The High Cost of Living in NOLA

photo by Ken Lund

Occupy.com quoted me in For Struggling Renters in New Orleans, Hope May Be Coming A Bit Late. It opens,

Twenty-four-year old Stuart Marino is a finance major at University of New Orleans with $8,000 in student loan debt and 33 credit hours until graduation. But the alternative to obtaining that diploma is worse. As statistics show, those not having a college degree are much more likely to remain poor. Marino was not fortunate enough to have been born a decade earlier. Then, tuition at UNO was half of what it is now. During Republican Governor Bobby Jindal’s term, from 2007 to 2015, tuition at Louisiana public colleges skyrocketed due to massive budget cuts.

Despite having a job, Marino says he spends more than 30 percent of his income on rent and utilities. He would not be able to cover the cost of a $1,000 medical emergency. Indeed, he has delayed getting his car fixed, something vital to reaching his job and school.

“Fixing my car would be something I would be doing with that $700,” he said, referring to the monthly rent.

Marino’s story personifies what many people here and nationwide have experienced over the last decade as rents in cities and even in urban areas of less than 1 million have soared, exacerbating income inequality while disproportionately affecting racial minorities, the less educated and millennials.

In the last year alone, rents in the U.S. have increased 3 percent, according to Apartment List. In New York City and San Francisco, the median rent has climbed to $4,500 and higher. The cost of living in these cities can be understood as the price, however astronomical, of living in one of the country’s major economic centers, where industries like finance and tech pay high salaries.

But in smaller cities such as Miami and New Orleans, both of which count on tourism as a major source of revenue, more than a third of residents devote 50 percent of their monthly income to rent and utilities, according to Make Room, a campaign by the non-profit Enterprises Inc. that aims to create more affordable housing.

Factor in stagnant wages, a low supply of multi-unit housing, and higher credit requirements post-Recession, and the number of Americans paying 30 percent or more of their gross income on rent and utilities has risen by 22 percent in the past decade. This goes against what financial experts recommend: that people spend no more than 30 percent on basic monthly costs in order to have a cushion in case of catastrophic events like a job loss or a medical emergency.

Working harder is, in most cases, not an option. According to last month’s Bureau of Labor Statistics report, the number of Americans involuntarily working part-time has reached 6 million, and is showing “little movement since November.”

The Housing Crisis in New Orleans

New Orleans has undergone many changes since Hurricane Katrina devastated the city in August 2005. And not all of them have been positive. Sociological studies show that renters are more likely to remain displaced than homeowners. In areas of the city like the Lower 9th Ward, where most residents rented, fewer have returned since Katrina than in neighborhoods where home ownership was predominant – even including those areas that flooded. For those who have returned with few economic resources, many face a long wait for housing; according to the Housing Authority of New Orleans, in September 2015 more than 13,000 people, disproportionally African-American, were still waiting for housing vouchers.

Changing the current housing reality is akin to shoring up the foundation of a home; it can be done, but not easily. “Fundamentally, building housing is costly,” David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School and an expert in real estate and community development, told Occupy.com.

A free market economy incentivizes people to invest in something only in exchange for profit. That leaves the job of providing affordable housing up to government, but municipalities have moved away from programs establishing dense urban public housing.

Reiss pointed out that vertical expansion could alleviate high rents in urban areas. But many residents, particularly those in historic neighborhoods, don’t want to see large buildings built in their neighborhoods; it’s a NIMBY, or “not in my backyard,” conundrum.

Nonbank Mortgage Servicers and the Foreclosure Crisis

photo by kafka4prez

The United States Government Accountability Office has issued a report, Nonbank Mortgage Servicers: Existing Regulatory Oversight Could Be Strengthened. The GAO found that

The share of home mortgages serviced by nonbanks increased from approximately 6.8 percent in 2012 to approximately 24.2 percent in 2015 (as measured by unpaid principal balance). However, banks continued to service the remainder (about 75.8 percent). Some market participants GAO interviewed said nonbank servicers’ growth increased the capacity for servicing delinquent loans, but they also noted challenges. For example, rapid growth of some nonbank servicers did not always coincide with their use of more advanced operating systems or effective internal controls to handle their larger portfolios—an issue identified by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and others.

