Tag Archives: HERA

Fannie, Freddie and Trump

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FHFA Director Bill Pulte

Central Banking quoted me in Fannie, Freddie . . . and Donald. It reads, in part,

IIn a client note on May 13, investment management firm Pimco said any privatisation of Fannie and Freddie would be a solution in search of a problem.

“If the GSEs are released but the government remains accountable to come to their rescue, wouldn’t taxpayers ultimately be the biggest loser, once again, by seeing GSE gains privatised but losses socialised?” it said, adding: “Don’t fix what’s not broken.”

David Reiss, professor at Cornell Law School, says Pimco’s view reflects the fact that the mortgage market has been functioning “pretty smoothly” since Fannie and Freddie were nationalised. According to this viewpoint, there is “no need to release them from conservatorship”.

However, Reiss says he does not like to see so much power and influence concentrated in the GSEs, and he believes the private sector would do a better job of evaluating credit risk.

“Some people – mostly investors in Fannie and Freddie securities – think [privatisation] is the right thing to do because the conservatorships were supposed to be temporary and the companies should be returned to private control and investors should be able to get some kind of return on their investments,” he says.

Reiss adds that some members of the Trump administration think privatisation would generate hundreds of billions of dollars in revenue that could be used to help pay down the national debt, offset tax cuts and seed a sovereign wealth fund.

Joe Tracy, senior fellow with think-tank the American Enterprise Institute and a former official with the Federal Reserve banks of New York and Dallas, agrees with Reiss. “The problem is that they are in conservatorship limbo, so the government has effectively nationalised a large segment of mortgage finance,” he says. “This should be carried out by the private sector.”

    *     *     *

Lawrence White, professor at New York University and co-author of Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Debacle of Mortgage Finance, says the GSEs are unlikely to become boring unless they are broken down. He believes that if Fannie and Freddie are privatised in their current form, each enterprise will be likely to pose a systemic risk from a financial stability perspective.

“The implication is that their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency [FHFAI, will need to have strong powers of examination and supervision and will need to impose substantial, risk-adjusted capital requirements,” he says.

“It is unclear whether there will be implications for the Fed as lender of last resort, since the Fed’s lending function is currently limited to banks.”

Reiss agrees that the two lenders are systemically important. If they “had to significantly scale back their lending, it would likely cause a crisis in the financial markets”, he says. “If that crisis were not quickly addressed it would cause a crisis in the real economy as well, freezing up credit for new construction and resales.”

Given that the two GSEs issue more than 70% of the outstanding $9 trillion of mortgage-backed securities in the US and, if privatised, would be two of the country’s largest publicly traded companies, the financial stability risks are clear, he says.

Reiss adds that if the privatisations were poorly planned, and if this were priced in by the markets, it would lead to “higher mortgage rates, with all of the knock-on effects that would have”. This, he says, would “increase the magnitude of a financial crisis if the two companies were to report poor financial results down the line”

Reiss’s interpretation of the Fed’s role is different to that of White, and he believes history may end up repeating itself. He says that although the FHFA is Fannie and Freddie’s primary regulator, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 requires the Fed to be consulted about any federal government processes related to the companies.

“The Fed may also co-ordinate with other parts of the federal government in responding to a financial crisis, such as purchasing Fannie and Freddie securities, as they did during the financial crisis of 2007-08,” he says. “One could well imagine the Fed playing a similar role in future crises involving Fannie and Freddie.

GSE Shareholders Floored, Again

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit issued an opinion in Saxton v. FHFA (No. 17-1727, Aug. 23, 2018). The Eighth Circuit joins the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and D.C. Circuits in rejecting the arguments of Fannie and Freddie shareholders that the Federal Housing Finance Agency exceeded its authority as conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The Court provides the following overview:

     The financial crisis of 2008 prompted Congress to take several actions to fend off economic disaster. One of those measures propped up Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Fannie and Freddie, which were founded by Congress back in 1938 and 1970, buy home mortgages from lenders, thereby freeing lenders to make more loans. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 4501. Although established by Congress, Fannie and Freddie operate like private companies: they have shareholders, boards of directors, and executives appointed by those boards. But Fannie and Freddie also have something most private businesses do not: the backing of the United States Treasury. 

     In 2008, with the mortgage meltdown at full tilt, Congress enacted the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA or the Act). HERA created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and gave it the power to appoint itself either conservator or receiver of Fannie or Freddie should either company become critically undercapitalized. 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(2), (4). The Act includes a provision limiting judicial review: “Except as  provided in this section or at the request of the Director, no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the [FHFA] as a conservator or a receiver.” Id. § 4617(f). 

