Taking up Housing Finance Reform

photo by Elliot P.

I am going to be a regular contributor to The Hill, the political website.  Here is my first column, It’s Time to Take Housing Finance Reform Through The 21st Century:

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two mortgage giants under the control of the federal government, have more than 45 percent of the share of the $10 trillion of mortgage debt outstanding. Ginnie Mae, a government agency that securitizes Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Veterans Affairs (VA) mortgages, has another 16 percent.

These three entities together have a 98 percent share of the market for new residential mortgage-backed securities. This government domination of the mortgage market is not tenable and is, in fact, dangerous to the long-term health of the housing market, not to mention the federal budget.

No one ever intended for the federal government to be the primary supplier of mortgage credit. This places a lot of credit risk in the government’s lap. If things go south, taxpayers will be on the hook for another big bailout.

It is time to implement a housing finance reform plan that will last through the 21st century, one that appropriately allocates risk away from taxpayers, ensures liquidity during crises, and provides access to the housing markets to those who can consistently make their monthly mortgage payments.

The stakes for housing finance reform today are as high as they were in the 1930s when the housing market was in its greatest distress. It seems, however, that there was a greater clarity of purpose back then as to how the housing markets should function. There was a broadly held view that the government should encourage sustainable homeownership for a broad swath of households and the FHA and other government entities did just that.

But the Obama Administration and Congress have not been able to find a path through their fundamental policy disputes about the appropriate role of Fannie and Freddie in the housing market. The center of gravity of that debate has shifted, however, since the election. While President-elect Donald Trump has not made his views on housing finance reform broadly known, it is likely that meaningful reform will have a chance in 2017.

Even if reform is more likely now, just about everything is contested when it comes to Fannie and Freddie. Coming to a compromise on responses to three types of market failures could, however, lead the way to a reform plan that could actually get enacted.

Even way before the financial crisis, housing policy analysts bemoaned the fact that Fannie and Freddie’s business model “privatizing gains and socialized losses.” The financial crisis confirmed that judgment. Some, including House Financial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling (R-Texas), have concluded that the only way to address this failing is to completely remove the federal government from housing finance (allowing, however, a limited role for the FHA).

The virtue of Hensarling’s Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act (PATH) Act of 2013 is that it allocates credit risk to the private sector, where it belongs. Generally, government should not intervene in the mortgage markets unless there is a market failure, some inefficient allocation of credit.

But the PATH Act fails to grapple with the fact that the private sector does not appear to have the capacity to handle all of that risk, particularly on the terms that Americans have come to expect. This lack of capacity is a form of market failure. The ever-popular 30-year fixed-rate mortgage, for instance, would almost certainly become an expensive niche product without government involvement in the mortgage market.

The bipartisan Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014, or the Johnson-Crapo bill, reflects a more realistic view of how the secondary mortgage market functions. It would phase out Fannie and Freddie and replace it with a government-owned company that would provide the infrastructure for securitization. This alternative would also leave credit risk in the hands of the private sector, but just to the extent that it could be appropriately absorbed.

Whether we admit it or not, we all know that the federal government will step in if a crisis in the mortgage market gets bad enough. This makes sense because frozen credit markets are a type of market failure. It is best to set up the appropriate infrastructure now to deal with such a possibility, instead of relying on the gun-to-the-head approach that led to the Fannie and Freddie bailout legislation in 2008.

Republicans and Democrats alike have placed homeownership at the center of their housing policy platforms for a long time. Homeownership represents stability, independence and engagement with community. It is also a path to financial security and wealth accumulation for many.

In the past, housing policy has overemphasized the importance of access to credit. This has led to poor mortgage underwriting. When the private sector also engaged in loose underwriting, we got into really big trouble. Federal housing policy should emphasize access to sustainable credit.

A reform plan should ensure that those who are likely to make their mortgage payment month-in, month-out can access the mortgage markets. If such borrowers are not able to access the mortgage market, it is appropriate for the federal government to correct that market failure as well. The FHA is the natural candidate to take the lead on this.

Housing finance reform went nowhere over the last eight years, so we should not assume it will have an easy time of it in 2017. But if we develop a reform agenda that is designed to correct predictable market failures, we can build a housing finance system that supports a healthy housing market for the rest of the century, and perhaps beyond.

Low Down Payment Mortgages, Going Forward

photo by TheGrayLion

TheStreet.com quoted me in Home Loan Down Payments Are in Decline: Will Uncle Sam Ride to the Rescue? It opens,

President-elect Donald Trump has enough problems on his hands as his administration takes shape, with the economy, health care, geopolitical strife and a divided country all on his plate.

