The CFPB Makes Its Case

CFPB Director Cordray

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau released its Semi-Annual Report. Given that the Bureau is under attack by Republicans in Congress and in the Trump Administration, one can read this as a defense (a strong defense, I might editorialize) for the work that the Bureau has done on behalf of consumers. The core of the Bureau’s argument is that it levels the playing field for consumers when they deal with financial services companies:

The Bureau has continued to expand its efforts to serve and protect consumers in the financial marketplace. The Bureau seeks to serve as a resource on the macro level, by writing clear rules of the road and enforcing consumer financial protection laws in ways that improve the consumer financial marketplace, and on the micro level, by helping individual consumers get responses to their complaints about issues with financial products and services. While the various divisions of the Bureau play different roles in carrying out the Bureau’s mission, they all work together to protect and educate consumers, help level the playing field for participants, and fulfill the Bureau’s statutory obligations and mission under the Dodd-Frank Act. In all of its work, the Bureau strives to act in ways that are fair, reasonable, and transparent.

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When Federal consumer financial protection law is violated, the Bureau’s Supervision, Enforcement, and Fair Lending Division are committed to holding the responsible parties accountable. In the six months covered by this report, our supervisory actions resulted in financial institutions providing approximately $6.2 million in redress to over 16,549 consumers. During that timeframe, we also have announced enforcement actions that resulted in orders for approximately $200 million in total relief for consumers who fell victim to various violations of consumer financial protection laws, along with over $43 million in civil money penalties. We brought numerous enforcement actions for various violations of the Dodd-Frank Act and other laws, including actions against Mastercard and UniRush for breakdowns that left tens of thousands of economically vulnerable RushCard users unable to access their own money to pay for basic necessities; two separate actions against CitiFinancial and CitiMortgage for keeping consumers in the dark about options to avoid foreclosure; and against three reverse mortgage companies for deceptive advertisements, including claiming that consumers who obtained reverse mortgages could not lose their homes. We also brought two separate actions against credit reporting agencies Equifax and TransUnion for deceiving consumers about the usefulness and actual cost of credit scores they sold to consumers, and for luring consumers into costly recurring payments for credit products; and an action against creditor reporting agency Experian for deceiving consumers about the usefulness of credit scores it sold to consumers. The Bureau also continued to develop and refine its nationwide supervisory program for depository and nondepository financial institutions, through which those institutions are examined for compliance with Federal consumer financial protection law. (10-11, footnotes omitted)

Anyone who was around during the late 1990s and early 2000s would know that consumers are much better off with the Bureau than without it. This report provides some of the reasons why that is the case.

Fox in The CRA Henhouse

Law360 quoted me in Treasury’s Fair Lending Review Worries Advocates (behind a paywall). It reads, in part,

President Donald Trump’s Treasury Department said Monday that revisiting a 1977 law aimed at boosting bank lending and branches in poor neighborhoods was a “high priority,” but backers of the Community Reinvestment Act fear that any move by this administration would be aimed at weakening, not modernizing, the law.

Critics and some backers of the Community Reinvestment Act say that the law does not take into account mobile banking and the decline of branch networks among a host of other updates needed to meet the realities of banking in 2017.

While there is some agreement on policy, the politics of reworking the CRA are always difficult. Those politics will be even more difficult with the Trump administration and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, who ran into problems with the CRA when he was the chairman of OneWest Bank, leading the review, said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

“A team at Treasury led by the OneWest leadership should give consumer advocates pause,” he said.

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Across the administration, from the U.S. Department of Education to the Department of Justice, civil rights enforcement has taken a back seat to other concerns. And Mnuchin is in the process of populating the Treasury Department with former colleagues from OneWest.

Trump nominated former OneWest CEO Joseph Otting to be comptroller of the currency earlier this month and is reportedly close to nominating former OneWest Vice Chairman and Chief Legal Officer Brian Brooks as deputy Treasury secretary. Brooks is currently the general counsel at Fannie Mae.

Activists who fought the CIT-OneWest merger on CRA grounds say that the placement of those former OneWest executives in positions of authority over the law should raise alarms.

“[Mnuchin’s] bank, OneWest, also had one of the worst community reinvestment records of all the banks that CRC analyzes in California, which raises questions about his motivation in ‘reforming’ the Community Reinvestment Act. Is he interested in reforming it to help communities, or to help the industry do even less?” said Paulina Gonzalez of the California Reinvestment Coalition.

