- BNY Mellon files a brief on writ for cert with the Supreme Court warning the potential for “warping” the residential mortgage-backed securities market if it overturns the Second Circuit’s decision finding that provisions of the Trust Indenture Act did not apply to the securities at issue.
- Investors of Citibank file a class action in NY state court claiming that Citibank ignored toxic residential mortgage-backed securities causing $2.3 billion in losses.
- Investors sue RAIT Financial Trust and its trustees alleging that the trust knew about subsidiary pocketing fees leading to a $21.5 million SEC settlement.
Tag Archives: RMBS
Monday’s Adjudication Roundup
- Following SCOTUS’s March Omnicare decision, a pension fund is claiming that the Second Circuit failed to take into account said decision in failing to revive Bank of America mortgage suit. The plaintiff requests SCOTUS’s review.
- U.S. District Court judge dismisses whistleblower suit against CitiMortgage where ex-VP claimed the bank engaged in reckless lending practice and made false claims.
- NY appellate court will not revive suit against Morgan Stanley and UBS for misrepresentation of $665 million in residential mortgage-backed securities.
The End of Private-Label Securities?
Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase
J.P. Morgan’s Securitized Products Weekly has a report, Proposed FRTB Ruling Endangers ABS, CMBS and Non-Agency RMBS Markets. This is one of those technical studies that have a lot of real world relevance to those of us concerned about the housing markets more generally.
The report analyzes proposed capital rules contained in the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB). JPMorgan believes that these proposed rules would make the secondary trading in residential mortgage-backed securities unprofitable. It also believes that “there is no sector that escapes unscathed; capital will rise dramatically across all securitized product sectors, except agency MBS.” (1) It concludes that “[u]ltimately, in its current form, the FRTB would damage the availability of credit to consumers, reduce lending activity in the form of commercial mortgage and set back private securitization, entrenching the GSEs as the primary securitization vehicle in the residential mortgage market.” (1)
JPMorgan finds that the the impact of these proposed regulations on non-agency residential-mortgage backed securities (jumbos and otherwise) “is so onerous that we wonder if this was the actual intent of the regulators.” Without getting too technical, the authors thought “that the regulators simply had a mathematical mistake in their calculation (and were off by a factor of 100, but unfortunately this is what was intended.” (4) Because these capital rules “would make it highly unattractive for dealers to hold inventory in non-agency securities,” JPMorgan believes that they threaten the entire non-agency RMBS market. (5)
The report concludes with a policy takeaway:
Policymakers have at various times advocated for GSE reform in which the private sector (and private capital) would play a larger role. However, with such high capital requirements under the proposal — compared with capital advantages for GSE securities and a negligible amount of capital for the GSEs themselves — we believe this proposal would significantly set back private securitization, entrenching the GSEs as the primary securitization vehicle in the mortgage market. (5, emphasis removed)
I am not aware if JPMorgan’s concerns are broadly held, so it would important to hear others weigh in on this topic.
If the proposed rule is adopted, it is likely not to be implemented for a few years. As a result, there is plenty of time to get the right balance between safety and soundness on the one hand and credit availability on the other. While the private-label sector has been a source of trouble in the past, particularly during the subprime boom, it is not in the public interest to put an end to it: it has provided capital to the jumbo sector and provides much needed competition to Fannie, Freddie and Ginnie.
Monday’s Adjudication Roundup
- TCW Asset Management Co. will continue to face $128 million suit from investors for allegedly lying about the value of mortgage-backed securities.
- A court found that the City of Saratoga Springs failed to timely appeal in case over incorporation of affordable housing.
- The Second Circuit affirmed decision that found that an insurer did not need to pay out $15 million to Nomura for misleading descriptions of residential mortgage-backed securities.
- National Union Fire Insurance Co. filed a brief in case over ski resorts, claiming that claims notes are privileged “because they contain legal advice from outside counsel.”
Monday’s Adjudication Roundup
- Union pension funds have filed a petition for cert in the U.S. Supreme Court to consider whether Bank of New York Mellon Corp. is liable for failure in oversight of 26 trusts of over $30 billion in residential mortgage-backed securities.
- S. Securities and Exchange Commission rejects claims that its in-house court is unconstitutional in suit against Atlanta investment adviser, Timbervest LLC.
- The D.C. Circuit allows reconsideration of HUD’s disparate-impact defense in American Insurance Association case, where the lower court had interpreted the Fair Housing Act to allow suits in which seemingly neutral actions have a discriminatory impact.
Why Credit Rating Agencies Exist
Robert Rhee has posted Why Credit Rating Agencies Exist to SSRN. The abstract reads,
Although credit rating agencies exist and are important to the capital markets, there remains a question of why they should exist. Two standard theories are that rating agencies correct a problem of information asymmetry and that they de facto regulate investments. These theories do not fully answer the question. This paper suggests an alternative explanation. While rating agencies produce little new information, they sort information available in the credit market. This sorting function is needed due to the large volume of information in the credit market. Sorting facilitates better credit analysis and investment selection, but bond investors or a cooperative of them cannot easily replicate this function. Outside of their information intermediary and regulatory roles, rating agencies serve a useful market purpose even if credit ratings inherently provide little new information. This alternative explanation has policy implications for the regulation of the industry.
I do not think that there is much new in this short paper, but it does summarize recent research on the function of rating agencies. Rhee’s takeaway is that, “given their dominant public function, rating agencies should be subject to greater regulatory scrutiny and supervision qualitatively on levels similar to the regulation of auditors and securities exchanges.” (15) Amen to that.
Better to Be a Banker or a Non-Banker?
The Community Home Lenders Association (CHLA) has prepared an interesting chart, Comparison of Consumer and Financial Regulation of Non-bank Mortgage Lenders vs. Banks. The CHLA is a trade association that represents non-bank lenders, so the chart has to be read in that context. The side-by side-chart compares the regulation of non-banks to banks under a variety of statutes and regulations. By way of example, the chart leads off with the following (click on the chart to see it better):
The chart emphasizes all the ways that non-banks are regulated where banks are exempt as well as all of the ways that they are regulated in the identical manner. Given that this is an advocacy document, it only mentions in passing the ways that banks are governed by various little things like “generic bank capital standards” and safety and soundness regulators. That being said, it is still good to look through the chart to see how non-bank regulation has been increasing since the passage of Dodd-Frank.
