NYC’s Housing Supply

The New York City Rent Guidelines Board (of which I am a member) released its 2017 Housing Supply Report. It has a lot of interesting data for housing nerds as well as those of us obsessed with NYC. Here is a taste:

  • There are a total of 3,217,521 units of housing.
  • 2,184,295 are rental units.
    • 848,721 are non-regulated rentals.
    • 1,335,574 are regulated rentals in one form or another (rent stabilized, rent controlled etc.)
  • 1,033,226 are owner units.
    • 116,134 are condos
    • 330,679 are coops
    • 586,413 are conventional homes.

Some other highlights include,

  • Permits for 16,269 new dwelling units were issued in NYC in 2016, a 71.2% decrease over the prior year and the first decrease since 2009.
  • There was a 31.3% decrease in the number of co-op or condo units accepted in 2016, to 282 plans containing 8,671 units.
  • The number of housing units newly receiving 421-a exemptions decreased 17.8% in 2016, to 4,493.
  • The number of housing units newly receiving J-51 abatements and exemptions decreased 22.5% in 2016, to 34,311.
  • The number of new housing units completed in 2016 increased 61.9% over the prior year, to 23,247.
  • Demolitions were down in 2016, decreasing by 2.0%, to 1,849 buildings.
  • City-sponsored residential construction spurred 23,408 new housing starts in FY 2016, 74% of which were rehabilitations.
  • The City-owned in rem housing stock declined 70.2% during FY 2016, to 125 units. (4)

For those who do not know the byzantine world of NYC housing policy, 421-a exemptions relate to new construction and J-51 abatements relate to renovation of existing construction. It is interesting to see how policy changes impact housing construction.

Any one year’s figures provide just a snapshot, so if you really want to get a sense of the big picture, you should check out the earlier reports too. For instance, last year’s report stated that there were permits for 56,528 new dwelling units in 2015, an increase of 176% from 2014.  This is way more than the long term trend. Permits for new dwelling units never got much higher than the low thirty thousand range but fell to a low as six thousand during the depths of the Great Recession.

When you realize that the 421-a tax abatement was set to expire at the end of 2015, this big jump in permits makes sense as developers filed a ton of permits to take advantage of the program while they could. It will be interesting to see how the new 421-a regime will impact permits for new construction going forward.

Student Debt And Homeownership

student-loan-debt-1160848_1280

The National Association of Realtors, along with SALT, a consumer literacy program provided by American Student Assistance, released the results from a joint survey about student debt and homeownership. They found that “Seventy-one percent of non-homeowners repaying their student loans on time believe their debt is stymieing their ability to purchase a home . . ..” They have also produced a cool infographic to illustrate their main points:

  • Nearly a third of current homeowners (31 percent) in the survey said student debt is postponing plans to sell their home and purchase a new one.
  • A little over a majority of those polled (52 percent) expect to be delayed by more than five years from purchasing a home because of repaying their student debt. One in five anticipates being held back three to five years as well as over 60 percent of baby boomers. Not surprisingly, those with higher amounts of student loan debt and those with lower incomes expect to be delayed the longest.
  • Mirroring other recent data on young Americans being more likely to live with their parents than in any other living situations, almost half (46 percent) of young millennials polled currently live with family (both paying and not paying rent).
  • 42 percent of respondents indicated student debt delayed their decision to move out of their family member’s home after college.

I am not convinced that SALT President John Zurick is right when he says, “It is imperative to the nation’s economy that we find immediate and practical solutions to financially empower the 43 million Americans with student debt.” I think SALT and NAR are also overselling their findings somewhat in their press release headline, New Evidence Links Student Debt with Inability to Purchase a Home, because the survey reports subjective beliefs and does not offer any kind of baseline from which we can measure this current snapshot of consumer sentiment.

That being said, there has been a lot of concern about the relationship between student debt and household composition recently. It is certainly worth trying to understand the relationship between all different forms of debt and how they expand and limit choices available to households. And whatever the limitations of this NAR/SALT study, I have no doubt that the system for financing higher education needs an overhaul for its own sake as well as for the impacts it has on other choices that households make.