The Treasury secretary has defended his bank’s foreclosure practices and others that drew fair lending advocates’ ire, saying that most of the problems at OneWest were holdovers from IndyMac, the failed subprime lender OneWest’s investors purchased after it failed.

Discussing reforms to the CRA under any administration, particularly a typical Republican administration, would be difficult on its own for lawmakers and inside regulatory agencies, Schaberg said.

“Anybody down in the middle-management tier of any of the banking agencies, they’re not going to touch this because it’s so politically charged,” he said.

The added distrust of the Trump administration and Mnuchin among fair housing advocates makes the prospect of any legislation to reshape even harder to imagine. Even without legislation, new leadership at the regulatory agencies that monitor for CRA compliance could take a lighter touch. And that has fair housing backers on edge.

“In my mind, there’s a fox-in-the-henhouse mentality,” Reiss said.

Securitizing Single-Family Rentals

photo by SSobachek

Laurie Goodman and Karan Kaul of the Urban Institute’ Housing Finance Policy Center have issued a a paper on GSE Financing of Single-Family Rentals. They write,

Fannie Mae recently completed the first government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) securitization of single-family rental (SFR) properties owned by an institutional investor. This securitization, Fannie Mae Grantor Trust 2017-T1, was for Invitation Homes, one of the largest institutional players in the SFR business. When this transaction was first publicly disclosed in January as part of Invitation Homes’ initial public offering, we wrote an article describing the transaction and detailing some questions it raises. Now that the deal has been completed and more details have been released, we wanted to look closely at some of its structural aspects, examine the need for this type of financing, and discuss SFR affordability. (1, citations omitted)

By way of background, the paper notes that

The 2015 American Housing Survey indicates that approximately 40 percent of the US rental housing stock is in one-unit, single-family structures, with another 17 percent in two- to four-unit structures, which are also classified as single-family. Thus, 57 percent of the US rental stock falls under the single-family classification. Although this share increased from 51 percent in 2005 to 57 percent in 2015, this increase was preceded by an almost identical decline from 56.6 percent in 1989 to 51 percent in 2005.

Most SFR properties are owned by mom and pop investors. These purchases were typically financed through the GSEs’ single-family business. Fannie Mae allowed up to 10 properties in the name of a single borrower, and Freddie Mac allowed up to six properties. Rent Range estimates that 45 percent of all single-family rentals are owned by small investors with only one property and 85 percent are owned by those who own 10 or fewer properties. So the GSEs cover 85 percent of the single-family rental market by extending loans to small investors through single-family financing. Of the remaining 15 percent, 5 percent is estimated to be owned by players with over 50 units, and just 1 percent is owned by institutional SFR investors with more than 1,000 properties.

Institutional investors, such as Invitation Homes, entered the SFR market in 2011. Entities raised funds and purchased thousands of foreclosed homes at rock-bottom prices and rented them out to meet the growing demand for rental housing. Then, they built the expertise, platforms, and infrastructure to manage scattered-site rentals. Changes in the business model have required these entities to search for financing alternatives.(1-2, citations omitted)

The paper concludes that “Invitation Homes was an important first transaction—it allowed Fannie Mae to learn about the institutional single-family rental market by partnering with an established player.” (9) It also notes a number of open questions for this growing segment of the rental market: should there be affordability requirements that apply to GSE financing of SFRs and should SFRs count toward meeting GSEs’ affordable housing goals?

That there would be an institutional SFR market sector was inconceivable before the financial crisis. The fire sale in houses during the Great Recession created an opening for institutional investors to enter the single-family rental market.  It is now a small but growing part of the overall rental market. It is important that policy makers get ahead of the curve on this issue because it is likely to effect big changes on the entire housing market.

Fannie Mae Student Loan Mortgage Swap

HIghYa quoted me in Fannie Mae Student Loan Mortgage Swap: Should You Do It? It reads, in part,

This past week federal mortgage giant Fannie Mae announced it had created a new avenue for its borrowers to pay off student loans: the student loan mortgage swap.

The swap works like this, according to documentation published by Fannie Mae:

  • Fannie Mae mortgage borrowers get the benefit
  • They do a “cash-out” refinance
  • The money from that refinance is used to pay off your loan(s) in full

The concept of this is pretty elegant in our opinion. People who are saddled with student loans – the average grad has about $36,000 in debt at graduation – don’t usually stumble upon a huge chunk of money to pay off those loans.

If you’re lucky enough to own a home that’s gone up in value enough to create a sizeable difference between what your home is worth and what you owe, then Fannie Mae allows you to borrow against that amount (equity) by taking it out as cash you can use on a student loan.

