Author Archives: David Reiss

The End of Private-Label Securities?

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Steve Jurvetson

Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase

J.P. Morgan’s Securitized Products Weekly has a report, Proposed FRTB Ruling Endangers ABS, CMBS and Non-Agency RMBS Markets. This is one of those technical studies that have a lot of real world relevance to those of us concerned about the housing markets more generally.

The report analyzes proposed capital rules contained in the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB). JPMorgan believes that these proposed rules would make the secondary trading in residential mortgage-backed securities unprofitable. It also believes that “there is no sector that escapes unscathed; capital will rise dramatically across all securitized product sectors, except agency MBS.” (1) It concludes that “[u]ltimately, in its current form, the FRTB would damage the availability of credit to consumers, reduce lending activity in the form of commercial mortgage and set back private securitization, entrenching the GSEs as the primary securitization vehicle in the residential mortgage market.” (1)

JPMorgan finds that the the impact of these proposed regulations on non-agency residential-mortgage backed securities (jumbos and otherwise) “is so onerous that we wonder if this was the actual intent of the regulators.” Without getting too technical, the authors thought “that the regulators simply had a mathematical mistake in their calculation (and were off by a factor of 100, but unfortunately this is what was intended.” (4) Because these capital rules “would make it highly unattractive for dealers to hold inventory in non-agency securities,” JPMorgan believes that they threaten the entire non-agency RMBS market. (5)

The report concludes with a policy takeaway:

Policymakers have at various times advocated for GSE reform in which the private sector (and private capital) would play a larger role. However, with such high capital requirements under the proposal — compared with capital advantages for GSE securities and a negligible amount of capital for the GSEs themselves — we believe this proposal would significantly set back private securitization, entrenching the GSEs as the primary securitization vehicle in the mortgage market. (5, emphasis removed)

I am not aware if JPMorgan’s concerns are broadly held, so it would important to hear others weigh in on this topic.

If the proposed rule is adopted, it is likely not to be implemented for a few years.  As a result, there is plenty of time to get the right balance between safety and soundness on the one hand and credit availability on the other. While the private-label sector has been a source of trouble in the past, particularly during the subprime boom, it is not in the public interest to put an end to it:  it has provided capital to the jumbo sector and provides much needed competition to Fannie, Freddie and Ginnie.

SF’s Airbnboom

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Brian Johnson & Dane Kantner

The Christian Science Monitor quoted me in San Francisco Votes Down Airbnb Limits: Can Competing Interests Be Balanced? It reads, in part,

A defeated ballot measure in San Francisco, which would have imposed further restrictions on users of Airbnb and similar websites, is a sign of how the issue of short-term housing rentals is vexing city governments in the United States and beyond.

From Fort Lauderdale, Fla., to Los Angeles, lawmakers and residents alike are struggling to balance the power of technological change with the many critics of the home-sharing industry: homeowners who complain about deterioration in the quality of life in residential neighborhoods, hotels that fret about lost revenues, and activists who say that short-term housing is stripping the marketplace of affordable long-term units.

Yet even some of the trend’s most ardent critics suggest that more restrictions are not necessarily the answer. Better enforcement of current laws would go a long way toward balancing the conflicting interests, they say.

*     *     *

On the other coast, just as many cities are struggling. New York City is still up in the air about how to handle the sharing economy, says Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss, who has followed Airbnb’s evolution.

This week, Airbnb promised to provide detailed data to the New York City Council, he notes. “The company is doing this in part to fend off [legislation] that would severely limit their reach in NYC,” he says via e-mail. One piece of proposed legislation increases penalties for violations of existing laws, and another mandates that the city track illegal apartment conversions, according to Professor Reiss.

Still, the sharing economy is with us for the long term as consumers continue to vote with their wallets, he says. “The bottom line is that we are in a period of transition. And while it is unlikely that we will return to the pre-sharing economy, it is also unlikely that we will have a sharing economy that is driven just by market actors, without government regulation,” he adds.

Home and Marriage

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The Pug Father

TheStreet.com quoted me in First-Time Homebuyers Often Wait to Buy House After Marriage. It reads, in part,

The number of people purchasing their first home, especially Millennials, could be impacted negatively by shifting demographics as the median age for marriage is rising.

A recent survey by NeighborWorks America, the Washington, D.C.-based affordable housing organization, found that 43% the respondents said they intended to buy a home when they “got married or moved in with a life partner.” The median age for a first marriage has risen to 29.3 years old for men and 27 years old for women, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. In 2000, men first got married at 26.8 years old while the median age for women was 25.1 years old.

Other respondents said they would wait to buy a home when other changes occurred, with 22% who will purchase one when they have children and 18% who are still seeking their first full-time job.

Many Millennials are delaying the purchase of a home because not only are they waiting until they are older to get married, a large percentage are also saddled with a large amount of student loans. The survey also demonstrated that 57% respondents admitted that student loans were either “very much” or “somewhat” of an obstacle, a rising concern compared to 49% who expressed this sentiment in 2014.

