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When Tokenized Real-World Assets Collide With The Real World

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Biying Cheng and I have a column in Law 360, When Tokenized Real-World Assets Collide With Real World. It reads,

The city of Detroit filed a public nuisance lawsuit in July of last year in the Michigan Circuit Court for the Third Judicial Circuit against Real Token, its co-founders and 165 affiliated entities, alleging building code and safety violations across over 400 Detroit residential properties.[1] RealT is a blockchain real estate platform that sells fractional interests in individual U.S. rental properties through the issuance of crypto security tokens.

On July 22, the judge issued a temporary restraining order — later converted into a preliminary injunction on Nov. 4 — barring RealT from collecting rent, pursuing evictions without a certificate of compliance and directing future rent into escrow until properties are brought up to code.

Detroit v. Jacobson is ongoing, with a trial scheduled to begin in May. The case highlights the brave new world we face when real estate assets are tokenized via blockchain technology.

The facts surrounding the case raise three pressing questions. First, are these real estate tokens securities? Second, assuming they are, do investors know what they are getting into when they purchase them? Third, and most importantly, are the very human tenants in these properties being provided with habitable housing by their decentralized finance landlords?

Are real estate tokens securities?

Until the Trump administration indicated that it might be taking a new approach to crypto more generally, it seemed clear that tokens like those issued by RealT were securities. Gary Gensler, chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission under the Biden administration, had stated that security tokens were generally securities under the long-standing Howey test, derived from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1946 decision in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.[2]

Trump administration officials have not, however, spoken in one voice on the issue. While SEC Commissioner Hester M. Peirce, the head of the SEC cryptocurrency task force, stated in July last year that “tokenized securities are still securities,” SEC Chairman Paul Atkins stated that “most crypto assets are not securities” a few weeks afterwards.[3]

Further muddying the waters, President Donald Trump’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets released a report around the same time that distinguished between tokenized securities and tokenized nonsecurities, such as “commercial real estate.”[4]

On July 31, Atkins also announced the Project Crypto initiative to aid “President Trump in his historic efforts to make America the ‘crypto capital of the world.'” Under the aegis of Project Crypto, the SEC intends to develop “clear guidelines that market participants can use to determine whether a crypto asset is a security or subject to an investment contract” to slot crypto-assets into various categories.

The initiative also contemplates “an innovation exemption that would allow registrants and non-registrants to quickly go to market with new business models and services,” with no need to comply with burdensome regulatory requirements.[5]

It remains to be seen which types of real estate tokens will be deemed by the Trump administration to be securities and which will be deemed interests in real estate. It is important to acknowledge, however, that it would be a radical change to deem real estate tokens like RealT’s not to be securities, and it would upend decades of settled law relating to the Howey test.[6]

Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Aug. 11 reaffirmed a broad interpretation of the Howey test in SEC v. Barry.[7] To determine whether a security token is a security, the starting point is to decide whether it is an “investment contract” for the purposes of the Securities Act. Courts have found that the Howey test requires four elements to be met to determine whether something is an investment contract: (1) there must be an investment by the investor (2) in a common enterprise (3) with an expectation of profit (4) derived primarily from the efforts of others.

The Ninth Circuit in Barry found that sales of fractional interests in life settlements were investment contracts under the Howey test, and thus are securities. A life settlement is a transaction in which someone sells a policy insuring their own life to investors for an agreed-upon price, and the investors then take over the payment of the premiums and collect the death benefit after the insured dies. The defendants were sales agents for Pacific West Capital Group, a firm that buys life insurance policies from seniors and then sells fractional interests in those policies to investors.

Applying Howey, the court held that investors’ expected profits depended on PWCG’s managerial and ongoing efforts, including its policy selection, operation of the premium-reserve mechanism and the fractionalized structure that left investors reliant on PWCG’s management. The life settlements were thus found to be investment contracts.

Although this case does not address the tokenization issue, it demonstrates that the Howey test is generally applicable to transactions that fall under the broad category of “investment contracts.” So, while recent regulatory announcements impose some uncertainty regarding the applicability of the test, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Barry shows that the Howey test is still alive and well, at least for now.

Are investors protected?

