Tag Archives: Congress

Mortgage Rates & Refis

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TheStreet.com quoted me in Mortgage Rates Expected to Rise and Push Down Refinancing Levels. It reads, in part,

Mortgage rates will continue their upward climb in 2017 as the economy demonstrates additional growth and inflation, but this will of course dampen the enthusiasm for homeowners who have sought to refinance their mortgages up until early this year.

The levels of refinancing will definitely “take a hit relative to 2016,” said Greg McBride, chief financial analyst for Bankrate, a New York-based financial content company.”

A survey conducted by RateWatch found that 56.57% of the 400 financial institutions polled said it is unlikely mortgage rates will fall and unlikely there will be an increase in refinancing in 2017. RateWatch, a Fort Atkinson, Wis.-based premier banking data and analytics service owned by TheStreet, Inc., surveyed the majority of banks, credit unions, and other financial institutions in the U.S. between December 16 and December 29, 2016 on how the Donald Trump presidency will affect the banking industry. The survey found that 35.71% said an increase in refinancing levels is very unlikely, while 6.29% said such an increase is somewhat likely, 1.14% said one would be likely and 0.29% said it would be very likely.

Mortgage rates, which are tied to the 10-year Treasury note, are predicted to fluctuate between 4% to 4.5% in 2017 “with a brief trip below 4% in the event of a market sell-off or economic stumble,” McBride said.

The 4% threshold is critical for homeowners, because when mortgage rates fall below this benchmark level, more consumers are in a position to refinance “profitably,” which is why 2016 experienced a “surge in activity,” McBride said.

When rates rise about the 4% level, the number of homeowners who opt to refinance declines dramatically and “refinancing levels will be notably lower in 2017,” he said.

The mortgages in the 3% range gave many homeowners the opportunity to refinance last year, some for the second time, as many consumers also chose to refinance their mortgages during the 2013 to 2015 period.

As the economy expands and workers are experiencing pay increases, the number of home sales should also rise in 2017.

“People who are working and receiving a pay increase will buy a house whether mortgage rates are 4% or 4.5%,” McBride said. “They may buy a different house, but they will still buy a house.”

Refinancing activity is likely to continue ramping up in January rather than later in the year as the “recent dip in rates allows procrastinators to act before rates continue their movement up,” said Jonathan Smoke, chief economist for Realtor.com, a Santa Clara, Calif.-based real estate company. “As interest rates resume their ascent and get closer to 4.5% on the 30-year mortgage, the number of households who can benefit from refinancing will diminish. That’s why we expect lenders to shift their focus to the purchase market this year.”

Economic growth resulted in interest rates rising before the election and in its aftermath. The rates rose because of the expectation from the financial markets of expanding fiscal policies leading to additional growth and inflationary pressures, Smoke said.

Mortgage rates will continue to rise in 2017 as a result of more people being employed, and this economic backdrop will favor the buyer’s market instead of the refinancing market. Current data from the Mortgage Bankers Association already demonstrates that refinancing activity has declined compared to 2016 due to higher interest rates, Smoke said.

“Rates have eased a bit since the start of the year as evidence of a substantial shift in inflation remains limited and the financial markets oversold bonds in December,” he added.

*     *     *

Borrowers should be concerned with increased interest rate volatility in 2017, said David Reiss, a professor at the Brooklyn Law School. The Trump administration has been sending out mixed signals, which may lead bond investors and lenders to change their outlook more frequently than in the past.

“Borrowers should focus on locking in attractive interest rates quickly and working closely with their lender to ensure that the loan closes before the interest rate lock expires,” he said. “While there is no clear consensus on why rates went lower after the new year, Trump has not set forth a clear plan as to how he will achieve those goals and Congress has not signaled that it is fully on board with them. This leaves investors less confident that Trump will make good on those positions, particularly in the short-term.”

Can Fannie and Freddie Be Privatized?

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Kroll Bond Rating Agency posted Housing Reform 2017: Can the GSEs be Privatized? The big housing finance reform question is whether there is now sufficient consensus in Washington to determine the fate of Fannie and Freddie, now approaching their ninth year in conservatorship.

Kroll concludes,

The Mortgage Bankers Association sends a very clear message about privatizing the GSEs: It will raise rates for homeowners and add systemic risk back into the financial system. Why do we need to fix a proven market mechanism that is not broken? KBRA believes that if Mr. Mnuchin and the President-elect truly want to encourage the growth of a private market for U.S. mortgages, then they must accept that true privatization of the GSEs that eliminates any government guarantee would fundamentally change the mortgage market.