Nonbank servicers are generally subject to oversight by federal and state regulators and monitoring by market participants, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the enterprises). In particular, CFPB directly oversees nonbank servicers as part of its responsibility to help ensure compliance with federal laws governing mortgage lending and consumer financial protection. However, CFPB does not have a mechanism to develop a comprehensive list of nonbank servicers and, therefore, does not have a full record of entities under its purview. As a result, CFPB may not be able to comprehensively enforce compliance with consumer financial laws. In addition, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) is the safety and soundness regulator of the enterprises. As such, it has indirect oversight of third parties that do business with the enterprises, including nonbanks that service loans on the enterprises’ behalf. However, in contrast to bank regulators, FHFA lacks statutory authority to examine these third parties to identify and address deficiencies that could affect the enterprises. GAO has previously determined that a regulatory system should ensure that similar risks and services are subject to consistent regulation and that a regulator should have sufficient authority to carry out its mission. Without such authority, FHFA may lack a supervisory tool to help it more effectively monitor third parties’ operations and the enterprises’ actions to manage any associated risks.

As with many GAO reports, this one provides a lot of information about a very obscure, but important, subject. In this case, the report provides a good overview of the servicing industry since the financial crisis. The report also highlights the risks to consumers and the financial industry that result from the rapid expansion of the servicing market share of nonbanks.

One of the disturbing aspects of the foreclosure crisis was the sense that the servicing sector couldn’t do a better job of assisting borrowers, even if it wanted to, because it did not have the resources to meet the challenge. Changes implemented since then, driven in large part by the CFPB, may make things better during the next such crisis. But this report does not give one the sense that they will be all that much better. The GAO report rightly calls for further work to be done to ensure that the industry is prepared to meet the challenges that are sure to come its way.

Bold New Housing Plan?

photo by Cybershot800i

Wanderer Above the Sea of Fog by Caspar David Friedrich

Enterprise Community Partners has released An Investment in Opportunity: A Bold New Vision for Housing Policy in the U.S. I thought it would be useful to highlight its specific proposals to make rental housing affordable for low-income households:

I. ENSURE BROAD ACCESS TO HIGH-OPPORTUNITY NEIGHBORHOODS

  1. Improve the Section 8 program and expand regional mobility programs to help more families with rental assistance vouchers access high-opportunity neighborhoods 
  2. Establish state and local laws banning “source of income” discrimination by landlords and property owners 
  3. Balance the allocation of Low-Income Housing Tax Credits and other federal subsidies to both high-opportunity neighborhoods and low-income communities, while creating more opportunities for mixed-income developments 
  4. Establish inclusionary zoning rules at the state and local levels 
  5. Establish state and local regulations that encourage innovation and promote the cost-effective development of multifamily housing 
  6. Incorporate affordable housing considerations into local and regional transportation planning through equitable transit-oriented development

II. PROMOTE COMPREHENSIVE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN LOW-INCOME NEIGHBORHOODS

  1. Make the public and private investments necessary to preserve existing affordable housing while creating mixed-income communities 
  2. Build capacity of public, private and philanthropic organizations at the local level to pursue cross-sector solutions to the problems facing low-income communities 
  3. Create state and local land banks and other entities to return vacant and abandoned properties to productive use 
  4. Make permanent and significantly expand the New Markets Tax Credit 
  5. Create a new federal tax credit for private investments in community development financial institutions and other community development entities 
  6. Establish federal regulations that encourage “impact investments” in low-income communities by individual and institutional investors

III. RECALIBRATE OUR PRIORITIES IN HOUSING POLICY TO TARGET SCARCE SUBSIDY DOLLARS WHERE THEY’RE NEEDED MOST

  1.  Reform the Mortgage Interest Deduction and other federal homeownership subsidies to ensure that scarce resources are targeted to the families who are most in need of assistance 
  2. Gradually double annual allocations of Low-Income Housing Tax Credits and provide additional gap financing to support the expansion 
  3. Significantly expand funding to Section 8 vouchers to ensure that the most vulnerable households in the U.S. have access to some form of rental assistance 
  4. Expand funding to the Housing Trust Fund and the Capital Magnet Fund as part of any effort to reform America’s mortgage finance system 
  5. Break down funding silos to encourage public investments in healthy and affordable housing for recipients of Medicaid 
  6. Create permanent funding sources at the state and local level to support affordable housing

IV. IMPROVE THE OVERALL FINANCIAL STABILITY OF LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS

  1. Establish minimum wages at the federal, state and local levels that reflect the reasonable cost of living for each community 
  2. Expand the Earned Income Tax Credit, the Child Tax Credit and other essential income supports to America’s low-wage workers 
  3. Create a new federal fund to help test and scale innovative financial products that encourage low-income households to save, with a primary focus on unrestricted emergency savings 
  4. Help more low-income families build strong credit histories 
  5. Establish strong protections against predatory financial products

Not sure if I could really categorize this as “bold.” “Unrealistic” seems more apt in today’s political environment. Indeed, it reads like a wishlist drafted by a committee.