Promoters of real-world asset tokenization claim that they can lower barriers to real estate investing by allowing retail investors into the types of deals that once required high investment minimums and limited access to accredited investors. While the low cost and ease of entry into the real estate tokenization market are real, major challenges remain for retail investors to understand the risks posed by the tokens, as well as those posed by the underlying properties themselves.

Under the current regulatory framework, if a real estate token offering meets the Howey test, it is an investment contract and thus a security. The transaction then must be registered with the SEC or exempted.

Real estate token issuers typically rely on exemptions such as Regulation A, Regulation Crowdfunding, Regulation D and Regulation S. Each of those exemptions has various limitations on solicitation, investor accreditation and amounts raised, as well as other aspects of the offering.

States such as New York and California also have their own regulations that tokens must comply with. State securities regulators have identified schemes tied to digital assets as a top threat for retail investors.[8] It is far from clear whether real estate tokens generally comply with all of the federal and state investor protection regimes that apply to them.

In addition to being exposed to fraud and misrepresentation by token issuers, retail investors are also exposed to real-world problems relating to their investments that can rapidly interrupt cash flows and investor distributions.

Are tenants protected?

The Detroit RealT lawsuit clearly demonstrates how digital assets and their underlying real-world assets interact in a way that an investor pitch deck cannot. As alleged in the lawsuit, tenants in their properties have suffered for months from lack of heat, leaky roofs and other unsafe conditions. Investors are suffering — albeit only financially — for owning such poorly maintained properties.

Tenants are not without remedies. Many local governments, including Detroit, have significant statutory protections in place for residential tenants. Residential rentals in Detroit must obtain and maintain a certificate of compliance, and courts can effectively halt rent payments or consider noncompliance against landlords in  cases. When units are out of compliance, tenants may be directed to escrow rent until code issues are fixed, as the judge in the RealT case has ordered.

What’s next?

We are just beginning to live in a world of tokenized real estate. The RealT case in Detroit should provide some guidance as to how we should navigate this new world.

But the regulatory environment is not yet clear. Investors do not yet understand what they are investing in. And tenants may be suffering real-world consequences until a whole host of regulatory and business issues are worked out.

The sooner we figure it out, the better for all.

[1] City of Detroit, City of Detroit Announces Major Lawsuit Against Real Token And 165 Related Corporate Entities for Widespread Nuisance Abatement Violations (July 24, 2025), https://detroitmi.gov/news/city-detroit-announces-major-lawsuit-against-real-token-and-165-related-corporate-entities.

[2] Gary Gensler, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks on the Importance of Oversight and Investor Protection in Our Crypto Markets (Apr. 4, 2022), Securities and Exchange Commission, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/gensler-remarks-crypto-markets-040422. , 328 U.S. 293 (1946).

[3] Hester Peirce, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Tokenized Securities, (July 9, 2025), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/peirce-statement-tokenized-securities-070925; Paul Atkins, American Leadership in the Digital Finance Revolution (July 31, 2025), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/atkins-digital-finance-revolution-073125.

[4] President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets, Strengthening American Leadership In Digital Financial Technology 37 (July 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/07/fact-sheet-the-presidents-working-group-on-digital-asset-markets-releases-recommendations-to-strengthen-american-leadership-in-digital-financial-technology/.

[5] Paul Atkins, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, American Leadership in the Digital Finance Revolution (July 31, 2025), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/atkins-digital-finance-revolution-073125.

[6] SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).

[7] SEC v. Barry, 146 F.4th 1242 (9th Cir. 2025).

[8] NASAA Highlights Top Investor Threats, North American Securities Administrators Association (Mar. 6, 2025), https://www.nasaa.org/75001/nasaa-highlights-top-investor-threats-for-2025/.

Treasury’s Take on Housing Finance Reform

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Treasury Secretary Mnuchin Being Sworn In

The Department of the Treasury released its Strategic Plan for 2018-2022. One of its 17 Strategic Objectives is to promote housing finance reform:

Support housing finance reform to resolve Government-Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) conservatorships and prevent taxpayer bailouts of public and private mortgage finance entities, while promoting consumer choice within the mortgage market.

Desired Outcomes

Increased share of mortgage credit supported by private capital; Resolution of GSE conservatorships; Appropriate level of sustainable homeownership.

Why Does This Matter?

