Author Archives: David Reiss

FHA’s Clean Bill of Health

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HUD Secretary Castro

HUD Secretary Julián Castro

The Federal Housing Administration released its Annual Report to Congress on the Financial Status of the FHA Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund. The MMIF covers the lion’s share of the FHA’s mortgage insurance obligations. In his forward to the report, HUD Secretary Castro focused on the achievement of two goals, the MMIF has “reached its congressionally mandated capital ratio” and it “reduced its annual mortgage insurance premium” which “opened the doors for tens of thousands of Americans to become homeowners or to refinance into a more affordable loan.” (2) Some commentators had been critical of lowering the premium before the MMIF reached its mandated capital ratio, but all’s well that ends well, or so it seems.

I was particularly struck by the key characteristics of FY 2015 FHA borrowers:

  • The average credit score for all FHA endorsements was 680, and the average loan size was $190,928 for all mortgages, and $186,176 for purchase mortgages.
  • 82 percent of FHA purchase loans (614,148 loans) were for first-time homebuyers.
  • In calendar year (CY) 2014, FHA provided financing for 43 percent of all African-American borrowers, and 44 percent of all Hispanic borrowers. In contrast, in CY 2014, FHA represented just 21 percent of the total purchase market.
  • African-American borrowers represented 10.4 percent of total FHA endorsements in FY 2015; Hispanic borrowers represented 17.4 percent of total FHA endorsements in the same period.
  • FHA assisted more than 57,990 senior households to age in place through the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) [reverse mortgage] program.
  • At the state level, during CY 2014, FHA-insured loans represented at least 20 percent of all purchase activity in 32 states. In 12 states and Puerto Rico, FHA-insured lending represented a quarter of all 2014 purchase lending. Nevada, Puerto Rico, and Arizona had the highest proportion of FHA purchase activity in 2014, with FHA-insured loans representing 34 percent, 33 percent, and 31 percent of all purchase loans in those areas, respectively. Arizona and Nevada were particularly hard hit by the housing crisis, and FHA has played an important role in the recovery in those states. (6-7)

The FHA had an outsized role for the entire country after the financial crisis and it is still having an outsized role in many ways for many communities. The big issue going forward is whether the FHA will further lower its premiums in an attempt to reach more borrowers and if it can do so in a fiscally responsible manner.

Fannie, Freddie & The Affordable Housing Feint

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ShapiroPhoto

Robert J. Shapiro

kamarck_mm_duo

Elaine C. Kamarck

 

 

 

 

 

Robert J. Shapiro and Elaine C. Kamarck have posted A Strategy to Promote Affordable Housing for All Americans By Recapitalizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. While it presents as a plan to fund affordable housing, the biggest winners would be speculators who bought up shares of Fannie and Freddie stock and who may end up with nothing if a plan like this is not adopted.  The Executive Summary states that

This study presents a strategy for ending the current conservatorship and majority government ownership of Fannie and Freddie in a way that will enable them, once again, to effectively promote greater homeownership by average Americans and greater access to affordable housing by low-income households. This strategy includes regulation of both enterprises to prevent a recurrence of their effective insolvency in 2008 and the associated bailouts, including 4.0% capital reserves, regular financial monitoring, examinations and risk assessments by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), as dictated by HERA. Notably, an internal Treasury analysis in 2011 recommended capital requirements, consistent with the Basel III accords, of 3.0% to 4.0%. In addition, the President should name a substantial share of the boards of both enterprises, to act as public interest directors. The strategy has four basic elements to ensure that Fannie and Freddie can rebuild the capital required to responsibly carry out their basic missions, absorb losses from future housing downturns, and expand their efforts to support access to affordable housing for all households:

  • In recognition of Fannie and Freddie’s repayments to the Treasury of $239 billion, some $50 billion more than they received in bailout payments, the Treasury would write off any remaining balance owed by the enterprises under the “Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements” (PSPAs).
  • The Treasury also would end its quarterly claim or “sweep” of the profits earned by Fannie and Freddie, so their future retained earnings can be used to build their capital reserves.
  • Fannie and Freddie also should raise roughly $100 billion in additional capital through several rounds of new common stock sales into the market.
  • The Treasury should transfer its warrants for 79.9% of Fannie and Freddie’s current common shares to the HTF [Housing Trust Fund] and the CMF [Capital Magnet Fund], which could sell the shares in a series of secondary stock offerings and use the proceeds, estimated at $100 billion, to endow their efforts to expand access to affordable housing for even very low-income households.

