Tag Archives: Congress

Fannie + Freddie = Frannie

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The Federal Housing Finance Agency released its 2016 Scorecard Progress Report. It contains some interesting information about the FHFA’s ongoing efforts to reshape Fannie and Freddie notwithstanding the inaction of Congress. These efforts are not broadcast very clearly, but they are documented nonetheless:

Maintaining a high degree of uniformity in the prepayment speeds of the Enterprises’ mortgage-backed securities is important to the success of the Single Security Initiative. Accordingly, the 2016 Scorecard called for the Enterprises to assess new or revised Enterprise programs, policies, and practices for their effect on the cash flows of mortgage-backed securities eligible for financing through TBA market.

In July 2016, FHFA published An Update on Implementation of the Single Security and the Common Securitization Platform (July 2016 Update), which included a description of specific steps FHFA would take and steps FHFA would require the Enterprises to take to ensure the continued convergence of prepayment speeds across the Enterprises’ mortgage-backed securities. The July 2016 Update indicated that each Enterprise would be required to submit for FHFA review any proposed changes the Enterprise believed could have a measureable effect on the prepayment rates and performance of TBA-eligible securities, including its analysis of any effects on prepayment speeds and/or removals of delinquent mortgage loans from securities under a range of scenarios. In addition, FHFA monitors Enterprise programs, policies, and practices that are initially determined to have no significant effect on prepayment rates or security performance and works with the Enterprises to address any unexpected effects as they arise. (25)

While this is all very technical stuff, it boils down to the effort of the FHFA to make Fannie and Freddie’s securities indistinguishable from each other so they can be treated as a Single Security. Once this process is completed, we will enter a new phase for the GSEs. The two companies wont really be competitors, they will be like identical twins.

Senators Corker and Warner are trying to resuscitate a housing finance reform bill, but this administrative reform is proceeding apace through ten years of Congressional inaction. The FHFA’s actions will likely limit the choices that Congress will have in very real ways, assuming Congress can ever get itself to act.

This is not necessarily a bad thing, it is just good to name it for what it is: housing finance reform implemented by an independent agency, not by a democratically elected Congress.

Skinny Budget Sucker Punch

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The Waco Tribune-Herald quote me in Cutting Habitat Could Hurt Local Economy. It reads,

Last summer, through a series of tragic events, one of our longtime church members faced the frightening possibility of homelessness. She had lived with her father for more than 50 years and, following his death, she learned of a crippling reverse mortgage on their home. She couldn’t pay off the mortgage and so she had to find a new place to live.

Our congregation sprang into action. More than 50 people contributed to the purchase of a mobile home, but it required extensive remodeling, so several church members worked over 300 hours to make it livable. One handyman devoted about three months to the project full-time.

On Sept. 21, we presented her with the keys to her new home during worship. It was one of the most uplifting moments I’ve had in 23 years of ministry. This congregation-wide labor of love brought us all closer to one another and closer to God. It was a demonstration of the love of Jesus Christ and it was transformative.

Home ownership changes lives and changes communities. I serve as a board member and volunteer for Waco Habitat for Humanity. Since 1986, Waco Habitat has built and sold 168 homes and completed another 414 home repairs and preservation projects. Over the past three decades, the economic impact of all these services exceeds $6.9 million in greater Waco. In a community that generally tracks about 15 percent higher than the state average for poverty rates and 20 percent lower than the state average for home ownership rates, this impact cannot be overstated. It’s transformative as well.

The “skinny budget” unveiled by the Trump administration on March 16 proposes reducing federal spending on housing programs and assistance by 13 percent. Among other cuts, it seeks to eliminate the Community Development Block Grant Program; Home Investment Partnerships Program; Self-Help Homeownership Opportunity Program; CDFI fund, which administers the New Market Tax Credit program at Treasury; and entire Corporation for National and Community Service, which implements the AmeriCorps program.

One reason I work with Habitat is because it offers a hand up, not a hand out. If these cuts are approved by Congress, they will devastate Habitat’s ability to offer that hand up. Other local housing agencies and organizations will see a similarly crippling effect.

Fortunately, this is just the first pass of the federal budget, and many members of Congress — including many Republicans — have already voiced opposition to it. For instance, Rep. Hal Rogers said: “While we have a responsibility to reduce our federal deficit, I am disappointed that many of the reductions and eliminations proposed in the president’s skinny budget are draconian, careless and counterproductive.”

David Reiss, director of academic programs at the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship, echoes this. “Terminating these programs out of the blue is like a sucker punch in the gut of countless communities across the country.”