The privatization of the GSEs implies, in the short term at least, a significant decrease in the financing available to the U.S. housing market. In the absence of a TBA market, no coupon would be high enough to support the entire range of demand for mortgage finance, only pockets of higher quality loans as with the jumbo mortgage market today. Unless the U.S. moved to the Danish model with 100% variable rate notes, no nonbank could fund the production of home mortgages efficiently and commercial banks are unlikely to pick up the slack for the reasons discussed above.

In the event of full privatization of the GSEs, private loans will have significantly higher cost for consumers and offer equally more attractive returns for financial institutions and end investors, a result that would generate enormous political opposition among the numerous constituencies in the housing market. Needless to say, getting such a proposal through Congress should prove to be quite an achievement indeed. (4)

I disagree with Kroll’s framing of the issue:  “Why do we need to fix a proven market mechanism that is not broken?” To describe Fannie and Freddie as “not broken” seems farcical to me. They are in a state of limbo with extraordinary backing from the federal government. It might be that we would want to continue them with much the same functionality that they currently have, but we would still want this transition to be done intentionally.  Nobody, but nobody, was thinking that putting them into conservatorship was the end game,

While the current structure has some advantages over privatization, the reverse is true too.  The greatest benefit of privatization is getting rid of the taxpayer backstop in case of a failure by one or both of the companies.

We shouldn’t be saying — hey, what we have now is good enough. Rather, we should be asking — what do we expect out of our housing finance system and how do we get it?

There appears to be a broad consensus to reduce taxpayer exposure to a bailout.  There also appears to be a broad consensus (one that I do not support as broadly as others) to protect the 30 year fixed rate mortgage that remains so popular in the United States.

Industry insiders believe that a fully private system would not provide sufficient capital for the mortgage market. They are also concerned that a fully private system would put the kibosh on the To Be Announced (TBA) market that provides so much stability for the mortgage origination process.

A thoughtful reform proposal could incorporate all of these concerns while also clearing away the sticky problems built into the Fannie/Freddie model of housing finance.

“If it ain’t broke don’t fix it” is not a good enough philosophy after we have lived through the financial crisis. We should focus on the big questions of what we want from our 21st century housing finance system and then design a system that will implement it accordingly.

Muddled Future for Fannie & Freddie

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The United States Government Accountability Office released a report, Objectives Needed for the Future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac After Conservatorships.  The GAO’s findings read a bit like a “dog bites man” story — stating, as it does, the obvious:  “Congress should consider legislation that would establish clear objectives and a transition plan to a reformed housing finance system that enables the enterprises to exit conservatorship. FHFA agreed with our overall findings.” (GAO Highlights page) I think everyone agrees with that, except unfortunately, Congress.  Congress has let the two companies languish in the limbo of conservatorship for over eight years now.

Richard Shelby, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, asked the GAO to prepare this report in order to

examine FHFA’s actions as conservator. This report addresses (1) the extent to which FHFA’s goals for the conservatorships have changed and (2) the implications of FHFA’s actions for the future of the enterprises and the broader secondary mortgage market. GAO analyzed and reviewed FHFA’s actions as conservator and supporting documents; legislative proposals for housing finance reform; the enterprises’ senior preferred stock agreements with Treasury; and GAO, Congressional Budget Office, and FHFA inspector general reports. GAO also interviewed FHFA and Treasury officials and industry stakeholders (Id.)

The GAO’s findings are pretty technical, but still very important for housing analysts:

In the absence of congressional direction, FHFA’s shift in priorities has altered market participants’ perceptions and expectations about the enterprises’ ongoing role and added to uncertainty about the future structure of the housing finance system. In particular, FHFA halted several actions aimed at reducing the scope of enterprise activities and is seeking to maintain the enterprises in their current state. However, other actions (such as reducing their capital bases to $0 by January 2018) are written into agreements for capital support with the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and continue to be implemented.

In addition, the change in scope for the technology platform for securitization puts less emphasis on reducing barriers facing private entities than previously envisioned, and new initiatives to expand mortgage availability could crowd out market participants.

Furthermore, some actions, such as transferring credit risk to private investors, could decrease the likelihood of drawing on Treasury’s funding commitment, but others, such as reducing minimum down payments, could increase it.

GAO has identified setting clear objectives as a key principle for providing government assistance to private market participants. Because Congress has not established objectives for the future of the enterprises after conservatorships or the federal role in housing finance, FHFA’s ability to shift priorities may continue to contribute to market uncertainty. (Id.)

One finding seems particularly spot on to me. As I wrote yesterday, it appears as if the FHFA is not focusing sufficiently on building the infrastructure to serve secondary mortgage markets other than Fannie and Freddie.  It seems to me that a broader and deeper bench of secondary mortgage market players will benefit the housing market in the long run.