 

What If . . . Fannie and Freddie Imploded?

photo by US HUD

So, I was spending some quality time with the Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of the Inspector General’s most recent Semiannual Report to the Congress. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) is the regulator of Fannie and Freddie as well as their conservator. Essentially, the FHFA calls all of the shots for the two companies.

It got me to wondering, does the Office of the Inspector General really have a handle on whether Fannie and Freddie are in good shape or not? The report opens with a Snapshot of OIG Accomplishments. The Snapshot contains the following categories:

  • OIG Investigations Monetary Results
  • Judicial Actions
  • Hotline Contacts
  • Audit and Evaluation Reports Issued
  • White Papers Issued
  • Office of Compliance and Special Projects Reports Issued
  • Nonmonetary Recommendations Made
  • Regulations Reviewed
  • Responses to Requests Under the Freedom of Information Act

As I read through the report, I had the distinct feeling that I had got lost among the trees of bureaucratic oversight and had lost sight of the contours of the Frannie forest.

I want to know one thing — are the two companies solvent and will they be solvent for the foreseeable future? The OIG’s Snapshot is pretty backward facing and focuses on a lot of pretty minor issues, like counting hotline contacts, instead of focusing on the fundamentals.

I know, I know — if we can measure something, then we want to share it with the world, but the Snapshot actually decreases my faith that OIG and FHFA are taking care of the entire forest and not just a few of the trees they were able to measure.

That being said, the report does get  to some of the important issues later on. It acknowledges that

Since September 2008, FHFA has administered two conservatorships of unprecedented scope and undeterminable duration. Under HERA,the Agency’s actions as conservator are not subject to judicial review or intervention, nor are they subject to procedural safeguards that are ordinarily applicable to regulatory activities such as rulemaking. As conservator of the Enterprises, FHFA exercises control over trillions of dollars in assets and billions of dollars in revenue, and makes business and policy decisions that influence and impact the entire mortgage finance industry. For reasons of efficiency, concordant goals with the Enterprises, and operational savings, FHFA has determined to delegate revocable authority for general corporate governance and day-to-day matters to the Enterprises’ boards of directors and executive management. (10)

The OIG clearly understands what is at stake in the conservatorships. But as I read the remainder of the report, I did not see sufficient emphasis on the range of risks that Fannie and Freddie face, such as hedging risk and operational risk. Hopefully, someone at the FHFA is paying sufficient attention to the range of risks the two companies face. If not, we can expect a new type of crisis down the pike.

Risky Reverse Mortgages

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau released a report, Snapshot of Reverse Mortgage Complaints:  December 2011-December 2014. By way of background,

Reverse mortgages differ from other types of home loans in a few important ways. First, unlike traditional “forward” mortgages, reverse mortgages do not require borrower(s) to make monthly mortgage payments (though they must continue paying property taxes and homeowners’ insurance). Prospective reverse mortgage borrowers are required to undergo mandatory housing counseling before they sign for the loan. The loan proceeds are generally provided to the borrowers as lump-sum payouts, annuity-like monthly payments, or as lines of credit. The interest and fees on the mortgage are added to the loan balance each month. The total loan balance becomes due upon the death of the borrower(s), the sale of the home, or if the borrower(s) permanently move from the home. In addition, a payment deferral period may be available to some non-borrowing spouses following the borrowing spouse’s death. (3, footnotes omitted)

The CFPB concludes that

borrowers and their non-borrowing spouses who obtained reverse mortgages prior to August 4, 2014 may likely encounter difficulties in upcoming years similar to those described in this Snapshot, i.e., non-borrowing spouses seeking to retain ownership of their homes after the borrowing spouse dies. As a result, many of these consumers may need notification of and assistance in averting impending possible displacement should the non-borrowing spouse outlive his or her borrowing spouse.

For millions of older Americans, especially those without sufficient retirement reserves, tapping into accrued home equity could help them achieve economic security in later life. As the likelihood increases that older Americans will use their home equity to supplement their retirement income, it is essential that the terms, conditions and servicing of reverse mortgages be fair and transparent so that consumers can make informed decisions regarding their options. (16)
Reverse mortgages have a number of characteristics that would make them ripe for abuse: borrowers are elderly; borrowers have a hard time refinancing them; borrowers can negatively affect their spouses by entering into to them. Seems like a no brainer for the CFPB to pay close attention to this useful but risky product.