The Hispanic Homeownership Gap

 

 

 

photo by Gabriel Santana

Freddie Mac’s latest Economic & Housing Research Insight asks Will the Hispanic Homeownership Gap Persist? It opens,

This is the American story.

A wave of immigrants arrives in the U.S. Perhaps they’re escaping religious or political persecution. Perhaps a drought or famine has driven them from their homes. Perhaps they simply want to try their luck in the land of opportunity.

They face new challenges in America. Often they arrive with few resources. And everything about them sets them apart—their religions, their languages, their cultures, their foods, their appearances. They are not always welcomed. They frequently face discrimination in housing, jobs, education, and more. But over time, they plant their roots in American soil. They become part of the tapestry that is America. And they thrive.

This is the story of the Germans and Italians and many other ethnic groups that poured into the U.S. a century ago.

Today’s immigrants come, for the most part, from Latin America and Asia instead of Europe. Hispanics comprise by far the largest share of the current wave. Over the last 50 years, more than 30 million Hispanics migrated to the U.S. And these Hispanics face many of the same challenges as earlier European immigrants.

Homeownership provides a key measure of transition from a newly-arrived immigrant to an established resident. Many immigrants arrive without the financial resources needed to purchase a home. In addition, the unfamiliarity and complexity of the U.S. housing and mortgage finance systems pose obstacles to homeownership. As a result, homeownership rates start low for new immigrants but rise over time.

The homeownership rate among Hispanics in the U.S.—a population that includes new immigrants, long-standing citizens, and everything in between— stands around 45 percent, more than 20 percentage points lower than the rate among non-Hispanic whites. Much of this homeownership gap can be traced to differences in age, income, education and other factors associated with homeownership.

Will the Hispanic homeownership gap close over time, as it did for the European immigrants of a century ago? Or will a significant gap stubbornly persist, as it has for African-Americans? (1-2)

It concludes,

Census projections of future age distributions suggest that the age differences of Whites and Hispanics will be reduced by six percent (0.7 years) by 2025 and 12 percent (1.2 years) by 2035. If these projections are realized, the White/Hispanic homeownership gap is likely to narrow by 20 percent (five percentage points) by 2035. The Census projections include both current residents and future immigrants, and averaging the characteristics of these two groups of Hispanics tends to mask the relatively-rapid growth in homeownership among the current residents.

It is important to remember that about 13 percent of the White/Hispanic homeownership gap cannot be traced to population characteristics such as age and income. The explanation for this residual gap is unclear, although some of it may be due to wealth gaps and discrimination. (12)

Researchers at the Urban Institute have documented the importance of the Hispanic homeownership rate to the housing market more generally. It is worthwhile for policymakers to focus on it as well.

Framing Bipartisan Housing Finance Reform

photo by Jan Tik

The Bipartisan Policy Center has issued A Framework for Improving Access and Affordability in a Reformed Housing Finance System. The brief was written by Michael Stegman who had served as the Obama Administration’s top advisor on housing policy. It opens,

With policymakers gearing up to reform the housing finance system, it is worth revisiting one of the issues that stymied negotiators in the reform effort of 2014: how to ensure adequate access to credit in the new system. The political landscape has changed substantially since 2014. For those who are focused on financing affordable housing and promoting access to mortgage credit, the status quo—the continued conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—may no longer be as appealing as it was during those negotiations. This brief draws upon the lessons learned from that experience to outline a framework for bipartisan consensus in this transformed political environment.

The “middle-way” approach described here is not dependent upon any one structure or future role for the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), though it does assume the continuation of a government guarantee of qualified mortgage-backed securities (MBS). It is this guarantee that forms the basis of the obligation to ensure that the benefits flowing from the government backstop are as broadly available as possible, consistent with safety and soundness and taxpayer protection.

In recent months, at least three such proposals have been developed that preserve a federal backstop (see Mortgage Bankers Association, Bright and DeMarco, and Parrott et al. proposals). Should the administration and Congress pursue a strict privatization approach to reform, lacking a guarantee, it’s unlikely that any affordable housing obligations would be imposed in the reformed system. (cover page, footnotes omitted)

Stegman goes on to describe “The Affordable Housing Triad:”

Over the years, Congress has made it clear that the GSEs’ public purpose includes supporting the financing of affordable housing and promoting access to mortgage credit “throughout the nation, including central cities, rural areas, and underserved areas,” even if doing so involves earning “a reasonable economic return that may be less than the return earned on other activities.” As part of this mandate, policymakers have created a triad of affordable housing and credit access requirements:

  1. Meeting annual affordable-mortgage purchase goals set by the regulator;
  2. Paying an assessment on each dollar of new business to help capitalize two different affordable housing funds; and
  3. Developing and executing targeted duty-to-serve strategies, the purpose of which is to increase liquidity in market segments underserved by primary lenders and the GSEs, defined by both geography and housing types. (1, footnote omitted)

The paper outlines three bipartisan options that would not

compromise the obligation to provide liquidity to all corners of the market at the least possible cost, consistent with taxpayer protection and safety and soundness. Each option attempts to ensure that the system as a whole provides access and affordability at least as much as the existing system; includes an explicit and transparent fee on the outstanding balance of guaranteed MBS; and includes a duty to serve the broadest possible market. (3)

The paper is intended to spark further conversation about housing finance reform while advocating for the needs of low- and moderate-income households. I hope it succeeds in pushing Congress to focus on the details of what could be a bipartisan exit strategy from the endless GSE conservatorships.

