggressive DFS,” Reiss said.

Bank Break-ins

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"Balaclava 3 hole black" by Tobias "ToMar" Maier. Licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons - https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Balaclava_3_hole_black.jpg#/media/File:Balaclava_3_hole_black.jpg

Chris Odinet has posted Banks, Break-Ins, and Bad Actors in Mortgage Foreclosure to SSRN. The abstract reads,

During the housing crisis banks were confronted with a previously unknown number mortgage foreclosures, and even as the height of the crisis has passed lenders are still dealing with a tremendous backlog. Overtime lenders have increasingly engaged third party contractors to assist them in managing these assets. These property management companies — with supposed expertise in the management and preservation of real estate — have taken charge of a large swathe of distressed properties in order to ensure that, during the post-default and pre-foreclosure phases, the property is being adequately preserved and maintained. But in mid-2013 a flurry of articles began cropping up in newspapers and media outlets across the country recounting stories of people who had fallen behind on their mortgage payments returning home one day to find that all of their belongings had been taken and their homes heavily damaged. These homeowners soon discovered that it was not a random thief that was the culprit, but rather property management contractors hired by the homeowners’ mortgage servicer.

The issues arising from these practices have become so pervasive that lawsuits have been filed in over 30 states, and legal aid organizations in California, Florida, Michigan, Nevada, and New York report that complaints against lender-engaged property managements firms number among their top grievances. This Article analyzes lender-engaged property management firms and these break-in foreclosure activities. In doing so, the paper makes a three-part call to action, which includes the implementation of bank contractor oversight regulations, the creation of a private cause of action for aggrieved homeowners, and the curtailment of property preservation clauses in mortgage contracts.

This is a timely article about a cutting edge issue. All too often I have heard pro-bank lawyers claim that banks almost never foreclose improperly. The news reports and lawsuits discussed in this article counter that claim. And yet, I hope that some empirically-minded person could quantify the frequency of such misbehavior to better inform policymakers going forward.

Friday’s Government Reports Roundup

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  • United States Government Accountability Office releases report: “Collateral Requirements Discourage Some Community Development Financial Institutions from Seeking Membership”.
  • The National Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC) released its Out of Reach 2015 report, in which it asserts that low wages and high rents are preventing people from living in many different areas of the country. It states that the most expensive city to live in is San Francisco, where a worker would need to make $40/hour to afford a decent two-bedroom apartment.
  • The Federal Reserve released its Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2014, which reveals how adult-consumers feel they are doing financially. Though in a number of categories adults’ beliefs on how they are doing went up beneficially, half of all renters that wanted to purchase a home could not afford the down payment and 31% were unable to qualify for a mortgage.

The Community Reinvestment Act: Guilty of What?

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Ray Brescia recently posted the final version of The Community Reinvestment Act: Guilty, but not as Charged to SSRN. The article wades into a seemingly technical debate that has extraordinary political and ideological implications: did misguided liberal policies push financial institutions to engage in the risky lending practices that led to the financial crisis. I never gave this argument much credit because the supposed chain of causation seemed too attenuated to me. Nonetheless, the debate has had legs among some policy analysts. The article generally agrees with my own — admittedly impressionistic — views of the matter. It also argues that the CRA needs to be modernized to reflect how mortgage credit is extended in the 21st century. The abstract reads,

Since its passage in 1977, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) has charged federal bank regulators with “encourag[ing]” certain financial institutions “to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered consistent with safe and sound” banking practices. Even before the CRA became law – and ever since – it has become a flashpoint. Depending on your perspective, this simple and somewhat soft directive has led some to charge that it imposes unfair burdens on financial institutions and helped to fuel the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 and the financial crisis that followed. According to this argument, the CRA forced banks to make risky loans to less-than creditworthy borrowers. Others defend the CRA, arguing that it had little to do with the riskiest subprime lending at the heart of the crisis.

Research into the relationship between the mortgage crisis and the CRA generally vindicates those in the camp that believe the CRA had little to do with the risky lending that fueled these crises. At the same time, recent research by the National Bureau of Economic Research attempts to show that the CRA led to riskier lending, particularly in the period 2004-2006, when the mortgage market was overheated.

This paper reviews this and other existing research on the subject of the impact of the CRA on subprime lending to assess the role the CRA played in the mortgage crisis of 2007 and the financial crisis that followed. This paper also takes the analysis a step further, and asks what role the CRA played in failing to prevent these crises, particularly their impact on low- and moderate-income communities: i.e., the very communities the law was designed to protect. Based on a review of the best existing evidence, the initial verdict of not guilty – that the CRA did not cause the financial crisis, as some argue – still holds up on appeal. At the same time, as more fully described in this piece, an appreciation for the weaknesses inherent in the law’s structure, when combined with an understanding of the manner in which it was enforced by regulators, lead one to a different conclusion; although the CRA did not cause the crisis, it failed to prevent the very harms it was designed to prevent from befalling the very communities it is supposed to protect.

The defects in the CRA that emerge from this review, in total, suggest not that the CRA was too strong, but, rather, too weak. They also point to important reforms that should be put in place to strengthen and fine-tune the CRA to ensure that it can meet its important goal: ensuring that financial institutions meet the needs of low- and moderate-income communities, communities for which access to capital and banking services on fair terms is a necessary condition for economic development, let alone economic survival. Such reforms could include expanding the scope of the CRA to cover more financial institutions, creating a private right of action that would grant private and public litigants an opportunity to enforce the law through the courts, and having regulators enforce the CRA in such a way that will put more pressure on banks to modify more underwater mortgages.

I doubt that this article will be the final word on this topic, both because the existing empirical work seems inconclusive and also because the topic is one that has important ideological implications for the right and the left (‘government caused the financial crisis’ versus ‘corporate greed run amok caused the crisis’). Nonetheless, this article provides a thorough critique of one of the leading empirical studies of the topic.