United States v. CFPB

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photo by AgnosticPreachersKid

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, E. Barrett Prettyman Federal Courthouse

The Trump Administration has filed an amicus brief in PHH Corp. v. CFPB. The case is schedule for an en banc hearing in May. The filing is particularly newsworthy because the Trump Administration is siding with PHH, a mortgage lender, against the CFPB, a federal agency. The Trump Administration summarizes its position as follows:

In 2010, Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, giving the CFPB authority to enforce U.S. consumer-protection laws that had previously been administered by seven different government agencies, as well as new provisions added by Dodd-Frank itself. See 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b). The CFPB is headed by a single Director who is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of five years, id. § 5491(b), (c)(1), and who may be removed by the President only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,” id. § 5491(c)(3).

The panel in this case held that this “for cause” removal provision violates the constitutional separation of powers. Op. 9-10. The panel explained—and neither party disputes—that, as a general matter, the President has “Article II authority to supervise, direct, and remove at will subordinate [principal] officers in the Executive Branch” in order to exercise his vested power and duty to faithfully execute the laws. Op. 4. The panel recognized as well that Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935), established an exception to that rule, holding that Congress may “forbid [the] removal except for cause” of members of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—a holding that has been understood to cover members of other multi-member regulatory commissions that share certain features and functions with the FTC. Op. 4.

The principal constitutional question in this case is whether the exception to the President’s removal authority recognized in Humphrey’s Executor should be extended by this Court beyond multi-member regulatory commissions to an agency headed by a single Director. While we do not agree with all of the reasoning in the panel’s opinion, the United States agrees with the panel’s conclusion that single-headed agencies are meaningfully different from the type of multi-member regulatory commission addressed in Humphrey’s Executor.

The Supreme Court’s analysis in Humphrey’s Executor was premised on the nature of the FTC as a continuing deliberative body, composed of several members with staggered terms to maintain institutional expertise and promote a measure of stability that would not be immediately undermined by political vicissitudes. A single-headed agency, of course, lacks those critical structural attributes that have been thought to justify “independent” status for multi-member regulatory commissions. Moreover, because a single agency head is unchecked by the constraints of group decision-making among members appointed by different Presidents, there is a greater risk that an “independent” agency headed by a single person will engage in extreme departures from the President’s executive policy. And as the panel recognized, while multi-member regulatory commissions sharing the characteristics of the FTC discussed in Humphrey’s Executor have existed for over a century, limitations on the President’s authority to remove a single agency head are a recent development to which the Executive Branch has consistently objected.

We therefore urge the Court to decline to extend the exception recognized in Humphrey’s Executor in this case. (1-2)

This is of course an obscure argument about administrative law jurisprudence, but it also has serious real world consequences. I have previously argued that the panel reached the wrong result in this case and I think that the en banc Court will overturn it.

This amicus brief does not add too much to the reasoning in Judge Kavanaugh’s majority opinion in PHH v. CFPB, although it does flesh out one important argument that it made. The brief provides some support for the position that multi-member commissions are better suited to run independent agencies than single directors. But while it makes the case that single director agencies may not be the best choice for agency design, it does not make the case that it is an unconstitutional one.

 

Trump, Homelessness and the General Welfare

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photo by Jay Black

The Hill published my column, Trump’s Budget Proposal Is Bad News for Housing Across the Nation. It opens,

The White House unveiled its much anticipated budget proposal today. It shows deep cuts to important agencies, including a more than $6 billion decrease in funding to the U.S Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). More than 75 percent of the agency’s budget goes to helping families pay their rent. Thus, these cuts would have a negative impact on thousands upon thousands of poor and working class households.

Many years ago, Congress enshrined the “goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family” within its Declaration of National Housing Policy. This goal was not just justified by the basic needs of those with inadequate housing, but also because “the general welfare and security of the nation” required it. As our nation’s leading cities grapple with rapidly growing homeless populations, this additional justification takes on added weight today.

Click here to read the rest of it.

Three Paths to Housing Finance Reform

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photo by theilr

The Urban Institute’s Jim Parrott has posted Clarifying the Choices in Housing Finance Reform. It opens,

The housing finance reform debate has often foundered under the weight of its complexity. Not only is it a complicated topic, both in its substance and its politics, but the way that we talk about it makes the issues involved indecipherable to all but a few. Each proponent brings a different nomenclature, a different frame of reference, often an entirely different language, making it enormously difficult to sort through where there is agreement and where there is not.