 

Who Qualifies as a First-Time Homebuyer?

NewHomeSource quoted me in Who Qualifies as a First-Time Homebuyer? It opens,

You don’t always have to be a first-time homebuyer to qualify for down payment assistance programs.

As you consider purchasing a home, you may have come across down payment assistance programs that aim to assist first-time homebuyers.

“How can I qualify?” you might have asked yourself.

It turns out, you don’t always have to be a first-time homebuyer to qualify, even though it might say otherwise in the name.

“Freddie Mac defines ‘first-time homebuyers’ for its Home Possible program as someone who had ‘no ownership interest (sole or joint) in a residential property during the three-year period preceding the date of the purchase of the mortgage premises,’” says David Reiss, professor of law and research director for the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship at the Brooklyn Law School.

Freddie Mac, a government-sponsored home loan mortgage corporation, says that its Home Possible mortgages offer low down payments for low- to moderate-income homebuyers or buyers in high-cost or underserved communities.

Another federal mortgage association, Fannie Mae, also offers down payment assistance programs for first-time homebuyers.

“The Fannie Mae standard 97% LTV Options let first-time homebuyers put down 3 percent,” says Reiss. “The program defines a first-time homebuyer as someone who ‘had no ownership interest (sole or joint) in a residential property during the three-year period preceding the date of purchase of the security property.’”

Similarly, the U.S Department of Housing and Urban Development defines a first-time homebuyer as an individual who has had no ownership in a principal residence three years prior to the closing date of the property.

Not a first-time homebuyer under these definitions? There’s hope for you still.

“Given the overwhelming dominance that the FHA, Fannie and Freddie have on the mortgage market, homebuyers who have sat out of the housing market for a while may find that they qualify for first-time homebuyer programs even if they have owned a home before,” adds Reiss.

Additionally, there are also assistance programs available for “displaced homemakers.” A displaced homemaker generally meets the following qualifications:

  • Provided unpaid services to family members in the home, such as a stay-at-home parent,
  • Were given financial assistance from another family member, but are no longer supported by that income and
  • Are unemployed/underemployed with difficulty gaining employment or upgraded pay.

“A displaced homemaker or single parent will also be considered a first-time homebuyer if he or she had no ownership interest in a principal residence (other than a joint ownership interest with a spouse) during the preceding three-year time period,” Reiss says.

Muddled Future for Fannie & Freddie

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The United States Government Accountability Office released a report, Objectives Needed for the Future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac After Conservatorships.  The GAO’s findings read a bit like a “dog bites man” story — stating, as it does, the obvious:  “Congress should consider legislation that would establish clear objectives and a transition plan to a reformed housing finance system that enables the enterprises to exit conservatorship. FHFA agreed with our overall findings.” (GAO Highlights page) I think everyone agrees with that, except unfortunately, Congress.  Congress has let the two companies languish in the limbo of conservatorship for over eight years now.

Richard Shelby, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, asked the GAO to prepare this report in order to

examine FHFA’s actions as conservator. This report addresses (1) the extent to which FHFA’s goals for the conservatorships have changed and (2) the implications of FHFA’s actions for the future of the enterprises and the broader secondary mortgage market. GAO analyzed and reviewed FHFA’s actions as conservator and supporting documents; legislative proposals for housing finance reform; the enterprises’ senior preferred stock agreements with Treasury; and GAO, Congressional Budget Office, and FHFA inspector general reports. GAO also interviewed FHFA and Treasury officials and industry stakeholders (Id.)

The GAO’s findings are pretty technical, but still very important for housing analysts:

In the absence of congressional direction, FHFA’s shift in priorities has altered market participants’ perceptions and expectations about the enterprises’ ongoing role and added to uncertainty about the future structure of the housing finance system. In particular, FHFA halted several actions aimed at reducing the scope of enterprise activities and is seeking to maintain the enterprises in their current state. However, other actions (such as reducing their capital bases to $0 by January 2018) are written into agreements for capital support with the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and continue to be implemented.

In addition, the change in scope for the technology platform for securitization puts less emphasis on reducing barriers facing private entities than previously envisioned, and new initiatives to expand mortgage availability could crowd out market participants.

Furthermore, some actions, such as transferring credit risk to private investors, could decrease the likelihood of drawing on Treasury’s funding commitment, but others, such as reducing minimum down payments, could increase it.

GAO has identified setting clear objectives as a key principle for providing government assistance to private market participants. Because Congress has not established objectives for the future of the enterprises after conservatorships or the federal role in housing finance, FHFA’s ability to shift priorities may continue to contribute to market uncertainty. (Id.)

One finding seems particularly spot on to me. As I wrote yesterday, it appears as if the FHFA is not focusing sufficiently on building the infrastructure to serve secondary mortgage markets other than Fannie and Freddie.  It seems to me that a broader and deeper bench of secondary mortgage market players will benefit the housing market in the long run.