The idea is that your mortgage rate will probably be lower than your student loan rate, which means instead of paying back your student loans at 6.5%, let’s say, you can now pay it back at your mortgage refi rate of, in most cases, less than 4.5%.

Basically, you’re swapping your student loan payments for mortgage payments, which is how this little financial maneuver gets its name.

The news first came out on April 25 in the form of a press release which said the mortgage swap was designed to offer the borrower “flexibility to pay off high-interest rate student loans” and get a lower mortgage rate.

The change was among two others that will, in theory, work in favor of potential or current homeowners who have student loan debt.

“These new policies provide three flexible payment solutions to future and current homeowners and, in turn, allow lenders to serve more borrowers,” Fannie Mae Vice President of Customer Solutions Jonathan Lawless said in the release.

What You Need to Know About Fannie Mae’s Student Loan Swap

Remember how we said that the money you get from your mortgage refinance can be used for a student loan or multiple student loans?

That happens because this refinance is what’s known as a cash-out refinance.

What is a Cash-Out Refinance?

A cash-out refinance is part of the general class of refinancing.

When you refinance your home, you’re basically selling the rest of what you owe to a lender who’s willing to let you pay them back at a lower interest rate than what you currently have.

The upside is that you have lower monthly payments because your interest rates are lower, but the downside is that your payments are lower because they’re most likely spread out over 30 years, or, at least, longer than what you had left on your original mortgage.

So, you’ll be paying less but you’ll be paying longer.

A cash-out refinance adds a twist to all this. You see, when you do a traditional refinance, you’re borrowing the amount you owe. However, in a cash-out refinance, you actually borrow more than you owe and the lender gives you the difference in cash.

Let’s say you owe $100,000 on your house at 7% with 20 years left. You want to take advantage of a cash-out refi, so you end up refinancing for $120,000 at 4.6% for 30 years.

Assuming all fees are paid for, you get $20,000 in cash. The lender gives you that cash because it’s yours – it comes from the equity in your home.

How the Fannie Mae Student Loan Swap Works

Fannie Mae’s new program takes the cash-out refinance a little further and says that you can only use your cash-out amount for student loans.

However, it’s not that easy. There are certain requirements you have to meet in order to be eligible for the program. Here’s a list of what you need to know:

  • The borrower has to have paid off at least one of their student loans
  • You’re only allowed to pay off your student loans, not loans other people are paying
  • The money must cover the entire loan(s), not just part of it/them
  • Your loan-to-value ratios must meet Fannie Mae’s eligibility matrix

We checked the Fannie Mae eligibility matrix and, at the time this article was published in April 2017, the maximum loan-to-value they’d allow on your principle residence was 80% for a fixed-rate mortgage and 75% on an adjustable rate mortgage.

In other words, they want to know that what you owe on the house is, at most, 80% of what it’s worth.

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Our Final Thoughts About Fannie Mae’s Student Loan Swap

The Fannie Mae student loan mortgage swap is certainly an innovative way to cut down on your student loan debt via equity in your home.

The pros of this kind of financial product are that, if cash-out refinance rates are lower than student loan rates, then you can stand to save money every month.

And because refis typically last 30 years, your monthly payments will most likely be lower than what they were when you were making payments on your mortgage and your student loan.

The main drawbacks of using a Fannie Mae cash-out refinance to pay off your loans is that you’ll put your home at a higher risk because house values could fall below the amount you borrowed on your refi.

Making a student loan mortgage swap also changes your debt from unsecured to secured. Brooklyn Law School Professor David Reiss reiterated this point in an email to us.

He said that borrowers need to “proceed carefully when they convert unsecured debt like a student loan into secured debt like a mortgage.”

The benefits are great, he said, but the dangers and risks are pretty acute.

“When debt is secured by a mortgage, it means that if a borrower defaults on the debt, the lender can foreclose on the borrower’s home,” David said. “Bottom line – proceed with caution!”

We think what Mark Kantrowitz and David Reiss have pointed out is extremely valuable. While a student loan mortgage swap may seem like a good way to pay off your debt, the fact that it swaps your unsecured debt for secured debt could mean trouble down the road.

