Tag Archives: fannie

Fannie & Freddie and Multifamily

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The Urban Institute has posted a Housing Finance Policy Center Brief, The GSEs’ Shrinking Role in the Multifamily Market. It opens,

Though the two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—are best known for their dominant role in the single-family mortgage market, they have also been major providers of multifamily housing financing for more than 25 years. Their role in the multifamily market, however, has declined substantially since the housing crisis and has reverted to more normalized levels. In addition, even as the GSEs continue to meet or exceed their multifamily affordable housing goals, their financing for certain underserved segments of the market has fallen steeply in recent years.

Given recent declines, policymakers and regulators should consider maintaining or increasing the GSEs’ footprint in the multifamily market, especially in underserved segments. The scorecard cap increases and exemptions recently employed by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to slow the decline in GSE multifamily volume have been somewhat effective, but they may not be enough to prevent the GSEs’ role from shrinking further. (1)

The policy brief’s main takeaway is that “policymakers and regulators should consider maintaining or increasing GSEs’ role in the multifamily market.” (8) I was struck by the fact that this policy brief pretty much took for granted that it is good for the GSEs to have such a big (and increasing) role in the multifamily market:

Though the multifamily market continues to remain strong and private financing is readily available today, it is also poised to grow significantly because of rising property prices and higher future demand. This raises the question of whether the GSEs should continue to shrink their multifamily footprint even further below the level of early 2000s, a period of relatively stable housing market. (8)

Government intervention in markets is usually called for when there is a market failure. The policy brief indicates the opposite — “private financing is readily available today.” The brief does argue that financing “backed by pure private capital is likely to be concentrated within the more profitable mid-to-high end of the market.” (9) That does not indicate that there is a market failure, just that borrowing costs should be cheaper for such projects. If the federal government is going to effectively subsidize a functioning credit market through the GSEs, it should make sure that it is getting something concrete in return, like affordable housing. Just supporting a credit market generally because it tends to support affordable housing is an inefficient way to achieve public goods like affordable housing. It also is a recipe for special interest capture and a future housing finance crisis. To the extent that this private credit market can function on its own, the government should limit its role to safety and soundness regulation and affordable housing creation.

Reiss on Mortgage Lingo

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MainStreet.com quoted me in 10 Terms of Mortgage Industry Lingo for Potential Homeowners to Learn. It reads, in part,

The mortgage industry is no different from the rest of the financial or tech world and is fraught with odd terminology, tons of acronyms and other confusing jargon.

While it appears to be a great deal of inaccessible blather, learning what these terms really mean can save homeowners thousands of dollars as they are negotiating the terms of their mortgage.

Unpacking the lingo is the first step as you sink your hard-earned money into a house for the next 30 years. Pretty soon you can banter about points and closings just like the rest of the experts.

Here are ten terms that we demystify as you prepare you as you embark on one of the largest commitments in your lifetime.

Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae – Is There a Family Connection?

Just who exactly are Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae? What about Ginnie Mae? This trio was created by the federal government to support a national market for mortgage credit, said David Reiss, a law professor at Brooklyn Law School in New York. None of these entities interacts directly with homebuyers. Instead, all have the goal to make it easier for mortgage lenders to sell mortgages to investors by promising “those in mortgage-backed securities that they will receive their payments of interest and principal in a timely manner in case borrowers default on their payments,” he said.

After a wave of foreclosures following the Great Depression, Ginnie Mae was created by the government to support affordable housing in the U.S. Now it provides funding for all government-insured or government-guaranteed mortgage loans.

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Points

Real estate brokers and mortgage lenders discuss points quite often, especially as you get closer to finalizing the terms of your mortgage, since they are negotiable. This refers to the percentage points of the loan amount that a lender charges to a borrower for a loan, Reiss said. For instance, if a lender charges 1 point on a $200,000 loan, the borrower will owe an additional $2,000 to the lender at the time the loan is closed.

The Future of Fannie and Freddie: The Definitive Panel!

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The  NYU Journal of Law & Business has published The Future of Fannie and Freddie (also on SSRN):

This is a transcript of a panel discussion titled, “The Future of Fannie and Freddie.” The panelists were Dr. Mark Calabria from the Cato Institute; Professor David Reiss from Brooklyn Law School; Professor Lawrence White from NYU Stern School of Business; Dr. Mark Willis from NYU’s Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy. The panel was moderated by Professor Michael Levine from NYU School of Law. Panelists looked at economic policy and future prospects for Fannie and Freddie. My remarks focused on the goals of housing finance policy.

The actual panel occurred some time ago, but it remains current given the limbo in which housing finance reform finds itself.

The Rescue of Fannie and Freddie

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Federal Reserve researchers, W. Scott Frame, Andreas Fuster, Joseph Tracy and James Vickery, have posted a staff report, The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The abstract reads,

We describe and evaluate the measures taken by the U.S. government to rescue Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in September 2008. We begin by outlining the business model of these two firms and their role in the U.S. housing finance system. Our focus then turns to the sources of financial distress that the firms experienced and the events that ultimately led the government to take action in an effort to stabilize housing and financial markets. We describe the various resolution options available to policymakers at the time and evaluate the success of the choice of conservatorship, and other actions taken, in terms of five objectives that we argue an optimal intervention would have fulfilled. We conclude that the decision to take the firms into conservatorship and invest public funds achieved its short-run goals of stabilizing mortgage markets and promoting financial stability during a period of extreme stress. However, conservatorship led to tensions between maximizing the firms’ value and achieving broader macroeconomic objectives, and, most importantly, it has so far failed to produce reform of the U.S. housing finance system.