Under this strategy, Fannie and Freddie could once again ensure the liquidity and stability of U.S. housing markets, under prudent financial constraints and less exposure to the risks of mortgage defaults. The strategy would dilute the common shares holdings of current private investors from 20% to 10%, while increasing their value as Fannie and Freddie restore and claim their profitability. Finally, the strategy would establish very substantial support through the HTF and CPM for state programs that increase access to affordable rental housing by very low-income American and affordable home ownership by low-to-moderate income households.

Wow — there is a lot that is very bad about this plan.  Where to begin? First, we would return to the same public/private hybrid model for Fannie and Freddie that got us into so much trouble to begin with.

Second, it would it would reward speculators in Fannie and Freddie stock. That is not terrible in itself, but the question would be — why would you want to? The reason given here would be to put a massive amount of money into affordable housing. That seems like a good rationale, until you realize that that money would just be an accounting move from one federal government account to another. It does not expand the pie, it just makes one slice bigger and one slice smaller. This is a good way to get buy-in from some constituencies in the housing industry, but from a broader public policy perspective, it is just a shuffling around of resources.

There’s more to say, but this blog post has gone on long enough. Fannie and Freddie need to be reformed, but this is not the way to do it.

 

RMBS 3.0 and the Public Good

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The Car Spy

The Structured Finance Industry Group has issued RMBS 3.0: A Comprehensive Set of Proposed Industry Standards to Promote Growth in the Private Label Securities Market. RMBS 3.0 is SFIG’s initiative to reinvigorate the “private label” residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) market:

In order to improve the RMBS market as the industry moves beyond the legacy of the housing crisis, members must tackle the difficult but critical task of creating standardized representations, warranties and repurchase enforcement mechanisms, and address other integral parts of the RMBS issuance process.

Post-crisis, a very small “RMBS 2.0” market has emerged. A review of RMBS 2.0 practices indicates that post-crisis transactions have utilized varying approaches as investors and issuers continue to explore how to best design the structural elements of an RMBS transaction. In a number of cases, divergence among the various approaches has significantly influenced rating agency decisions and limited investor participation. Most industry participants seem to believe that, without a targeted effort at establishing generally accepted best practices, the RMBS market will continue to reflect disparate standards. (1)

In particular,

By identifying, analyzing, explaining and creating solutions for the legal, operational and risk-related issues that concern post-crisis RMBS industry participants, and presenting the work in a centralized, user-friendly manner, RMBS 3.0 seeks to:

1. Create standardization where possible, in a manner that reflects widely agreed upon best practices and procedures.

2. Clarify differences in alternative standards in a centralized and easily comprehendible manner to improve transparency across RMBS transactions.

3. Develop new solutions to the challenges that impede the emergence of a sustainable, scalable and fluid post-crisis RMBS market.

4. Draft or endorse model contractual provisions, or alternative “benchmark” structural approaches, where appropriate to reflect the foregoing.

While SFIG cannot create legally enforceable standards, we strongly believe that the adoption of a set of common standards that are driven by industry participants will be more successful than those dictated by regulation. The project also aims for increased transparency in the practices of participating members. Accordingly, we encourage issuers to either adopt one or more of the “alternative benchmark” RMBS 3.0 standards or utilize alternative approaches in a manner that increases transparency and promotes a better functioning marketplace. (1-2)

Given the rotten state of the private label market, this is an important attempt at self-regulation by this trade group. The push for transparency is, of course, important for investors. They must have confidence in what they are buying if the RMBS market is to grow.

But these decisions will also have impacts on homeowners. For instance, the scope of “materiality” in the context of a fraud representation could impact lender behavior at origination. The public does not have an opportunity to provide input on these model representations. Perhaps it should.