Understanding The Ability To Repay Rule

photo by https://401kcalculator.org

The Spring 2017 edition of the Consumer Financial Bureau’s Supervisory Highlights contains “Observations and approach to compliance with the Ability to Repay (ATR) rule requirements. The ability to repay rule is intended to keep lenders from making and borrowers from taking on unsustainable mortgages, mortgages with payments that borrowers cannot reliably make.  By way of background,

Prior to the mortgage crisis, some creditors offered consumers mortgages without considering the consumer’s ability to repay the loan, at times engaging in the loose underwriting practice of failing to verify the consumer’s debts or income. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) amended the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) to provide that no creditor may make a residential mortgage loan unless the creditor makes a reasonable and good faith determination based on verified and documented information that, at the time the loan is consummated, the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan according to its terms, as well as all applicable taxes, insurance (including mortgage guarantee insurance), and assessments. The Dodd-Frank Act also amended TILA by creating a presumption of compliance with these ability-to-repay (ATR) requirements for creditors originating a specific category of loans called “qualified mortgage” (QM) loans. (3-4, footnotes omitted)

Fundamentally, the Bureau seeks to determine “whether a creditor’s ATR determination is reasonable and in good faith by reviewing relevant lending policies and procedures and a sample of loan files and assessing the facts and circumstances of each extension of credit in the sample.” (4)

The ability to repay analysis does not focus solely on income, it also looks at assets that are available to repay the mortgage:

a creditor may base its determination of ability to repay on current or reasonably expected income from employment or other sources, assets other than the dwelling (and any attached real property) that secures the covered transaction, or both. The income and/or assets relied upon must be verified. In situations where a creditor makes an ATR determination that relies on assets and not income, CFPB examiners would evaluate whether the creditor reasonably and in good faith determined that the consumer’s verified assets suffice to establish the consumer’s ability to repay the loan according to its terms, in light of the creditor’s consideration of other required ATR factors, including: the consumer’s mortgage payment(s) on the covered transaction, monthly payments on any simultaneous loan that the creditor knows or has reason to know will be made, monthly mortgage-related obligations, other monthly debt obligations, alimony and child support, monthly DTI ratio or residual income, and credit history. In considering these factors, a creditor relying on assets and not income could, for example, assume income is zero and properly determine that no income is necessary to make a reasonable determination of the consumer’s ability to repay the loan in light of the consumer’s verified assets. (6-7)

That being said, the Bureau reiterates that “a down payment cannot be treated as an asset for purposes of considering the consumer’s income or assets under the ATR rule.” (7)

The ability to repay rule protects lenders and borrowers from themselves. While some argue that this is paternalistic, we do not need to go much farther back than the early 2000s to find an era where so-called “equity-based” lending pushed many people on fixed incomes into default and foreclosure.

Buying a Foreclosure or Short Sale

DailyWorth quoted me in Should I Buy a Foreclosure or Short Sale? It reads, in part,

I’m looking to buy a new home, and I’ve noticed that there are a couple of “short sale” and foreclosed homes in the area where I’m interested in living. These homes are priced substantially lower than others, and I’m wondering what the catch is. I’ve heard that short sales or foreclosures often need repairs. What else do I need to know to decide whether to invest in one of these properties?

Purchasing a home through a short sale or a foreclosure process can be a way to get a good deal on a property. But it isn’t for the faint of heart. Both processes are likely to be more complicated than purchasing a home on the open market.

First, make sure you understand the differences between these categories. Both are used when a property owner is in financial distress and can no longer afford mortgage payments.

In a short sale, the proceeds from the sale will fall short of the debt owed on the property. Such a sale can only occur if the mortgage holder (usually a bank) has agreed to accept less than the amount owed on the loan.

In a foreclosure, on the other hand, the mortgage holder has repossessed the property and is trying to recoup its losses by selling the house for the amount still owed on the loan. That amount is typically still less than the market value of the home.

Here are some of the common issues you may encounter when buying a foreclosure or short sale.

Purchasing Delays
If you’re considering buying a property listed as short sale or foreclosure, keep in mind a few things, experts say.“The process for purchasing this kind of property may not be as easy as purchasing a home directly from a seller who is current on their mortgage,” says Colin McDonald, real estate agent with Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices Blake in Delmar, N.Y.For instance, it typically takes six to eight weeks to close on a normal home, McDonald says. But with a short sale or foreclosure, the property may not close for six months or even a year.“[W]hen a property is being listed as a short sale or foreclosure, you’re no longer just dealing with the seller,” McDonald says. “A bank is now involved, and unfortunately, they only care about getting what is owed to them. They will drag the process on for as long as they like.”