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been in federal conservatorship for nine years. Taxpayers continue to stand behind their obligations through capital support agreements while there is no clear path for the resolution of their conservatorship. The GSEs, combined with federal housing programs such as those at the Federal Housing Administration and the Department of Veterans Affairs, support more than 70 percent of new mortgage originations. Changes should encourage the entry of greater private capital in the U.S. housing finance system. Resolution of the GSE conservatorships and right-sizing of federal housing programs is necessary to support a more sustainable U.S. housing finance system. (16)

The Plan states that Treasury’s strategies to achieve these objectives are to engage “stakeholders to develop housing finance reform recommendations.” (17) These stakeholders include Congress, the FHFA, Fed, SEC, CFPB, FDIC, HUD (including the FHA), VA, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Association of State Banking Regulators as well as “The Public.” Treasury further intends to disseminate “principles and recommendations for housing finance reform” and plan “for the resolution of current GSE conservatorships.” (Id.)

This is all to the good of course, but it is at such a high level of generality that it tells us next to nothing. In this regard, Trump’s Treasury is not all that different from Obama and George W. Bush’s. Treasury has not taken a lead on housing finance reform since the financial crisis began. While there is nothing wrong with letting Congress take the lead on this issue, it would move things forward if Treasury created an environment in which housing finance reform was clearly identified as a priority in Washington. Nothing good will come from letting Fannie and Freddie limp along in conservatorship for a decade or more.

The Fate of the CFPB

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President Obama Nominating Richard Cordray to Lead Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, with Elizabeth Warren

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia issued a decision in PHH Corporation v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, No. 15-1177 (October 11, 2016), that found an important aspect of the structure of the CFPB to be unconstitutional:  the insulation of the Director from Presidential supervision. While this decision will almost certainly be appealed, even if it is upheld, it will allow the the CFPB to continue functioning much as it has.

I was interviewed about the decision on NPR’s All Things Considered in a segment titled, Appeals Court Orders Restructuring Of Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (audio available). The transcript reads,

AUDIE CORNISH, HOST:

A federal appeals court has mandated big changes to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The three-judge panel says the consumer watchdog agency is set up in a way that’s unconstitutional. In its ruling, the court says the agency will have to restructure. NPR’s Yuki Noguchi reports.

YUKI NOGUCHI, BYLINE: The suit was brought by a mortgage lender called PHH, which asked the court to invalidate a $109 million enforcement action against it and scrap the agency, too. The D.C. Court of Appeals sent the fine back to the bureau for review.

But it also ruled that the CFPB’s director has too much power to write and enforce rules without enough oversight from another branch of government. The remedy, the panel says, is that the CFPB should fall under the president’s control. And the president should be able to remove the director at will.

The CFPB’s opponents in the financial services industry declared victory. Bill Himpler is executive vice president for the American Financial Services Association.

BILL HIMPLER: Our issue is still with the authority given to a single director. That is, as the court pointed out, not subject to a lot of oversight.

NOGUCHI: Himpler instead supports a CFPB run by a bipartisan commission, similar to others like the Securities and Exchange Commission. David Reiss, a law professor at Brooklyn Law School, says the ruling is not an existential challenge to the CFPB or its past decisions.

DAVID REISS: The decision does not invalidate the CFPB’s actions. This is more about its structure going forward.

NOGUCHI: Reiss says an appeal to the Supreme Court is all but guaranteed. Indeed, the CFPB says it disagrees with the conclusion. In an emailed statement, a spokesperson says the ruling does not change its mission and that it is, quote, “considering options for seeking further review of the court’s decision.”

Dennis Kelleher is CEO of Better Markets, a group that advocates for stronger financial regulation. He says the bureau’s actions on banks have made the financial sector more determined to undercut the agency.

DENNIS KELLEHER: They do not want a consumer watchdog on the Wall Street beat. That’s what this fight is about.

NOGUCHI: The decision was not unanimous on all the issues. Judge Karen Henderson dissented in part, saying the panel overreached in calling the bureau’s structure unconstitutional. Yuki Noguchi, NPR News, Washington.

 

The Future of Securitization

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SEC Commissioner Piwowar

SEC Commissioner Piwowar

SEC Commissioner Michael Piwowar’s Remarks at ABS Vegas 2016 are worth a look for all of those interested in the future of the mortgage-backed securities market. I have interspersed selections of his remarks with my comments:

As our country’s capital markets regulator, the SEC’s tripartite mission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.  Securitization can transform illiquid assets like mortgages, auto loans, credit card receivables, and future sales of David Bowie albums into marketable securities.  By serving as an efficient means of allocating scarce capital, securitization supports economic growth, business development, and job creation.  Securitization further fosters resiliency by diversifying the funding base of our economy.