 This staff report provides a nice overview of the two companies since the financial crisis. I was particularly interested by a couple of sections. First, I found the discussion of receivership versus conservatorship helpful. Second, I liked how it outlined the five objectives for an optimal intervention:

(i) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be enabled to continue their core securitization and guarantee functions as going concerns, thereby maintaining conforming mortgage credit supply.

(ii) The two firms would continue to honor their agency debt and mortgage-backed securities obligations, given the amount and widely held nature of these securities, especially in leveraged financial institutions, and the potential for financial instability in case of default on these obligations.

(iii) The value of the common and preferred equity in the two firms would be extinguished, reflecting their insolvent financial position.

(iv) The two firms would be managed in a way that would provide flexibility to take into account macroeconomic objectives, rather than just maximizing the private value of their assets.

(v) The structure of the rescue would prompt long-term reform and set in motion the transition to a better system within a reasonable period of time. (14-15)

You’ll have to read the paper to see how they evaluate the five objectives in greater detail.

Affordable Housing for which Low-Income Households?

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The National Low Income Housing Coalition’s latest issue of Housing Spotlight provides its annual examination of “the availability of rental housing affordable to” extremely low income “and low income renter households . . ..” (1) It finds that

the gap between the number of ELI households and the number of rental homes that are both affordable and available to them has grown dramatically since the foreclosure crisis and recession. Despite this growing need, most new rental units being built are only affordable to households with incomes above 50% of AMI. At the same time, the existing stock of federally subsidized housing is shrinking through demolition and contract expirations, and waiting lists for housing assistance remain years long in many communities. Federal housing assistance is so limited that just one out of every four eligible households receives it. (1, emphasis in the original)
The article, “Affordable Housing is Nowhere to be Found for Millions,” describes the role of the National Housing Trust Fund, signed into law by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, but only recently funded by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:
The NHTF is structured as a block grant to states, and at least 90% of all funding will be used to produce, preserve, rehabilitate and operate rental housing. Further, 75% of rental housing funding must benefit ELI. The funding of the NHTF will make a difference in the lives of many ELI renters by supporting the development and preservation of housing affordable to this income group. However, additional funding to the NHTF will be necessary to assure support to all income eligible households in need of housing. (1, footnote omitted)
The NLIHC’s key findings from this work include,
  • The number of ELI renter households rose from 9.6 million in 2009 to 10.3 million in 2013 and they made up 24% of all renter households in 2013.
  • There was a shortage of 7.1 million affordable rental units available to ELI renter households in 2013. Another way to express this gap is that there were just 31 affordable and available units per 100 ELI renter households. The data show no change from the analysis a year ago.
  • For the 4.1 million renter households DLI renter households in 2013, there was a shortage of 3.4 million affordable rental units available to them. There were just 17 affordable and available units per 100 DLI renter households.
  • Seventy-five percent of ELI renter households spent more than half of their income on rent and utilities; 90% of DLI renter households spent more than half of their income for rent and utilities.
  • In every state, at least 60% of ELI renters paid more than half of their income on rent and utilities. (1)

Given that housing affordability remained a problem during both boom times and bust and given that we should not expect another dramatic expansion of federal subsidies for rental housing, now might be a good time to ask what we can reasonably expect from the Housing Trust Fund. Should it be spread wide and thin, helping many a bit, or narrow and deep, helping a few a lot? No right answers here.

Friday’s Government Reports Roundup

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Transferring Risk from Fannie & Freddie

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The Federal Housing Finance Agency has posted its FHFA Progress Report on the Implementation of FHFA’s Strategic Plan for the Conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. As its name suggests, it provides a progress report on a range of topics, but I was particularly interested in its section on credit risk transfers for single-family credit guarantees:

The 2014 Conservatorship Strategic Plan’s goal of reducing taxpayer risk builds on the Enterprises’ previous risk transfer efforts. Under the 2013 Conservatorship Scorecard, FHFA expressed the expectation that each Enterprise would conduct risk transfer transactions involving single-family loans with an unpaid principal balance (UPB) of at least $30 billion. The 2014 Conservatorship Scorecard tripled the required risk transfer amount, with the expectation that each Enterprise would transfer a substantial portion of the credit risk on $90 billion in UPB of new mortgage-backed securitizations. FHFA also expected each Enterprise to execute a minimum of two different types of credit risk transfer transactions. FHFA required the Enterprises to conduct all activities undertaken in fulfillment of these objectives in a manner consistent with safety and soundness. During 2014, the two Enterprises executed credit risk transfers on single-family mortgages with a UPB of over $340 billion, which is well above the required amounts. (14)

Risk transfer is an important tool to reduce the risks that taxpayers will be on the hook for future bailouts. The mechanism for these risk transfer deals are not well understood because they are pretty new. The Progress Report describes how they work in relatively clear terms:

The primary way that the Enterprises have executed single-family credit risk transfers to date has been through debt-issuance programs. Freddie Mac transactions are called Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) notes, and Fannie Mae transactions are called Connecticut Avenue Securities (CAS). Following the release of historical credit performance data in 2012, each Enterprise has issued either STACR or CAS notes that transfer a portion of the credit risk from large reference pools of single-family mortgages to private investors. These reference pools are comprised of loans that the Enterprises had previously securitized to sell the interest rate risk of the loans to private investors. The STACR and CAS transactions take the next step of transferring a portion of the credit risk for these loans to investors as well. Each subsequent credit risk transfer transaction is intended to provide credit protection to the issuing Enterprise on the mortgages in the relevant reference pool. (14)

The Progress Report provides more detail for those who are interested. For the rest of us, we may just want to think through the policy implications. How much credit risk can Fannie and Freddie offload? Is it sufficient to make a real dent in the overall risk that the two companies pose to taxpayers? It would be helpful if the FHFA answered those questions in future reports.