- NY federal court approves Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Goldman Sachs & Co. and UBS Securities LLC settlement for $235 million in class action from pension fund for false prospectuses in mortgage-backed securities.
- Better Markets, a financial reform advocacy group, files brief in support of $1.3 billion penalty for Bank of America Corp. for fraud in one of its programs, “Hustle”, which allegedly ripped off Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
- Investors filed suit against US Bank NA in New York for failing to act in their best interests in regard to mortgage-backed security trust losses.
Tag Archives: New York
This Is What Bad Faith Looks Like
A New York judge ruled in Federal National Mortgage Assoc. v. Singer, 2015 NY Slip Op. 51038(U) (July 15, 2015 Sup. Ct., New York County) (Moulton, J.) (unpublished opinion), that two lenders will forfeit more $100,000 in interest payments on two mortgages because they did not act in good faith in negotiating a mortgage modification, as required by New York law. There is a lot of choice language in the opinion, but it is useful to read the judge’s summary of what the borrowers went through in trying to get the modification.
The judge disagreed with the lenders’ “positive assessment of the negotiations” as it was “belied” by the facts:
Fannie Mae delayed filing of Action No. 1 (filed on June 14, 2011) 17 and 1/2 months after the date of default. Counsel then delayed filing the RJI [Request for Judicial Intervention] for another three months after the answer was filed. The first settlement conference, scheduled on March 14, 2012, had to be rescheduled to May 2, 2012 due to Fannie Mae’s non-appearance, a one and one-half month delay. It took Fannie Mae and its counsel another five and 1/2 months to provide an explanation for why the two mortgages could not be merged or consolidated, and only after wasting time at two conferences in June and July attended by attorneys without knowledge of the case or settlement authority and only after my court attorney probed for answers. Thereafter, the Singers submitted the requested documentation for a loan modification of the 400-Mtge., despite confusing and conflicting requests by the Rosicki firm, by August 3, 2012. When that application became “stale,” the court directed the Singers to update the information and, finally, after another two-month delay, Seterus offered the Singers a trial modification plan on or about October 11, 2012. When the Singers received the permanent loan modification papers from Seterus in January 2013, they objected to the payment of $63,632.21 in accrued interest and the $5,605.23 accrued interest. It took many months for Seterus to admit its mistake on the escrow deficiency, and only after much prodding by the court for status updates. Seterus did not offer the Singers a new loan modification agreement until the very end of October 2013 — a whopping nine-month delay. Finally, it took Fannie Mae’s counsel another five months to reject the Singers’ January 1, 2014 counteroffer to pay $18,000 of the accrued interest.
Accordingly, the court holds that Fannie Mae and/or its counsel have acted in bad faith and have unreasonably delayed a resolution of this foreclosure action. As a result, interest should be tolled on the note and mortgage in the amount over and above 2% annually, for the period from September 30, 2011 (one month after Singers’ filing of their answer in Action No. 1) through the date of this Decision and Order. (10-11, footnotes omitted)
It is hard to really get how crazy the modification process can be in the abstract, so sitting with facts like these is a useful exercise. And this seems like the right result on these facts.
I have blogged before about the Kafkaesque struggles that borrowers face. Some deny that lenders behave this badly in general but the cases and the large scale settlements “belie” this too. What will it take to give borrowers a consistent and reasonable experience with mortgage modifications?
Bank Break-ins
Chris Odinet has posted Banks, Break-Ins, and Bad Actors in Mortgage Foreclosure to SSRN. The abstract reads,
During the housing crisis banks were confronted with a previously unknown number mortgage foreclosures, and even as the height of the crisis has passed lenders are still dealing with a tremendous backlog. Overtime lenders have increasingly engaged third party contractors to assist them in managing these assets. These property management companies — with supposed expertise in the management and preservation of real estate — have taken charge of a large swathe of distressed properties in order to ensure that, during the post-default and pre-foreclosure phases, the property is being adequately preserved and maintained. But in mid-2013 a flurry of articles began cropping up in newspapers and media outlets across the country recounting stories of people who had fallen behind on their mortgage payments returning home one day to find that all of their belongings had been taken and their homes heavily damaged. These homeowners soon discovered that it was not a random thief that was the culprit, but rather property management contractors hired by the homeowners’ mortgage servicer.