That being said, I think that Enterprise’s vision is helpful in a variety of ways. First, it offers a pretty comprehensive list of policies and programs that that can be used to  make housing more affordable. Second, it recognizes income inequality is a big part of the problem for low-income households. Third, it acknowledges that current federal housing policy favors wealthy households (cf. mortgage interest deduction) over the poor. Finally, it acknowledges that restrictive local land use policies inflate the cost of housing.

I wonder if a bolder plan would be just to fully fund Section 8 so that all low-income households were able to afford a safe and well-maintained home. Probably just as unrealistic as Enterprise’s vision, but it has the virtue of being simple to understand and execute.

The Duty to Serve Underserved Markets

Riverview Homes Inc

The Federal Housing Finance Agency has issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Request for Comments regarding Enterprise Duty to Serve Underserved Markets.  The “Enterprises” are Fannie and Freddie and this duty to serve is a highly contested one, with some on the right blaming it for pretty much the whole financial crisis and some on the left arguing that it is the key rationale for keeping the government involved in the mortgage market.

This debate is complicated by the fact that Fannie and Freddie are in conservatorship for the foreseeable future. Whatever one believes the duty to serve should be for the two companies if they were operating independently, one might have a different view of it while they are operating as government instrumentalities.

The Notice provides the following summary:

The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) amended the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 (Safety and Soundness Act) to establish a duty for the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) (collectively, the Enterprises) to serve three specified underserved markets—manufactured housing, affordable housing preservation, and rural markets—to increase the liquidity of mortgage investments and improve the distribution of investment capital available for mortgage financing for very low-, low-, and moderate-income families in those markets. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) is issuing and seeking comments on a proposed rule that would provide Duty to Serve credit for eligible Enterprise activities that facilitate a secondary market for mortgages related to: Manufactured homes titled as real property; blanket loans for certain categories of manufactured housing communities; preserving the affordability of housing for renters and homebuyers; and housing in rural markets. The proposed rule would establish a method for evaluating and rating the Enterprises’ compliance with the Duty to Serve each underserved market.

Written comments must be received on or before March 17, 2016, so get crackin’.

Fannie/Freddie 2016 Scorecard

Anne Madsen

The Federal Housing Finance Agency has posted the 2016 Scorecard for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Common Securitization Solutions. The FHFA assesses the three entities using the following criteria, among others:

  • The extent to which each Enterprise conducts initiatives in a safe and sound manner consistent with FHFA’s expectations for all activities;
  • The extent to which the outcomes of their activities support a competitive and resilient secondary mortgage market to support homeowners and renters . . . (2)

The FHFA expects Fannie and Freddie to “Maintain, in a Safe and Sound Manner, Credit Availability and Foreclosure Prevention Activities for New and Refinanced Mortgages to Foster Liquid, Efficient, Competitive, and Resilient National Housing Finance Markets.” (3) The specifics are, unfortunately, not too specific when it comes to big picture issues like maintaining credit availability in a safe and sound manner, although the scorecard does discuss particular programs and policies like the Reps and Warranties Framework and the expiration of HAMP and HARP.

The FHFA also expects Fannie and Freddie to “Reduce Taxpayer Risk Through Increasing the Role of Private Capital in the Mortgage Market.” Here, the FHFA has more specifics, as it outlines particular risk transfer objects, such as requiring the Enterprises to transfer “credit risk on at least 90 percent of the unpaid principal balance of newly acquired single-family mortgages in” certain loan categories. (5)

The last goals relate to the building of the Common Securitization Platform and Single Security: Fannie and Freddie are to “Build a New Single-Family Infrastructure for Use by the Enterprises and Adaptable for Use by Other Participants in the Secondary Market in the Future.” (7) The FHFA us moving with all deliberate speed to reshape the secondary mortgage market in the face of indifference or gridlock in Congress.

The FHFA may implement the reform of Fannie and Freddie all by its lonesome. Maybe that’s the best result, given where Congress is these days.

 

Building HOME

housing construction

The HOME Coalition, a coalition of affordable housing organizations, has posted Building HOME: The HOME Investment Partnerships Program’s Impact on America’s Families and Communities, its 2015 report. I don’t think HOME is a household word, at least when it is in ALLCAPS, so here are the basics, taken from the report:

For over 20 years, the HOME Investment Partnerships Program (HOME) has proven to be one of the most effective, locally driven tools to help states and communities provide access to safe, decent, and affordable housing for low-income residents. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) reports that since HOME’s authorization in 1990, $26.3 billion in HOME funds have leveraged an additional $117 billion in public and private resources to help build and preserve nearly 1.2 million affordable homes and to provide direct rental assistance to more than 270,000 families. The HOME Coalition estimates that this investment has supported nearly 1.5 million jobs and has generated $94.2 billion in local income.