 

Fannie/Freddie Scorecard

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The Federal Housing Finance Agency released its 2017 Scorecard for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Common Securitization Solutions.  The scorecard highlights how the FHFA’s reform of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is proceeding apace, absent direction from Congress.  This reform path had been set by Acting Director DeMarco, appointed by President Bush, and has continued relatively unchanged under Director Watt, appointed by President Obama.

The scorecard’s assessment criteria for the two companies are,

  • The extent to which each Enterprise conducts initiatives in a safe and sound manner consistent with FHFA’s expectations for all activities;
  • The extent to which the outcomes of their activities support a competitive and resilient secondary mortgage market to support homeowners and renters;
  • The extent to which each Enterprise conducts initiatives with consideration for diversity and inclusion consistent with FHFA’s expectations for all activities;
  • Cooperation and collaboration with FHFA, each other, the industry, and other stakeholders; and
  • The quality, thoroughness, creativity, effectiveness, and timeliness of their work products. (2)

The scorecard states that Fannie and Freddie should increase credit risk transfers to investors.  Currently, the focus is on transferring risk from pretty safe and standard mortgages, but the FHFA is pushing Fannie and Freddie to increase risk transfers on a broader array of mortgage types.

The scorecard also states that the effort to integrate Fannie and Freddie through the Common Securitization Platform and the Single Security should continue so that the Single Security is operational in 2018.  The scorecard emphasizes that the Platform should allow “for the integration of additional market participants in the future.” (6)  While this has been a design requirement from the get-go, I have heard through the grapevine that this element of the Platform has not been pursued so vigorously.  To my mind, it seems like a key component if we want to build the infrastructure for a healthy secondary mortgage market for the rest of the 21st century.

 

Taking up Housing Finance Reform

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photo by Elliot P.

I am going to be a regular contributor to The Hill, the political website.  Here is my first column, It’s Time to Take Housing Finance Reform Through The 21st Century:

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two mortgage giants under the control of the federal government, have more than 45 percent of the share of the $10 trillion of mortgage debt outstanding. Ginnie Mae, a government agency that securitizes Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Veterans Affairs (VA) mortgages, has another 16 percent.

These three entities together have a 98 percent share of the market for new residential mortgage-backed securities. This government domination of the mortgage market is not tenable and is, in fact, dangerous to the long-term health of the housing market, not to mention the federal budget.

No one ever intended for the federal government to be the primary supplier of mortgage credit. This places a lot of credit risk in the government’s lap. If things go south, taxpayers will be on the hook for another big bailout.

It is time to implement a housing finance reform plan that will last through the 21st century, one that appropriately allocates risk away from taxpayers, ensures liquidity during crises, and provides access to the housing markets to those who can consistently make their monthly mortgage payments.

The stakes for housing finance reform today are as high as they were in the 1930s when the housing market was in its greatest distress. It seems, however, that there was a greater clarity of purpose back then as to how the housing markets should function. There was a broadly held view that the government should encourage sustainable homeownership for a broad swath of households and the FHA and other government entities did just that.

But the Obama Administration and Congress have not been able to find a path through their fundamental policy disputes about the appropriate role of Fannie and Freddie in the housing market. The center of gravity of that debate has shifted, however, since the election. While President-elect Donald Trump has not made his views on housing finance reform broadly known, it is likely that meaningful reform will have a chance in 2017.

Even if reform is more likely now, just about everything is contested when it comes to Fannie and Freddie. Coming to a compromise on responses to three types of market failures could, however, lead the way to a reform plan that could actually get enacted.

Even way before the financial crisis, housing policy analysts bemoaned the fact that Fannie and Freddie’s business model “privatizing gains and socialized losses.” The financial crisis confirmed that judgment. Some, including House Financial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling (R-Texas), have concluded that the only way to address this failing is to completely remove the federal government from housing finance (allowing, however, a limited role for the FHA).

The virtue of Hensarling’s Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act (PATH) Act of 2013 is that it allocates credit risk to the private sector, where it belongs. Generally, government should not intervene in the mortgage markets unless there is a market failure, some inefficient allocation of credit.

But the PATH Act fails to grapple with the fact that the private sector does not appear to have the capacity to handle all of that risk, particularly on the terms that Americans have come to expect. This lack of capacity is a form of market failure. The ever-popular 30-year fixed-rate mortgage, for instance, would almost certainly become an expensive niche product without government involvement in the mortgage market.