The issues arising from these practices have become so pervasive that lawsuits have been filed in over 30 states, and legal aid organizations in California, Florida, Michigan, Nevada, and New York report that complaints against lender-engaged property managements firms number among their top grievances. This Article analyzes lender-engaged property management firms and these break-in foreclosure activities. In doing so, the paper makes a three-part call to action, which includes the implementation of bank contractor oversight regulations, the creation of a private cause of action for aggrieved homeowners, and the curtailment of property preservation clauses in mortgage contracts.
This is a timely article about a cutting edge issue. All too often I have heard pro-bank lawyers claim that banks almost never foreclose improperly. The news reports and lawsuits discussed in this article counter that claim. And yet, I hope that some empirically-minded person could quantify the frequency of such misbehavior to better inform policymakers going forward.
Possession of Note Confers Standing to Foreclose
Dale Whitman posted this discussion of Aurora Loan Services, LLC v. Taylor, 2015 WL 3616293 (N.Y. Ct. App., June 11, 2015) on the DIRT listserv:
There is nothing even slightly surprising about this decision, except that it sweeps away a lot of confused and irrelevant language found in decisions of the Appellate Division over the years. The court held simply holds (like nearly all courts that have considered the issue in recent years) that standing to foreclose a mortgage is conferred by having possession of the promissory note. Neither possession of the mortgage itself nor any assignment of the mortgage is necessary. “[T]he note was transferred to [the servicer] before the commencement of the foreclosure action — that is what matters.” And once a note is transferred, … “the mortgage passes as an incident to the note.” Here, there was a mortgage assignment, the validity of which the borrower attacked, but the attack made no difference; “The validity of the August 2009 assignment of the mortgage is irrelevant to [the servicer’s] standing.”
The opinion in Aurora makes it clear that prior Appellate Division statements are simply incorrect and confused when they suggest that standing would be conferred by an assignment of the mortgage without delivery of the note. See, e.g., GRP Loan LLC v. Taylor 95 A.D.3d at 1174, 945 N.Y.S.2d 336; Deutsche Bank Trust Co. v. Codio, 94 A.D.3d 1040, 1041, 943 N.Y.S.2d 545 [2d Dept 2012].) For an excellent analysis of why these decisions are wrong, see Bank of New York Mellon v. Deane, 970 N.Y.S.2d 427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013).
The Aurora decision implicitly rejects such cases as Erobobo, which suppose that the failure to comply with a Pooling and Servicing Agreement would somehow prevent the servicer from foreclosing. In the present case, the loan was securitized in 2006, but the note was delivered to the servicer on May 20, 2010, only four days before filing the foreclosure action. This presented no problem at all the court. If the servicer had possession at the time of the filing of the case (as it did), it had standing. (I must concede, however, that the rejection is only implicit, since the Erobobo theory was not argued in Aurora.)
If there is a weakness in the Aurora decision, it is its failure to determine whether the note was negotiable, and (assuming it was) to analyze the application UCC Article 3’s “person entitled to enforce” language. But this is not much of a criticism, since it is very likely that under New York law, the right to enforce would be transferred by delivery of the note to the servicer even if the note were nonnegotiable.
It has taken the Court of Appeals a long time to get around to cleaning up this area of the law, but its work is exactly on target.
Monday’s Adjudication Roundup
- The CFPB increased PHH Corp.’s penalty to $109 million from $6.4 million on appeal, while upholding an administrative judge’s ruling that the firm was involved in a mortgage insurance kickback scheme.
- A class of PHH borrowers have been granted cert to the U.S. Supreme Court alleging that PHH Corp. violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.