 Chances are, dealing with a weakening real estate market, especially related to lower down payments, hasn’t entered his mind.
According to the November Down Payment Report, from Down Payment Resource, median down payments from first-time home buyers fell to just 4% of the home’s value, down from 6% in 2015. At the same time, home down payments for FHA-backed loans are also at 4%, signaling that homebuyers aren’t saving enough for home down payments, and thus face higher monthly mortgage payments.
There’s one school of thought that says homebuyers aren’t putting serious money down on a purchase, because they don’t have to.

“U.S. homebuyers are putting less down to purchase homes due to the wide availability of low- and no-down payment loans such as FHA loans, Fannie Mae’s HomeReady program, a resurgence of ‘piggy-back mortgages’ and other programs,” says Erin Sheckler, president of NexTitle, a full-service title and escrow company located in Belleview, Wash. “Meanwhile, USDA and VA loans also do not require any down payment whatsoever.”

Sheckler also notes that lending requirements have begun to ease nationwide, thus giving homebuyers more wiggle room with home down payments. “According to Ellie Mae’s Origination Insight Report, in August, home buyer down payments varied by loan program but, in nearly all cases, down-payments were near minimums,” says Sheckler.

Sheckler also doesn’t expect the low down payment trend to end anytime soon.

“How much money a person decides to put down on the purchase of a new home is a combination of risk and personal tolerance as well as the loan programs available to them,” she says. “As long as mortgage guidelines remain relaxed and with first-time homebuyers being an increasing segment of the market, we will likely see down-payments hover around the minimums into the near-term future.”

The risk with lower home down payments is real, however. “No one wants to find themselves house-poor,” Sheckler adds. “Being house-poor means that the majority of your wealth and monthly income is tied up in your residence. This can be a catastrophic situation if you find yourself suddenly faced with a loss of income or unexpected expenses.”

Homebuyers looking for more help from Uncle Sam, though, may come away disappointed in the next four years. “While Trump has been pretty silent on the housing market, (vice president-elect Mike) Pence and the Republican party platform have made it clear that they want to reduce the federal government’s footprint in the housing market,” says David Reiss, professor of law at Brooklyn Law School. “This is likely to mean fewer low down payment loan options being offered by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the FHA.”

Ensuring Sustainable Homeownership

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My short article, Ensuring That Homeownership Is Sustainable, was just published in the Westlaw Journal, Bank & Lender Liability. It opens,

The Federal Housing Administration has suffered as a result of many of the same unrealistic underwriting assumptions that led to problems for many lenders during the 2000s. It, too, was harmed by a housing market as bad as any since the Great Depression.

As a result, the federal government announced in 2013 that the FHA would require the first bailout in the agency’s history. While facing financial challenges, the FHA has also come under attack for the poor execution of policies designed to expand homeownership opportunities.

Leading commentators have called for the federal government to stop having the FHA do anything but provide liquidity to the low end of the mortgage market.

These critics rely on a few examples of agency programs that were clearly failures, but they do not address the FHA’s long history of undertaking comparable initiatives.

 In fact, the FHA has a history of successfully undertaking new homeownership programs. However, it also has operational flaws that should be addressed before it undertakes similar future homeownership initiatives.

INTRODUCTION TO THE FHA

Mortgage insurance is a product that is paid for by the homeowner but protects the lender if the homeowner defaults on the mortgage. The insurer pays the lender for losses it suffers from the homeowner’s default. Mortgage insurance is typically required for borrowers who have limited funds for down payments.

The FHA provides mortgage insurance for loans on single family and multifamily homes, and it is the world’s largest government mortgage insurer. Other significant providers are the Department of Veterans Affairs and private companies known as private mortgage insurers.

Mortgage insurance makes homeownership possible for many households that would otherwise not be able to meet lenders’ underwriting requirements.

Just like much of the federal housing infrastructure, the FHA has its roots in the Great Depression. The private mortgage insurance industry, like many others, was decimated in the early 1930s. Companies in the industry began to fail as almost half of all mortgages went into default. The government created the FHA to replace the PMI industry, which remained dormant for decades.

In the Great Depression, the housing markets faced problems that were similar to those faced by the same markets in the late 2000s. These problems included rapidly falling housing prices, widespread unemployment and underemployment, the rapid tightening of credit and — as a result of all of those trends — much higher default and foreclosure rates.

The FHA noted in its second annual report, issued in 1936, that the “shortcomings of the old system need no recital. It financed extensive overselling of houses at inflated values, to borrowers unable to pay for them.” Needless to say, the same could be said of our most recent housing bust.