As a case in point, three prominent proposals for reform have been put on the table in recent months: one offered by Lew Ranieri, Gene Sperling, Mark Zandi, Barry Zigas, and me (Promising Road Proposal); one offered by Ed DeMarco and Michael Bright (Milken Proposal); and one offered by the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA Proposal). These proposals have been discussed and debated in many forums, each assessed for its respective merits, risks, and likelihood of passage in Congress, but each largely in isolation from one another. That is, they are not compared in any intelligible way, forcing those hoping to come to an informed view to choose among what appear to be entirely different visions of reform, without any easy way to make sense of the choice.

In this brief essay, I thus bring these three proposals together into a single framework, making it clearer what they share and where they differ. Once the explanatory fog is lifted, one can see that they actually share a great deal and that deciding among them is not prohibitively complex, but a matter of assessing two or three key differences. (1-2)

After a review of each proposal, Parrott finds that there are two critical differences between the three proposals.

  • Ginnie versus CSP. For the securitization infrastructure in the new system, Milken uses the Ginnie Mae infrastructure, while the MBA and our proposal both use the CSP.
  • What to do with Fannie and Freddie. The MBA would turn them into privately owned utilities that compete with other market participants over the distribution of the system’s non-catastrophic credit risk, Milken would turn them into lender-owned mutuals that do the same, and we would combine them with the CSP to distribute that risk and manage the system’s securitization.

With these distinctions in mind, the proposals can be much more easily compared across the criteria that should ultimately drive our decisions on housing finance reform:

  • Access to sustainable credit. Which best maintains broad access to mortgage loans for those in a financial position to be a homeowner at the lowest rates?
  • Protecting the taxpayer. Which best insulates taxpayers behind private capital, aligns incentives systemwide and addresses the too-big-to-fail risk that undermined the prior system?
  • Promoting healthy competition. Which best maximizes the kinds of competition that will improve options and services for consumers, lenders, and investors?
  • Ease of transition. Which provides the least disruptive, least costly path of reform? (7-8)

This is a very useful tool for understanding the choices that we face if we are to move beyond the limbo of Fannie and Freddie’s conservatorships.  One limitation is that Parrott does not address the Hensarling wing of the Republican Party which is looking to completely privatize the housing finance system for conforming mortgages. Given that Hensarling is the Chair of the House Financial Services Committee, he will have a powerful role in enacting any reform legislation.

I am not all that hopeful that Congress will be able to come up with a bill that can pass both houses in the near future.  But Parrott’s roadmap is helpful preparation for when we are ready.

GSE Investors’ Hidden Win

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Judge Brown

The big news yesterday was that the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit ruled in the main for the federal government in Perry Capital v. Mnuchin, one of the major cases that investors brought against the federal government over the terms of the Fannie and Freddie conservatorships.

In a measured and carefully reasoned opinion, the court rejected most but not all of the investors’ claims.  The reasoning was consistent with my own reading of the broad conservatorship provisions of the Housing and Economic Recover Act of 2008 (HERA).

Judge Brown’s dissent, however, reveals that the investors have crafted an alternative narrative that at least one judge finds compelling. This means that there is going to be some serious drama when this case ultimately wends its way to the Supreme Court. And there is some reason to believe that a Justice Gorsuch might be sympathetic to this narrative of government overreach.

Judge Brown’s opinion indicts many aspects of federal housing finance policy, broadly condemning it in the opening paragraph:

One critic has called it “wrecking-ball benevolence,” James Bovard, Editorial, Nothing Down: The Bush Administration’s Wrecking-Ball Benevolence, BARRON’S, Aug. 23, 2004, https://tinyurl.com/Barrons-Bovard; while another, dismissing the compassionate rhetoric, dubs it “crony capitalism,” Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr., Commentary, Fannie/Freddie Bailout Baloney, CATO INST., https://tinyurl.com/Cato-O-Driscoll (last visited Feb. 13, 2017). But whether the road was paved with good intentions or greased by greed and indifference, affordable housing turned out to be the path to perdition for the U.S. mortgage market. And, because of the dominance of two so-called Government Sponsored Entities (“GSE”s)—the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae” or “Fannie”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac” or “Freddie,” collectively with Fannie Mae, the “Companies”)—the trouble that began in the subprime mortgage market metastasized until it began to affect most debt markets, both domestic and international. (dissent at 1)

While acknowledging that the Fannie/Freddie crisis might justify “extraordinary actions by Congress,” Judge Brown states that

even in a time of exigency, a nation governed by the rule of law cannot transfer broad and unreviewable power to a government entity to do whatsoever it wishes with the assets of these Companies. Moreover, to remain within constitutional parameters, even a less-sweeping delegation of authority would require an explicit and comprehensive framework. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”) Here, Congress did not endow FHFA with unlimited authority to pursue its own ends; rather, it seized upon the statutory text that had governed the FDIC for decades and adapted it ever so slightly to confront the new challenge posed by Fannie and Freddie.