Property Tax Exemptions in Wonderland

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Cea

NYU’s Furman Center has released a policy brief, The Latest Legislative Reform of the 421-a Tax Exemption: A Look at Possible Outcomes. This brief is part of a series on affordable housing strategies for a high-cost city. It opens,

Since the early 1970s, New York City has provided a state-authorized, partial property tax exemption for the construction of new residential buildings. In the 1980s, the New York City Council amended the program to require that participating residential buildings in certain portions of Manhattan also provide affordable housing. Most recently, New York State extended the existing program through the end of 2015 and created a new 421-a framework for 2016 onward. However, for the program to continue beyond December, the legislation requires that representatives of residential real estate developers and construction labor unions reach a memorandum of understanding regarding wages of construction workers building 421-a program developments that contain more than 15 units.

This brief explores the possible impacts of the new 421-a legislation on residential development across a range of different neighborhoods in New York City, including neighborhoods where rents and sale prices are far lower than in the Manhattan Core and where the tax exemption or other subsidy may be necessary to spur new residential construction under current market conditions. We assess what could happen to new market rate and affordable housing production if the 421-a program were allowed to expire or if it were to continue past 2015 in the form contemplated by recently passed legislation. Our analysis shows that changes to the 421-a program could significantly affect the development of both market rate and affordable housing in the city (1, footnote omitted)

The 421-a program operates against the backdrop of a crazy quilt real property tax regime where similar buildings are taxed at wildly different rates because of various historical oddities and thinly-sliced legal distinctions. Like the Queen of Hearts, the rationale given by the Department of Finance for this unequal treatment amounts to no more than — And the reason is…because I say so, that’s why!

The brief concludes,

Our financial analysis of the possible outcomes from the 421-a legislation offers some insights into its potential impact on new construction. First, if the 421-a benefit expires in 2016, residential developers would lower the amount they would be willing to pay for land in many parts of the city. The result could be a pause in new residential developments in areas outside of the Manhattan Core as both buyers and sellers of land adjust to the new market.

*     *     *

Second, if the newly revised 421-a program with its higher affordability requirements and longer exemption period goes into effect in 2016 without any increase in construction costs, the city is likely to have more affordable rental units developed in many parts of the city compared to what the existing 421-a program would have created. Condominium development without the 421-a program may still continue to dominate in certain portions of Manhattan, though the program appears to make rentals more attractive. (12)

The first outcome — lower land prices if 421-a expires — is not that bad for anyone, except current landowners. And it is hard to feel bad for them, given that they should not have expected that 421-a would remain in effect forever (and not to mention the rapid increases in NYC land prices). The second outcome — the new 421-a framework — sounds like better public policy than the existing program.

But one wonders — what would it take for NYC to develop a rational real property tax regime to replace our notoriously inequitable one, one that treats like properties so differently from each other. Can we escape from Wonderland?

Home Buyers & Home Sellers

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Jkirriemuir

The National Association of Realtors has issued its 2015 Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers (highlights only at this link). The profile derives from NAR’s annual survey of recent home buyers and sellers. NAR found that

Demographics continue to shift as the share of first-time home buyers dropped further from last year’s report to 32 percent of the market. This is second only to the lowest share reported in 1987 of 30 percent. Last year’s report had a share of first-time buyers of 33 percent. First-time home buyers are traditionally more likely to be single male or female home buyers and traditionally have lower incomes. As the share of repeat buyers continues to rise, the number of married couples increases and the income of home buyers purchasing homes is higher. Married couples have double the buying power of single home buyers in the market and may be better able to meet the price increases of the housing market. (5)

This adds to the findings of a variety of earlier studies that have described long-term demographic trends that will affect the housing market in very big ways.

I was particularly intrigued by one finding about sellers,

Increased prices are also impacting sellers. Tenure in the home had risen to a peak of 10 years, but in this year’s report it has eased back to nine years. Historically, tenure in the home has been six to seven years. Sellers may now have the equity and buyer demand to sell their home after stalling or delaying their home sale. (5)

This is a dramatic change and reflects the the long-term effects of the Great Recession — just as people delayed buying a new car after the financial crisis, they also delayed purchasing a new home. It’s just that they delay takes longer to see.