The bipartisan Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014, or the Johnson-Crapo bill, reflects a more realistic view of how the secondary mortgage market functions. It would phase out Fannie and Freddie and replace it with a government-owned company that would provide the infrastructure for securitization. This alternative would also leave credit risk in the hands of the private sector, but just to the extent that it could be appropriately absorbed.

Whether we admit it or not, we all know that the federal government will step in if a crisis in the mortgage market gets bad enough. This makes sense because frozen credit markets are a type of market failure. It is best to set up the appropriate infrastructure now to deal with such a possibility, instead of relying on the gun-to-the-head approach that led to the Fannie and Freddie bailout legislation in 2008.

Republicans and Democrats alike have placed homeownership at the center of their housing policy platforms for a long time. Homeownership represents stability, independence and engagement with community. It is also a path to financial security and wealth accumulation for many.

In the past, housing policy has overemphasized the importance of access to credit. This has led to poor mortgage underwriting. When the private sector also engaged in loose underwriting, we got into really big trouble. Federal housing policy should emphasize access to sustainable credit.

A reform plan should ensure that those who are likely to make their mortgage payment month-in, month-out can access the mortgage markets. If such borrowers are not able to access the mortgage market, it is appropriate for the federal government to correct that market failure as well. The FHA is the natural candidate to take the lead on this.

Housing finance reform went nowhere over the last eight years, so we should not assume it will have an easy time of it in 2017. But if we develop a reform agenda that is designed to correct predictable market failures, we can build a housing finance system that supports a healthy housing market for the rest of the century, and perhaps beyond.

Consumer Protection, Going Forward

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photo by Lawrence Jackson

Warren, Obama and Cordray

The New York Times quoted me in Consumer Protection Bureau Chief Braces for a Reckoning. It opens,

Mild-mannered, lawyerly and with a genius for trivia, Richard Cordray is not the sort of guy you picture at the center of Washington’s bitter partisan wars over regulation and consumer safeguards.

But there he is, a 57-year-old Buckeye who friends say prefers his hometown diner to a fancy political reception, testifying in hearing after hearing on Capitol Hill about the agency he leads, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Republicans would like to do away with it — and with him, arguing that the agency should be led by a commission rather than one person.

And with a Republican sweep of Congress and the White House, they may get some or all of what they wish.

Mr. Cordray, a reluctant Washingtonian who has commuted here for six years from Grove City, Ohio, where his wife and twin children live, is the first director of the consumer watchdog agency, which was created in 2010 after Wall Street’s meltdown. By aggressively deploying his small army of workers — he has 1,600 of them — Mr. Cordray has turned the fledgling agency into one of Washington’s most powerful and pugnacious regulators.

The bureau has overhauled mortgage lending rules, reined in abusive debt collectors, prosecuted hundreds of companies and extracted nearly $12 billion from businesses in the form of canceled debts and consumer refunds. In September, it exposed the extent of Wells Fargo’s creation of two million fraudulent customer accounts, igniting a scandal that provoked widespread outrage and toppled the company’s chief executive.

And, according to Mr. Cordray, he and his team have barely scratched the surface of combating consumer abuse.

“We overcame momentous challenges — just building an agency from scratch, let alone one that deals with such a large sector of the economy,” Mr. Cordray said in an interview at his agency’s office here. “I’m satisfied with the progress we have made, but I’m not satisfied in the sense that there’s a lot more progress to be made. There’s still a lot to be done.”

But his future and the agency’s are uncertain. Democrats in Ohio are encouraging Mr. Cordray to run for governor in 2018, which would require him to quit his job in Washington fairly soon, rather than when his term ends in mid-2018. Champions of the agency are imploring him to stay, arguing that if he leaves, the agency is likely to be defanged, its powers to help consumers sapped.

Opponents of the bureau just won a big legal victory: The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit said last month that the structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was unconstitutional, and that the president should have the power to fire its director at will.

The agency is challenging the decision — which was made in a lawsuit brought by the mortgage lender PHH Corporation that contests the consumer bureau’s authority to fine it — and that has temporarily stopped the decision from taking effect. But the ruling has kept alive questions about whether too much power is concentrated in Mr. Cordray’s job, and whether the agency should be dismantled or restructured.

Mr. Cordray, who also battled on behalf of consumers in his previous jobs as Ohio’s attorney general and, before that, its treasurer, is praised in some circles as enormously effective, wielding the bureau’s power to restructure some industries and terrify others.

The bureau has “helped save countless people across the country from abusive financial practices,” said Hilary O. Shelton, the N.A.A.C.P.’s senior vice president for advocacy and policy.

Even the regulator’s frequent foes — including Alan S. Kaplinsky, a partner at Ballard Spahr in Philadelphia, who says the agency often overreaches — acknowledge its impact.