Over its lifetime, the FHA has insured more than 40 million mortgages, helping to make homeownership available to a broad swath of American households. Indeed, the FHA mortgage has been essential to America’s transformation from a nation of renters to one of homeowners.

The early FHA created the modern American housing finance system, as well as the look and feel of post-war suburban communities through the construction standards the agency set for the new houses it insured.

The FHA has also had many other missions over the course of its existence — and a varied legacy to match.

Beginning in the 1950s, the FHA’s role changed from serving the entire mortgage market to focusing on certain segments. This changed mission had a major impact on everything the FHA did, including how it underwrote mortgage insurance and for whom it did so.

In recent years, the FHA has come under attack for poorly executing some of its attempts to expand homeownership opportunities, and leading commentators have called for the federal government to stop assigning such mandates to the agency. They argue that the FHA should focus only on providing liquidity for the portion of the mortgage market that serves low- and moderate-income households.

These critics rely on a couple of examples of failed programs, such as the Section 235 program enacted as part of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 and the American Dream Downpayment Assistance Act of 2003.

Those programs required borrowers to make only tiny and sometimes even nominal down payments. The government enacted the Section 235 program in response to the riots that burned through American cities in the 1960s. It was intended to expand homeownership opportunities for low-income households, particularly black ones.

The American Dream program was also geared to increasing homeownership among lower-income and minority households. The crux of the critique of these programs is that they failed to ensure that borrowers had the capacity to repay their mortgages, leading to bad results for the FHA and borrowers alike.

Notwithstanding these failed initiatives, the FHA has a parallel history of successfully undertaking new homeownership programs. These successes include programs for veterans returning home from World War II, a mission that was later handed off to the VA.

At the same time, historically the FHA has clearly suffered from operational failures that should be addressed in the design of any future initiatives.

Unfortunately, the agency has not really grappled with its past failures as it moves beyond the financial crisis. To properly address operational failures, the FHA must first identify its goals. (6-7, footnote omitted)

Friday’s Government Reports Roundup

CFPB Mortgage Market Rules

woodleywonderworks

Law360 quoted me in Questions Remain Over CFPB Mortgage Rules’ Market Effects (behind a paywall). The story highlights the fact that the jury is still out on exactly what a mature, post-Dodd-Frank mortgage market will look like. As I blogged yesterday, it seems like the new regulatory regime is working, but we need more time to determine whether it is providing the optimal amount of sustainable credit to households of all income-levels. The story opens,

Despite fears that a set of Consumer Financial Protection Bureau mortgage rules that went into effect last year would cut off many black, Hispanic and other borrowers from the mortgage market, a recent government report showed that has not been the case.

Indeed, the numbers from the Federal Financial Institutions Examinations Council’s annual Home Mortgage Disclosure Act annual report showed that the percentage of black and Hispanic borrowers within the overall mortgage market actually ticked up in 2014, even as the percentage of loans those two communities got from government sources went down.

However, it may be too early to say how the CFPB’s ability-to-repay and qualified-mortgage rules are influencing decisions by lenders and potential borrowers as the housing market continues to recover from the 2008 financial crisis, experts say. 

“Clearly, there’s a story here, and clearly there’s a story from this 2014 data,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School. “But I don’t know that it’s that QM and [ability to repay] work.”

The CFPB was tasked with writing rules to reshape the mortgage market and stop the subprime mortgage lending — including no-doc loans and other shoddy underwriting practices — that marked the period running up to the financial crisis.

Those rules included new ability-to-repay standards, governing the types of information lenders would have to collect to have a reasonable certainty that a borrower could repay, and the qualified mortgage standard, a class of mortgages with strict underwriting standards that would be considered the highest quality.

The rules took effect in 2014, after the CFPB made changes aimed at easing lenders’ worries over potential litigation by borrowers should their QMs falter.

Even with those changes, there were worries that black, Hispanic and low-income borrowers could be shut out of the market, as lenders focused only on making loans that met the QM standard or large loans, known as jumbo mortgages, issued primarily to the most affluent borrowers.

According to the HMDA report, that did not happen in the first year the rules were in effect.

Both black and Hispanic borrowers saw a small uptick in the percentage of overall mortgages issued in 2014.

Black borrowers made up 5.2 percent of the overall market in 2014 compared with 4.8 percent in 2013, when lenders were preparing to comply with the rule, and 5.1 percent in 2012, the report said. Latino borrowers made up 7.9 percent of the overall market in 2014 compared with 7.3 percent in 2013 and 7.7 percent in 2012, the federal statistics show.