The report also has a series of highlights about houses, brokers and mortgages that are worth a looksee.

 

CFPB Mortgage Highlights Fall ’15

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Mike Licht

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau released its Fall 2015 Supervisory Highlights. In the context of mortgage origination, the CFPB found that

supervised entities, in general, effectively implemented and demonstrated compliance with the rule changes, there were instances of non-compliance with certain [rules] . . .. There were also findings of violations of disclosure requirements pursuant to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), implemented by Regulation X; the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), implemented by Regulation Z; and consumer financial privacy rules, implemented by Regulation P. (9, footnotes and sources omitted).

Specifically, it found that one or more entities failed to

  • “fully comply with the requirement that charges at settlement not exceed amounts on the good faith estimate by more than specified tolerances.” (10)
  • comply with the regulations governing HUD-1 settlement statements because of fees on the HUD-1 did match those on invoices; improper calculations on the HUD-1; and fees charged for services that were not provided, among other things.
  • provide required disclosures.
  • reimburse borrowers for understated APRs and finance charges, as required by Regulation Z.

In the context of mortgage servicing, the CFPB found that while it

continues to be concerned about the range of legal violations identified at various mortgage servicers, it also recognizes efforts made by certain servicers to develop an adequate compliance position through increased resources devoted to compliance. . . . Supervision continues to see that the inadequacies of outdated or deficient systems pose considerable compliance risk for mortgage servicers, and that improvements and investments in these systems can be essential to achieving an adequate compliance position. (15)

This is all well and good, but as I have noted before, it is hard to estimate how much of a problem exists from such a report — one or more entities did this, we are concerned about a range of legal violations of that . . .. I understand that the CFPB’s primary audience for this report are CFPB-supervised entities concerned with the CFPB’s regulatory focus, but this approach barely rises to the level of anecdote for the rest of us.

The End of Private-Label Securities?

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Steve Jurvetson

Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase

J.P. Morgan’s Securitized Products Weekly has a report, Proposed FRTB Ruling Endangers ABS, CMBS and Non-Agency RMBS Markets. This is one of those technical studies that have a lot of real world relevance to those of us concerned about the housing markets more generally.

The report analyzes proposed capital rules contained in the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB). JPMorgan believes that these proposed rules would make the secondary trading in residential mortgage-backed securities unprofitable. It also believes that “there is no sector that escapes unscathed; capital will rise dramatically across all securitized product sectors, except agency MBS.” (1) It concludes that “[u]ltimately, in its current form, the FRTB would damage the availability of credit to consumers, reduce lending activity in the form of commercial mortgage and set back private securitization, entrenching the GSEs as the primary securitization vehicle in the residential mortgage market.” (1)

JPMorgan finds that the the impact of these proposed regulations on non-agency residential-mortgage backed securities (jumbos and otherwise) “is so onerous that we wonder if this was the actual intent of the regulators.” Without getting too technical, the authors thought “that the regulators simply had a mathematical mistake in their calculation (and were off by a factor of 100, but unfortunately this is what was intended.” (4) Because these capital rules “would make it highly unattractive for dealers to hold inventory in non-agency securities,” JPMorgan believes that they threaten the entire non-agency RMBS market. (5)

The report concludes with a policy takeaway:

Policymakers have at various times advocated for GSE reform in which the private sector (and private capital) would play a larger role. However, with such high capital requirements under the proposal — compared with capital advantages for GSE securities and a negligible amount of capital for the GSEs themselves — we believe this proposal would significantly set back private securitization, entrenching the GSEs as the primary securitization vehicle in the mortgage market. (5, emphasis removed)

I am not aware if JPMorgan’s concerns are broadly held, so it would important to hear others weigh in on this topic.

If the proposed rule is adopted, it is likely not to be implemented for a few years.  As a result, there is plenty of time to get the right balance between safety and soundness on the one hand and credit availability on the other. While the private-label sector has been a source of trouble in the past, particularly during the subprime boom, it is not in the public interest to put an end to it:  it has provided capital to the jumbo sector and provides much needed competition to Fannie, Freddie and Ginnie.