“I’ve been practicing law in this area for well over 40 years, and there’s nothing that compares to it,” Mr. Kaplinsky said. “Every company in the consumer financial services market has felt the effects.”

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has nearly replaced the Better Business Bureau as the first stop for dissatisfied customers seeking redress. It has handled more than a million complaints, many of which it has helped resolve.

*     *    *

The housing crisis dominated the bureau’s early days. When Congress created the new overseer, it also dictated its first priority: making mortgages safer. The deadline was tight. If the bureau did not introduce new rules within 18 months, a congressionally mandated set of lending guidelines would automatically take effect.

The bureau made it with one day to spare.

It banned some practices that had fueled the crisis, like home loans with low teaser rates or no documentation of the borrower’s income, and steered lenders toward “qualified” loans with a stricter set of safeguards, including checks to ensure that customers could afford to repay what they borrowed.

After much grumbling — and many dire forecasts that the new rules would limit credit and harm consumers — mortgage lenders adjusted. They made nearly 3.7 million loans last year for home purchases, the highest number since 2007, according to government data.

“It seems like the financial services industry has figured out how to adapt to this new regulatory regime,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School who studied the effects of the bureau’s rule-making. “We’ve moved from the fox-in-the-henhouse market in the early 2000s, where you could get away with nearly anything, to this new model, where someone is looking over your shoulder.”

Housing Finance Reform, Going Forward

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photo by Michael Vadon

President-Elect Trump

Two high-level officials in the Treasury Department recently posted Housing Finance Reform: Access and Affordability Going Forward. It highlighted principles that should guide housing finance reform going forward. It opened,

Access to affordable housing serves as a cornerstone of economic security for millions of Americans. The purchase of a home is the largest and most significant financial transaction in the lives of many households. Access to credit and affordable rental housing defines when young adults start their own households and gives growing families options in choosing the quality and location of their homes. Homeownership can be an opportunity to build wealth, placing a college education within reach and helping older Americans attain a secure retirement. Whether they are aware of it or not, some of the most momentous decisions American families make are shaped by how the housing finance system serves them.

Financial reform has sought to reorient financial institutions to their core mission of supporting the real economy. The great unfinished business of financial reform is refocusing the housing finance system toward better meeting the needs of American families. How policymakers address this challenge will be the critical test for any model for housing finance reform. The most fundamental question any future system must answer is this: Are we providing more American households with greater and more sustainable access to affordable homes to rent or own? It is through this lens that we will assess the performance of the current marketplace and evaluate a set of policy considerations for addressing access and affordability in a future system. (1-2)

These principles of access and affordability have guided federal housing finance policy for quite some time, particularly in Democratic administrations. They now appear to fallen by the wayside as Republicans control both the Executive and Legislative branches.

President-Elect Trump has not yet outlined his thinking on housing finance reform. And the Republican Party Platform is somewhat vague on the topic as well. But it does give some guidance as to where we are headed:

We must scale back the federal role in the housing market, promote responsibility on the part of borrowers and lenders, and avoid future taxpayer bailouts. Reforms should provide clear and prudent underwriting standards and guidelines on predatory lending and acceptable lending practices. Compliance with regulatory standards should constitute a legal safe harbor to guard against opportunistic litigation by trial lawyers.

We call for a comprehensive review of federal regulations, especially those dealing with the environment, that make it harder and more costly for Americans to rent, buy, or sell homes.

For nine years, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been in conservatorship and the current Administration and Democrats have prevented any effort to reform them. Their corrupt business model lets shareholders and executives reap huge profits while the taxpayers cover all loses. The utility of both agencies should be reconsidered as a Republican administration clears away the jumble of subsidies and controls that complicate and distort home-buying.

The Federal Housing Administration, which provides taxpayer-backed guarantees in the mortgage market, should no longer support high-income individuals, and the public should not be financially exposed by risks taken by FHA officials. We will end the government mandates that required Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and federally-insured banks to satisfy lending quotas to specific groups. Discrimination should have no place in the mortgage industry.

Turning those broad statements into policies, we are likely to see some or all of the following on the agenda for housing finance reform:

  • a phasing out of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, perhaps via some version of Hensarling’s PATH Act;
  • a significant change to Dodd-Frank’s regulation of mortgage origination as well as a full frontal assault on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau;
  • a dramatic reduction in the FHA’s footprint in the mortgage market; and
  • a rescinding of Obama’s Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Executive Order.

Some are already arguing that Trump and Congress will take a more pragmatic approach to reforming the housing finance system than what is outlined in the Republican platform. I think it is more honest to say that we just don’t know yet what the new normal is going to be.