*      *      *

“The state of the economy has interfered with their ability to maintain a steady income and this has likely delayed marriage,” said David Reiss, a law professor at Brooklyn Law School. “As a result, they are less likely to become homeowners.”

What’s more, the lack of job security in the current economy has dampened many people’s enthusiasm to own a home.

“Buying a home is a big commitment to your future self and your family: ‘I will make that mortgage payment come hell or high water,’” he said. “Fewer people are going to want to make that commitment if the job market does not give them a reasonable basis to believe that they can live up to it.”

Gentrification & Socioeconomic Diversity

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Lisa Brewster

Lei Ding et al. have posted a Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper, Gentrification and Residential Mobility in Philadelphia, to SSRN. The abstract reads,

Gentrification has provoked considerable debate and controversy about its effects on neighborhoods and the people residing in them. This paper draws on a unique large-scale consumer credit database to examine the mobility patterns of residents in gentrifying neighborhoods in the city of Philadelphia from 2002 to 2014. We find significant heterogeneity in the effects of gentrification across neighborhoods and subpopulations. Residents in gentrifying neighborhoods have slightly higher mobility rates than those in nongentrifying neighborhoods, but they do not have a higher risk of moving to a lower-income neighborhood. Moreover, gentrification is associated with some positive changes in residents’ financial health as measured by individuals’ credit scores. However, when more vulnerable residents (low-score, longer-term residents, or residents without mortgages) move from gentrifying neighborhoods, they are more likely to move to lower-income neighborhoods and neighborhoods with lower values on quality-of-life indicators. The results reveal the nuances of mobility in gentrifying neighborhoods and demonstrate how the positive and negative consequences of gentrification are unevenly distributed.
I am not in a position to fully evaluate the methodology of this paper in this post. At first glance, however, it appears to be a well-constructed and large study, tracking “the residential location and financial health of a random sample of more than 50,000 adults.” (1) At the same time, useful household characteristics like income and race were not available to the authors, so the study has some significant limitations.

Given the intensive debates that gentrification engenders in NYC and elsewhere, it is still helpful that the authors offer up some facts and grounded interpretation of those facts. The authors specifically find that “gentrification is associated with positive changes in residents’ financial health: Residents in gentrifying neighborhoods experience an average increase of 11 points in their credit scores, compared with those who are not residents.” (1) At the same time, their results “suggest that less advantaged residents generally gained less from gentrification than others, and those who were unable to remain in a gentrifying neighborhood had negative residential and financial outcomes in the gentrification process.” (2)

Those who decry gentrification as well as those who promote it (quietly, more often than not) will find support for their positions in this paper. But those who are trying to understand just what we are talking about when we talk about gentrification and its effects will be left with a more textured understanding of how the demographics of gentrifying neighborhoods change. If cities are serious about promoting socioeconomic diversity, they must understand what is happening when neighborhoods are in flux.

Obama Administration on Frannie

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Michael Stegman

Michael Stegman, a White House Senior Policy Advisor, offered up the Obama Administration’s “perspective on critical housing issues” recently. (1) I found the remarks on the future of Fannie and Freddie to be of particular interest:

Before discussing what we would like to see happen in this Congress on GSE reform, you should be aware that last week the Administration made clear its opposition to taking any action in support of what has become known as “recap and release.” We believe that recapitalizing the GSEs with taxpayer funds and administratively- or legislatively-releasing them from conservatorship with a business model that conflicts with their public mission— in essence turning back the clock to the run up to the crisis~ would be both bad policy and poor stewardship of the taxpayers’ interest; willfully recreating the very system that helped do this nation so much harm.
ln remarks I presented two weeks ago at the Mortgage Bankers Association conference, I cautioned that no one should be misled by the increasingly noisy chorus of the advocates of recap and release, many of whom have placed big bets against reform so they can make a‘profit, and are doing everything they can to make sure that those bets pay off.
Nor, I said, should their promise that recap and release would generate a pot of money for affordable housing be taken seriously.
Despite claims to the contrary, recapitalizing the GSEs would not itself provide any resources for affordable housing. Nor can a related — or even unrelated — sale of Treasury’s investment in the GSEs provide any resources for affordable housing. The proceeds of the sale of any GSE obligations acquired by Treasury must by law be “dedicated for the sole purpose of deficit reduction.”
Rather than freeing recapitalized GSEs from conservatorship with their flawed charters intact, we should pursue more comprehensive approaches to reform such as those that members of Congress have introduced over the past two years including mutualizing Fannie and Freddie, or build upon bipartisan agreements on the features of a future secondary market system that were hammered out in the Senate Banking Committee last year:
Preservation of the TBA market; an explicit, paid for government guarantee of catastrophic losses for investors in qualifying MBS; maintaining a clear separation of the primary and secondary markets; ensuring the flow of mortgage credit in both good times and bad; separating the securitization plumbing from private credit risk taking; ensuring that community lenders have the same access to the secondary market as big banks; and making the benefits of government guaranteed MBS available to all households — both those who choose to rent and those with the ability and desire to own.
Members in Congress also reached bipartisan consensus on a transparent way to serve those the private market cannot serve without subsidy, through an annual 10 basis point assessment on the outstanding balance of government-guaranteed MES—which once fully implemented, would generate about 15 times more resources a year for affordable housing than FHFA is expected to raise through the GSEs’ current affordable housing levy–though we were pleased to see the Director begin collections on the affordability fee and look forward to effectively implementing the dollars through the Housing Trust Fund and the Capital Magnet Fund that should become available for the first time in the early months of 2016.
But there is much more work to be done on ensuring a level playing field in the new system, including a robust role for community banks and credit unions who know how best to serve their customers, and ensuring that all communities are served fairly, which can be most effectively achieved through a statutory duty to serve. Regrettably, the Committee could not agree upon such a provision during last year’s negotiations, and we will continue to fight for it. (3-4)
Much of these remarks are eminently reasonable but I have to say that the Obama Administration has not deployed much political capital on reforming the housing finance system. This has left the whole system in limbo and the longer it stays in limbo, the more likely it is that special interests will make inroads into the reform of the system, inroads that will not be in the public interest.
While the likelihood of reform coming out of the current Congress is incredibly small, the Administration should take all of the administrative steps it can to sketch out an outline of a housing finance system that can work for a broad range of borrowers through the credit cycle without putting excessive risk on taxpayers.
The Administration has taken some steps in the right direction, like off-loadling some risk from Fannie and Freddie to private investors. But there is a lot more work to be done if we are to have a system that provides the optimal amount of credit through the 21st century.