 

Fannie/Freddie Scorecard

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The Federal Housing Finance Agency released its 2017 Scorecard for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Common Securitization Solutions.  The scorecard highlights how the FHFA’s reform of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is proceeding apace, absent direction from Congress.  This reform path had been set by Acting Director DeMarco, appointed by President Bush, and has continued relatively unchanged under Director Watt, appointed by President Obama.

The scorecard’s assessment criteria for the two companies are,

  • The extent to which each Enterprise conducts initiatives in a safe and sound manner consistent with FHFA’s expectations for all activities;
  • The extent to which the outcomes of their activities support a competitive and resilient secondary mortgage market to support homeowners and renters;
  • The extent to which each Enterprise conducts initiatives with consideration for diversity and inclusion consistent with FHFA’s expectations for all activities;
  • Cooperation and collaboration with FHFA, each other, the industry, and other stakeholders; and
  • The quality, thoroughness, creativity, effectiveness, and timeliness of their work products. (2)

The scorecard states that Fannie and Freddie should increase credit risk transfers to investors.  Currently, the focus is on transferring risk from pretty safe and standard mortgages, but the FHFA is pushing Fannie and Freddie to increase risk transfers on a broader array of mortgage types.

The scorecard also states that the effort to integrate Fannie and Freddie through the Common Securitization Platform and the Single Security should continue so that the Single Security is operational in 2018.  The scorecard emphasizes that the Platform should allow “for the integration of additional market participants in the future.” (6)  While this has been a design requirement from the get-go, I have heard through the grapevine that this element of the Platform has not been pursued so vigorously.  To my mind, it seems like a key component if we want to build the infrastructure for a healthy secondary mortgage market for the rest of the 21st century.

 

Mnuchin and Housing Finance Reform

photo by MohitSingh

Sabri Ben-Achour of Marketplace interviewed me in Choice of Mnuchin Troubles Housing Activists. (The audio is available at the link at the top of the linked page.)  The summary of the story reads as follows:

Donald Trump has tapped financier, Hollywood producer and hedge fund manager Steven Mnuchin as Treasury Secretary. In that role, Mnuchin would have quite a lot to say about housing, finance and policies related to mortgage lending. Mnuchin has been involved in lending before, and it didn’t go well for many homeowners.

At issue specifically is his an investment in a failing mortgage lender in 2009 called IndyMac in California. Mnuchin and other investors renamed it OneWest, and it proceeded to foreclose on tens of thousands of homes nationwide. Critics say the company could have kept some portion of those people in their homes.

The story reads in part,

“I think the really big place where the Treasury Secretary can have an impact is on housing finance reform and, really, what we should do with Fannie and Freddie.”  David Reiss is a Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School.

The Trump Effect on Mortgage Rates

photo by Sergiu Bacioiu

The Christian Science Monitor quoted me in What Does President Trump Really Mean for Mortgage Rates? It opens,

In the week following the election, mortgage rates soared nearly half a percentage point. Average weekly 30-year fixed home loan rates are back above 4% for the first time since July 2015.

Here’s a three-minute read on the Trump Effect — past, present and future — on mortgage rates.

What happened to mortgage rates right after the election

Investors sold bonds on President-elect Donald Trump’s stated goals to lower taxes, boost deregulation and make massive infrastructure investments. A growing economy fueled by government spending could trigger higher inflation, which is a concern for the bond market.

As bond prices fell from the sell-off, yields rose. Higher bond yields equal higher mortgage rates. is happening with mortgage rates now

What is happening with mortgage rates now

Rates are already taking a breath. After a quick run-up following the election,  30-year mortgage rates are generally holding steady, near 4%.

What will happen to mortgage rates in 2017

The Federal Reserve this week reaffirmed its intention to begin raising short-term interest rates, most likely beginning in December. Following that hike, if it happens, the U.S. central bank’s policy-setting Federal Open Market Committee is looking to manage a slow climb in rates.

“The FOMC continues to expect that the evolution of the economy will warrant only gradual increases in the federal funds rate over time to achieve and maintain maximum employment and price stability,” Fed Chair Janet Yellen told Congress on Nov. 17. Those moves will influence longer-term rates such as on mortgages to rise as well.

And there’s another potential trigger for mortgage rates to move higher.

While Trump hasn’t taken a stance yet, Republican party leaders have been vocal about getting the government out of the mortgage business. That could mean redefining the role of the Federal Housing Administration and moving Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to the private sector.

David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School, concentrates on real estate finance and community development. He sees the Republican agenda to “reduce the government’s footprint in the mortgage market” as a possible catalyst to higher mortgage rates in the future.

“You put the government’s stamp of approval on companies like Fannie and Freddie, and it lowers interest rates because they can borrow at a lower rate — but then the taxpayers are on the hook if things go south, and that was the case in 2008,” Reiss tells NerdWallet. “If you reduce the federal government’s role in the housing markets, you’re going to reduce the likelihood of future bailouts by taxpayers. That’s the trade-off.”