*     *      *

With HOME, Congress created a program that provides states and communities with unmatched flexibility and local control to meet the housing needs that they identify as most pressing. HOME is the only federal housing program exclusively focused on addressing such a wide range of housing activities. States and local communities use HOME to fund new production where affordable housing is scarce, rehabilitation where housing quality is a challenge, rental assistance when affordable homes are available, and provide homeownership opportunities when those are most needed. Moreover, this flexibility means that states and communities can quickly react to changes in their local housing markets. (7, emphasis removed)

The report calls attention to the fact that Congress has been making big cuts to HOME funding since 2010. These cuts show the complexities inherent in federal housing policy, coming as they do right on the heels of the creation of the National Housing Trust Fund in 2008.

Congress appears to giveth and taketh away from housing programs in equal measure. As an added bonus for Congress, it taketh away on-budget items (HOME) and giveth off-budget items (NHTF, funded by Fannie and Freddie surcharges), making it an even more politically expedient trade-off. HOME dollars are a lot more flexible than NHTF dollars, so even a dollar for dollar trade has significant downsides for state housing programs. There is a lot not to like about this development in federal housing policy.

Fannie, Freddie & The Affordable Housing Feint

ShapiroPhoto

Robert J. Shapiro

kamarck_mm_duo

Elaine C. Kamarck

 

 

 

 

 

Robert J. Shapiro and Elaine C. Kamarck have posted A Strategy to Promote Affordable Housing for All Americans By Recapitalizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. While it presents as a plan to fund affordable housing, the biggest winners would be speculators who bought up shares of Fannie and Freddie stock and who may end up with nothing if a plan like this is not adopted.  The Executive Summary states that

This study presents a strategy for ending the current conservatorship and majority government ownership of Fannie and Freddie in a way that will enable them, once again, to effectively promote greater homeownership by average Americans and greater access to affordable housing by low-income households. This strategy includes regulation of both enterprises to prevent a recurrence of their effective insolvency in 2008 and the associated bailouts, including 4.0% capital reserves, regular financial monitoring, examinations and risk assessments by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), as dictated by HERA. Notably, an internal Treasury analysis in 2011 recommended capital requirements, consistent with the Basel III accords, of 3.0% to 4.0%. In addition, the President should name a substantial share of the boards of both enterprises, to act as public interest directors. The strategy has four basic elements to ensure that Fannie and Freddie can rebuild the capital required to responsibly carry out their basic missions, absorb losses from future housing downturns, and expand their efforts to support access to affordable housing for all households:

  • In recognition of Fannie and Freddie’s repayments to the Treasury of $239 billion, some $50 billion more than they received in bailout payments, the Treasury would write off any remaining balance owed by the enterprises under the “Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements” (PSPAs).
  • The Treasury also would end its quarterly claim or “sweep” of the profits earned by Fannie and Freddie, so their future retained earnings can be used to build their capital reserves.
  • Fannie and Freddie also should raise roughly $100 billion in additional capital through several rounds of new common stock sales into the market.
  • The Treasury should transfer its warrants for 79.9% of Fannie and Freddie’s current common shares to the HTF [Housing Trust Fund] and the CMF [Capital Magnet Fund], which could sell the shares in a series of secondary stock offerings and use the proceeds, estimated at $100 billion, to endow their efforts to expand access to affordable housing for even very low-income households.

Under this strategy, Fannie and Freddie could once again ensure the liquidity and stability of U.S. housing markets, under prudent financial constraints and less exposure to the risks of mortgage defaults. The strategy would dilute the common shares holdings of current private investors from 20% to 10%, while increasing their value as Fannie and Freddie restore and claim their profitability. Finally, the strategy would establish very substantial support through the HTF and CPM for state programs that increase access to affordable rental housing by very low-income American and affordable home ownership by low-to-moderate income households.

Wow — there is a lot that is very bad about this plan.  Where to begin? First, we would return to the same public/private hybrid model for Fannie and Freddie that got us into so much trouble to begin with.

Second, it would it would reward speculators in Fannie and Freddie stock. That is not terrible in itself, but the question would be — why would you want to? The reason given here would be to put a massive amount of money into affordable housing. That seems like a good rationale, until you realize that that money would just be an accounting move from one federal government account to another. It does not expand the pie, it just makes one slice bigger and one slice smaller. This is a good way to get buy-in from some constituencies in the housing industry, but from a broader public policy perspective, it is just a shuffling around of resources.

There’s more to say, but this blog post has gone on long enough. Fannie and Freddie need to be reformed, but this is not the way to do it.