*     *     *

[Congress] chose a well-understood and clearly-defined statutory framework—one that drew upon the common law to clearly delineate the outer boundaries of the Agency’s conservator or, alternatively, receiver powers. FHFA pole vaulted over those boundaries, disregarding the plain text of its authorizing statute and engaging in ultra vires conduct. Even now, FHFA continues to insist its authority is entirely without limit and argues for a complete ouster of federal courts’ power to grant injunctive relief to redress any action it takes while purporting to serve in the conservator role. See FHFA Br. 21  (2-3)

What amazes me about this dissent is how it adopts the decidedly non-mainstream history of the financial crisis that has been promoted by the American Enterprise Institute’s Peter Wallison.  It also takes its legislative history from an unpublished Cato Institute paper by Vice-President Pence’s newly selected chief economist, Mark Calabria and a co-author.  There is nothing wrong with a judge giving some context to an opinion, but it is of note when it seems as one-sided as this. The bottom line though is that this narrative clearly has some legs so we should not think that this case has played itself out, just because of this decision.

Consumer Protection in Trouble under Trump

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photo by www.cafecredit.com

The Dallas News quoted me in Agency That Protects Consumers from Financial Scammers in Trouble under Trump. It reads, in part,

Last week I asked 100 people in an audience, “How many of you have heard of the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau?”

Only five people raised their hands.

I’m surprised. In the 240-year history of our nation, we never had a truly pro-consumer federal agency until five years ago. It’s working, but now we’re in danger of losing it.

If you use money or credit, take out loans, buy cars or pay on a mortgage, this bureau in Washington, D.C. is changing the way financial companies do business with you.

We might lose the bureau because big and small banks and other financial institutions hate it. They’re fighting it in court with lawsuits and with campaign contributions to members of Congress who will decide.

We might lose it because an area congressman, Rep. Jeb Hensarling, R-Dallas, is closer to achieving his goal of watering down the nation’s financial regulatory system — nicknamed Dodd-Frank.

Hensarling leads the House committee that gives thumbs up or down to financial bills. With that power in hand, he received more campaign donations from banks, insurance companies and the securities and investment industry than any other member of Congress, the nonpartisan Center for Responsive Politics says.

And we might lose the bureau because we have a president who, unlike the previous president, will not veto Hensarling’s pro-Wall Street bill – The Financial Choice Act — that would rip Dodd-Frank apart.

Remember that Dodd-Frank and the bureau came about after the 2008 financial meltdown. The bureau is part of the master plan to make sure it never happens again.

Accomplishments

If you haven’t heard of the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, I’ll take part of the blame. Maybe The Watchdog hasn’t placed a big enough spotlight on it.

It was the bureau that revealed how Wells Fargo employees created two million fraudulent customer accounts. The bureau fined Wells Fargo $100 million.

The bureau worked to get $120 million in refunds for military families by policing improper practices with mortgages, credit cards, student loans and other financial products aimed at the military.

The bureau created rules that prevented lenders from approving risky home mortgage loans and charging hidden fees to home buyers.

The bureau forced credit card issuers to pay hundreds of millions of dollars back to consumers because of illegal practices, unfair billing and deceptive marketing.

The bureau went after crooked bill collectors, check cashers and credit repair services.

The bureau forced the three major credit bureaus to make it easier to submit corrections to inaccurate information on your credit report.

In sum, the scoreboard shows the bureau’s big number at $12 billion. That’s how much the bureau claims it has refunded to consumers or zeroed out when their invalid debts were canceled.

No wonder Wall Street, its golden boy Hensarling and the corps of dark-suited lobbyists want this darn thing rubbed out. Quickly.

*     *     *

Back to Bad Loans?

One who has studied government regulation tells me that financial institutions have adapted to the new order. The rules tamed the craziness that led to financial ruin nine years ago, says David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

Eliminating the bureau would force “a return to the dark old days when lenders could get away” with shadowy marketing practices, Reiss says.

“If the Trump administration were to get rid of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, consumers would have to be far more cautious when dealing with lenders,” he says. “There definitely would be a return to some of the predatory and abusive behavior. No one would be looking over the lender’s shoulder.”