There are many other benefits associated with securitization, including the potential for reduced costs of, and expanded access to, credit for borrowers, the ability to match risk profiles for specific investor demands, and increased secondary market liquidity.  Because banks and other originators can move loans off of their balance sheets into asset-backed securities (ABS), securitization can increase the availability of credit for both businesses and individuals.  In many instances, securitization can allow a person to obtain more favorable terms than can be obtained from a bank or other financial institution.

Thus, the ABS market serves as a critical source of capital, providing funding for home and automobile loans, credit cards, and many other purposes.  Yet, as shown during the recent financial crisis, investors may abandon the ABS market if they do not believe they possess sufficient information to evaluate the risks associated with a particular asset-backed security and to price it accordingly.

While I generally agree with Piwowar’s assessment of securitization’s value, it is worth noting that he does not acknowledge how important robust consumer protection is to maintaining a healthy securitization market over the long run.

I found his discussion of the Dodd-Frank credit risk retention rules particularly interesting:

For the record, I voted against the credit risk retention rules.  These rules require a securitizer to retain a minimum 5% credit risk of any securitization transaction and generally prohibit the sponsor from hedging its retained interest.  I was particularly dismayed by the “one-size-fits-all” approach taken by the regulators to create a flat 5% risk retention requirement for all asset classes, except for securitizations involving so-called “qualified residential mortgages” (QRMs) for which the risk retention level is zero.  These were arbitrary choices.

Residential mortgages, commercial mortgages, credit card receivables, and automobile loans each have distinct and different attributes associated with their underlying borrowers.  Rather than carefully examining these attributes to determine an optimal credit risk retention rate for each asset class, prudential regulators in Washington, D.C., took the easy way out – they simply set it at the maximum statutory rate and ignored the authorization from Congress to create lower risk retention requirements or use alternative methods to align interests.

Perhaps the prudential bureaucrats had their own conflict of interests in setting these requirements.  After all, a prudential bureaucrat has a strong interest in self-preservation.  Will a prudential bureaucrat get credit if optimally tailored risk retention rates increase economic growth and provide additional opportunities to families and businesses across America?  No.  Will a prudential bureaucrat take the blame if the next financial crisis – and there will be one eventually – relates at all to securitizations?  Probably.  Hence, what better way to side step responsibility than to refrain from using reasoned judgment and rely solely on the most risk-averse interpretation of statute instead?

Bureaucratic self-preservation might also explain the decision to adopt as broad of an exemption for QRMs as possible, so as to minimize any political fallout from the real estate and housing industries.  Few will disagree that residential mortgage-backed securities played an important role in the 2008 financial crisis.  For those in the audience involved in RMBS offerings, you must be quite happy with the broad exemption from the risk retention rules.  For those of you in the audience who are involved in other types of securitizations that had little, if any, part in causing the financial crisis, you are probably wondering why you were unfairly targeted.  Unfortunately, unlike Las Vegas, what happens in Washington does not stay in Washington. (footnotes omitted)

Piwowar gives short shrift to the benefits of clear and simple rules, but it is still worth paying attention to his critique of the “one size fits all” risk retention rules. If researchers can demonstrate that these rules are not optimally tailored, perhaps that would provide a reason to reconsider them. This is, of course, a long shot, given that the rules have been finalized, but Piwowar is right to shine light on the issue nonetheless.

Candid and thoughtful remarks from regulators are always refreshing. These make the grade.

Monday’s Adjudication Roundup

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  • BNY Mellon files a brief on writ for cert with the Supreme Court warning the potential for “warping” the residential mortgage-backed securities market if it overturns the Second Circuit’s decision finding that provisions of the Trust Indenture Act did not apply to the securities at issue.
  • Investors of Citibank file a class action in NY state court claiming that Citibank ignored toxic residential mortgage-backed securities causing $2.3 billion in losses.
  • Investors sue RAIT Financial Trust and its trustees alleging that the trust knew about subsidiary pocketing fees leading to a $21.5 million SEC settlement.

Monday’s Adjudication Roundup

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Monday’s Adjudication Roundup

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