- NY Court of Appeals bars mortgage-backed securities suit for $330 million against Deutsche Bank AG due to a six-year statute of limitations that started when the contract was signed.
- Nomura Holdings Inc. is appealing $806 million verdict in suit brought by the Federal Housing Finance Agency for selling bad mortgage-backed securities to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
- The Securities and Exchange Commission brought suit against a New York broker for $4.1 million for allegedly selling unregistered securities through several entities.
Reiss on Lawsky Legacy
Law360 quoted me in Lawsky’s Aggressive Tactics Provided Model For Regulators (behind a paywall). It reads, in part,
New York Superintendent of Financial Services Benjamin Lawsky’s frequent, aggressive and often creative enforcement actions generated billions of dollars for the state and put his agency at the forefront in financial services regulation, and observers expect a similar approach from Lawsky’s successor when he leaves his post next month.
Confirmed to lead the New York Department of Financial Services in May 2011, few expected the new agency, which combined the state’s banking and insurance regulators, to make much of a mark. But after collecting $3.3 billion in penalties and forcing several traders and top executives out of their positions, Lawsky’s agency has proven to be a powerful enforcer.
“His biggest legacy is simply that he stood up a brand new regulator in one of the global financial centers and made it matter almost immediately,” said Matthew L. Schwartz, a partner at Boies Schiller & Flexner LLP and a former federal prosecutor. Lawsky, who announced his departure from the agency on May 20, established a name for himself and for the Department of Financial Services when he jumped ahead of federal banking regulators and prosecutors in announcing a $340 million settlement with British bank Standard Chartered PLC over its alleged violation of U.S. sanctions against Iran and other countries in August 2012.
That a newly formed state regulatory agency would move ahead with a stiff penalty and threaten to wield the most powerful of weapons — the pulling of Standard Chartered’s license to operate in New York state — reportedly rankled his federal counterparts
* * *
“He made clear that consumer protection is integral to the mission of the agency,” Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss said.
Despite Lawsky’s frequent reminders that he works for New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo — for whom he has also served as chief of staff — and the superintendent’s constant praise for his staff, there is fear among some reformers that the DFS won’t be the same without Lawsky at the helm.
“Lawsky proves that the character of individual regulators can make a crucial difference more than the letter of the law itself,” said Bartlett Naylor of Public Citizen.
“Ideally, he’ll inspire his successor and other regulators that honor awaits the vigilant and opprobrium will fall upon the indolent. More practically, however, the problems of regulatory capture by an enormously influential industry reliant on government favor can prove overwhelming,” Naylor added.
Others are more confident that the agency Lawsky set up will continue its work even after his move to the private sector.
In part, that’s because the penalties the DFS has wracked up have been a boon to New York’s budget.
Cuomo, the state’s former attorney general, has an interest in many of the issues Lawsky acted on, as well.
“I have every reason to expect that Cuomo would want to have a very vigorous enforcer to replace Lawsky,” Reiss said.
Monday’s Adjudication Roundup
- Quicken Loans Inc. filed a complaint against the Justice Department and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development claiming that they tried to get Quicken to make false admissions during a settlement. The Government in turn sued Quicken under the False Claims Act for improper underwriting of mortgages and benefitting under the Federal Housing Administration insurance payouts.
- The United States Supreme Court denied cert to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, which argued that using contracts rather than grants to fund Section 8 public housing projects would impair the program.
- The Second Circuit Court of Appeals revived suit against Citigroup. The claims, which alleged that Citigroup tricked a Korean bank into taking $25 million in toxic collateralized debt obligations, were dismissed in the New York District Court in March 2013.
- Federal court requires RBS Securities to hand over which specific loans it is going to re-underwrite to National Credit Union Administration after allegedly causing the failure of at least two credit unions by misleading investors over hundreds of millions of dollars in mortgage-backed securities.
- Bank of America asks Second Circuit to vacate a $1.3 billion fine after jury found BofA had defrauded Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac using its “High-Speed Swim Lane” program.