Floodproofing Communities

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Gordon Tarpley

NYU’s Furman Center has released a Research Brief, Planning for Resilience: The Challenge of Floodproofing Multifamily Housing. The Brief opens,

As sea levels rise and storms become more frequent and severe due to climate change, many urban areas along the coasts and rivers of the United States are facing a flood-prone future. Especially in the older urban areas along the eastern seaboard, there is a significant stock of multifamily housing that will be increasingly at risk. Much of this housing is out of compliance with federal flood-resistant design and construction standards. Some of these buildings have housing units that are out of compliance because, regardless of their age, they were only recently mapped into the floodplain. And, even buildings that have been in the floodplain for longer may be out of compliance with the rules because their construction predated their jurisdiction’s adoption of the standards. (2)

And it concludes,

As the nation’s floodplains expand, the number and types of housing units at risk of flooding also grows. Multifamily housing makes up a larger share of the at-risk housing in the floodplain than was previously understood, and mitigating the risk to this housing and its residents presents unique challenges that local governments must be prepared to face. While there is no easy answer to how to fund the often costly and disruptive retrofit measures needed in these buildings, there are steps that local governments can take to make it easier for buildings to adapt, such as educating owners about risks, providing them with information about retrofit strategies, and helping them finance improvements. Including strategies like these in a long-term resilience plan will make communities stronger and will ensure that multifamily buildings and their residents are not left behind as flood-prone areas adapt. (10)

There is no doubt that this is right. New York City under both Mayors Bloomberg and De Blasio have taken this issue very seriously, but a lot of work remains to be done. And the odds are that the amount of work will only increase with time as sea levels rise higher and higher. Because many other local governments do not have the resources of NYC, they will get their wake up calls the hard way.

Given the broad effects of climate change, resiliency efforts would ideally be led by the federal government. But I don’t see that happening for a long time, probably after an avoidable tragedy on a large scale spurs Congress to action, notwithstanding its ideological commitments.

Frannie v. Private-Label Smackdown

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Eric Armstrong

S&P posted a report, Historical Data Show That Agency Mortgage Loans Are Likely to Perform Significantly Better Than Comparable Non-Agency Loans. The overview notes,

  • We examined the default frequencies of both agency and non-­agency mortgage loans originated from 1999­-2008.
  • As expected, default rates for both agencies and non-­agencies were higher for crisis-­era vintages relative to pre­-crisis vintages.
  • The loan characteristics that were the most significant predictors of default were FICO scores, debt­-to­-income (DTI) ratios, and loan­-to­-value (LTV) ratios.
  • Agency loans performed substantially better than non­agency loans for all vintages examined. The default rate of agency loans was approximately 30%-­65% that for comparable non-­agency loans, whether analyzed via stratification or through a logistic regression framework. (1)

This is not so surprising, but it is interesting to see the relative performance of Frannie (Fannie & Freddie) and Private-Label loans quantified and it is worth thinking through the implications of this disparity.

S&P was able to do this analysis because Fannie and Freddie released their “loan-level, historical performance data” to the public in order to both increase transparency and to encourage private capital to return to the secondary mortgage market. (1) Given that the two companies have transferred significant credit risk to third parties in the last few years, this is a useful exercise for potential investors, regulators and policymakers.

It is unclear to me that this historical data gives us much insight into future performance of either Frannie or Private-Label securities because so much has changed since the 2000s. Dodd-Frank enacted the Qualified Mortgage, Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage regimes for the primary and secondary mortgage market and they have fundamentally changed the nature of Private-Label securities. And the fact that Fannie and Freddie are now in conservatorship has changed how they do business in very significant ways just as much. So, yes, old Frannie mortgages are likely to perform better, but what about new ones?