Short sales can also take months to get lender approval. “The seller’s bank can make things very difficult, making the borrower jump through many hoops — hoops that can take a long time to navigate,” warns David Reiss, a professor of law at Brooklyn Law School who writes and teaches about real estate.

And in the end, the bank may respond with a counteroffer that doesn’t meet your budget or terms. “So you might wait for a long time only to be disappointed,” says Sep Niakan, owner of Condo Black Book, a leading condo search website in Miami and broker of HB Roswell Realty.

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 Potential Additional Fees
While the price of the home may be low, a foreclosure or short sale often comes with additional transaction costs. With a foreclosure, you may have to pay transfer taxes as well as any superior liens on the property. You may also have to pay an additional fee to the foreclosure company.
Typically, in a short sale, there is a negotiator involved who will require a fee, such as 2.5 percent of the purchase price, McDonald says. The buyer is usually required to pay this fee.You also may have to pay back taxes or other past dues associated with the property. If you buy a condo-foreclosure, for instance, “there may be many years of past due condo association fees that may not appear anywhere in public record, and you might end up inheriting a very large debt,” Niakan says. “Some local and state laws limit the amount you would be responsible for in those cases, but do your homework.”Purchasing a home at a price that is significantly below market always sounds like a good thing — and it can be for the right person. But keep in mind that if the property is really great, “there will be others who will also be interested in it,” McDonald warns. “This includes veteran investors who have deep pockets of cash.”If you hope to get a great home for a low price through a foreclosure or short sale, be sure to do your homework and be aware that it may take a long time and come with extra costs and repairs. And at the end of the day, buying a short sale or foreclosure isn’t for everyone.

“While you may get a good price, you will be paying for the house with uncertainty, delay, and frustration,” Reiss says. “You’ll need to determine for yourself whether it is worth it.”

Banks v. Cities

The Supreme Court issued a decision in Bank of America Corp. v. Miami, 581 U.S. __ (2017). The decision was a mixed result for the parties.  On the one hand, the Court ruled that a municipality could sue financial institutions for violations of the Fair Housing Act arising from predatory lending. Miami alleged that the banks’ predatory lending led to a disproportionate increase in foreclosures and vacancies which decreased property tax revenues and increased the demand for municipal services. On the other hand, the Court held that Miami had not shown that the banks’ actions were directly related to injuries asserted by Miami. As a result, the Court remanded the case to the Eleventh Circuit to determine whether that in fact was the case. This case could have big consequences for how lenders and others and other big players in the housing industry develop their business plans.

For the purposes of this post, I want to focus on the banks’ activities of the banks that Miami alleged they engaged in during the early 2000s. It is important to remember the kinds of problems that communities faced before the financial crisis and before the Dodd-Frank Act authorized the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. As President Trump and Chairman Hensarling (R-TX) of the House Financial Services Committee continue their assault on consumer protection regulation, we should understand the Wild West environment that preceded our current regulatory environment. Miami’s complaints charge that

the Banks discriminatorily imposed more onerous, and indeed “predatory,” conditions on loans made to minority borrowers than to similarly situated nonminority borrowers. Those “predatory” practices included, among others, excessively high interest rates, unjustified fees, teaser low-rate loans that overstated refinancing opportunities, large prepayment penalties, and—when default loomed—unjustified refusals to refinance or modify the loans. Due to the discriminatory nature of the Banks’ practices, default and foreclosure rates among minority borrowers were higher than among otherwise similar white borrowers and were concentrated in minority neighborhoods. Higher foreclosure rates lowered property values and diminished property-tax revenue. Higher foreclosure rates—especially when accompanied by vacancies—also increased demand for municipal services, such as police, fire, and building and code enforcement services, all needed “to remedy blight and unsafe and dangerous conditions” that the foreclosures and vacancies generate. The complaints describe statistical analyses that trace the City’s financial losses to the Banks’ discriminatory practices. (3-4, citations omitted)

Excessively high interest rates, unjustified fees, teaser interest rates and large prepayment penalties were all hallmarks of the subprime mortgage market in the early 2000s. The Supreme Court has ruled that such activities may arise to violations of the Fair Housing Act when they are targeted at minority communities.

Dodd-Frank has barred many such loan terms from a large swath of the mortgage market through its Qualified Mortgage and Ability-to-Repay rules. Trump and Hensarling want to bring those loan terms back to the mortgage market in the name of lifting regulatory burdens from financial institutions.

What’s worse, the  burden of regulation on the banks or the burden of predatory lending on the borrowers? I’d go with the latter.