And the percentage of the loans those borrowers got from government-backed sources like the Federal Housing Administration, a program run by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development targeting first-time and low- to middle-income borrowers, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and other agencies fell.

Overall, 68 percent of the loans issued to black borrowers came with that direct government support in 2014, down from 70.6 percent in 2013 and 77.2 percent in 2012, the HMDA report found. For Hispanic borrowers, 59.5 percent of the mortgages issued in 2014 had direct government support, down from 62.8 percent in 2013 and 70.7 percent in 2012.

For backers of the CFPB’s mortgage rules, those numbers came as a relief.

“We were definitely waiting with bated breath for this,” said Yana Miles, a policy counsel at the Center for Responsible Lending.

To supporters of the rules, the mortgage origination numbers reported by the federal government showed that black and Hispanic borrowers were not being shut out of the mortgage market.

“Not only did we not see lending from those groups go to zero, we’re seeing a very, very small baby step in the right direction,” Miles said. “We’re seeing opposite evidence as to what was predicted.”

And in some ways, the CFPB has written rules that met the goal of promoting safe lending following the poor practices of the housing bubble era while still giving space to lenders to get credit in the market.

“We have a functioning mortgage market,” Reiss said.

Better to Be a Banker or a Non-Banker?

 

The Community Home Lenders Association (CHLA) has prepared an interesting chart, Comparison of Consumer and Financial Regulation of Non-bank Mortgage Lenders vs. Banks.  The CHLA is a trade association that represents non-bank lenders, so the chart has to be read in that context. The side-by side-chart compares the regulation of non-banks to banks under a variety of statutes and regulations.  By way of example, the chart leads off with the following (click on the chart to see it better):

CLHA Chart

The chart emphasizes all the ways that non-banks are regulated where banks are exempt as well as all of the ways that they are regulated in the identical manner. Given that this is an advocacy document, it only mentions in passing the ways that banks are governed by various little things like “generic bank capital standards” and safety and soundness regulators. That being said, it is still good to look through the chart to see how non-bank regulation has been increasing since the passage of Dodd-Frank.

Underwriting Sustainable Homeownership

Mesa-Mesa Journal-Tribune FHA Demonstration Home-1925" by Marine 69-71

I have posted Underwriting Sustainable Homeownership: The Federal Housing Administration and the Low Down Payment Loan to SSRN (and to BePress). It is forthcoming in the Georgia Law Review. The abstract reads,

The United States Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) has been a versatile tool of government since it was created during the Great Depression. The FHA was created in large part to inject liquidity into a moribund mortgage market. It succeeded wonderfully, with rapid growth during the late 1930s. The federal government repositioned it a number of times over the following decades to achieve a variety of additional social goals. These goals included supporting civilian mobilization during World War II; helping veterans returning from the War; stabilizing urban housing markets during the 1960s; and expanding minority homeownership rates during the 1990s. It achieved success with some of its goals and had a terrible record with others. More recently, the FHA is in the worst financial shape it has ever been in.

Today’s FHA suffers from many of the same unrealistic underwriting assumptions that have done in so many other lenders during the 2000s. It has also been harmed, like other lenders, by a housing market as bad as any seen since the Great Depression. As a result, the federal government recently announced the first bailout of the FHA in its history. At the same time that it has faced these financial challenges, the FHA has also come under attack for the poor execution of some of its policies to expand homeownership. Leading commentators have called for the federal government to stop using the FHA to do anything other than provide liquidity to the low end of the mortgage market. These critics rely on a couple of examples of programs that were clearly failures but they do not address the FHA’s long history of undertaking comparable initiatives. This article takes the long view and demonstrates that the FHA has a history of successfully undertaking new homeownership programs. At the same time, the article identifies flaws in the FHA model that should be addressed in order to prevent them from occurring if the FHA were to undertake similar initiatives in the future.

In order to demonstrate this, the article first sets forth the dominant critique of the FHA. Relying on often overlooked primary sources, it then sets forth a history of the FHA and charts its constantly changing roles in the housing finance sector. In order to give a more detailed picture of the federal government’s role in housing finance, the article also incorporates the scholarly literature regarding (i) the intersection of race and housing policy and (ii) the economics and finance literature regarding the role that down payments play in the appropriate underwriting of mortgages for low- and moderate-income households. The article concludes that the FHA can responsibly address objectives other than the provision of liquidity to the residential mortgage market. It further proposes that FHA homeownership programs for low- and moderate-income families should be required to balance access to credit with households’ ability to make their mortgage payments over the long term. Such a proposal will ensure that the FHA extends credit responsibly to low- and moderate-income households while minimizing the likelihood of future bailouts.