     Shortly after the Act’s passage, FHFA determined that both Fannie and Freddie were critically undercapitalized and appointed itself conservator. FHFA then entered an agreement with the U.S. Department of the Treasury whereby Treasury would acquire specially-created preferred stock and, in exchange, would make hundreds of billions of dollars in capital available to Fannie and Freddie. The idea was that Fannie and Freddie would exit conservatorship when they reimbursed the Treasury.

     But Fannie and Freddie remain under FHFA’s conservatorship today. Since the conservatorship began, FHFA and Treasury have amended their agreement several times. In the most recent amendment, FHFA agreed that, each quarter, Fannie and Freddie would pay to Treasury their entire net worth, minus a small buffer. This so-called “net worth sweep” is the basis of this litigation. 

     Three owners of Fannie and Freddie common stock sued FHFA and Treasury, claiming they had exceeded their powers under HERA and acted arbitrarily and capriciously by agreeing to the net worth sweep. The shareholders sought only an injunction setting aside the net worth sweep; they dismissed a claim seeking money damages. Relying on the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Perry Capital LLC v. Mnuchin, 864 F.3d 591 (D.C. Cir. 2017), the district court dismissed the suit.

What amazes me as a longtime watcher of the GSE litigation is how supposedly dispassionate investors lose their heads when it comes to the GSE lawsuits. They cannot seem to fathom that judges will come to a different conclusion regarding HERA’s limitation on judicial review.

While I do not rule out that the Supreme Court could find otherwise, particularly if Judge Kavanaugh is confirmed, it seems like this unbroken string of losses should provide some sort of wake up call for GSE shareholders. But somehow, I doubt that it will.

Credit Risk Transfer and Financial Crises

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Susan Wachter posted Credit Risk Transfer, Informed Markets, and Securitization to SSRN. It opens,

Across countries and over time, credit expansions have led to episodes of real estate booms and busts. Ten years ago, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the most recent of these, began with the Panic of 2007. The pricing of MBS had given no indication of rising credit risk. Nor had market indicators such as early payment default or delinquency – higher house prices censored the growing underlying credit risk. Myopic lenders, who believed that house prices would continue to increase, underpriced credit risk.

In the aftermath of the crisis, under the Dodd Frank Act, Congress put into place a new financial regulatory architecture with increased capital requirements and stress tests to limit the banking sector’s role in the amplification of real estate price bubbles. There remains, however, a major piece of unfinished business: the reform of the US housing finance system whose failure was central to the GFC. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), put into conservatorship under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008, await a mandate for a new securitization structure. The future state of the housing finance system in the US is still not resolved.

Currently, US taxpayers back almost all securitized mortgages through the GSEs and Ginnie Mae. While pre-crisis, private label securitization (PLS) had provided a significant share of funding for mortgages, since 2007, PLS has withdrawn from the market.

The appropriate pricing of mortgage backed securities can discourage lending if risk rises, and, potentially, can limit housing bubbles that are enabled by excess credit. Securitization markets, including the over the counter market for residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and the ABX securitization index, failed to do this in the housing bubble years 2003-2007.

GSEs have recently developed Credit Risk Transfers (CRTs) to trade and price credit risk. The objective is to bring private market discipline to bear on risk taking in securitized lending. For the CRT market to accomplish this, it must avoid the failures of financial assets to price risk. Are prerequisites for this in place? (2, references omitted)

Wachter partially answers this question in her conclusion:

CRT markets, if appropriately structured, can signal a heightened likelihood of systemic risk. Capital markets failed to do this in the run-up to the financial crisis, due to misaligned incentives and shrouded information. With sufficiently informed and appropriately structured markets, CRTs can provide market based discovery of the pricing of risk, and, with appropriate regulatory and guarantor response, can advance the stability of mortgage finance markets. (10)

Credit risk transfer has not yet been tested by a serious financial crisis. Wachter is right to bring a spotlight on it now, before events in the mortgage market overtake us.

GSE Investors’ Hidden Win

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Judge Brown

The big news yesterday was that the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit ruled in the main for the federal government in Perry Capital v. Mnuchin, one of the major cases that investors brought against the federal government over the terms of the Fannie and Freddie conservatorships.

In a measured and carefully reasoned opinion, the court rejected most but not all of the investors’ claims.  The reasoning was consistent with my own reading of the broad conservatorship provisions of the Housing and Economic Recover Act of 2008 (HERA).

Judge Brown’s dissent, however, reveals that the investors have crafted an alternative narrative that at least one judge finds compelling. This means that there is going to be some serious drama when this case ultimately wends its way to the Supreme Court. And there is some reason to believe that a Justice Gorsuch might be sympathetic to this narrative of government overreach.

Judge Brown’s opinion indicts many aspects of federal housing finance policy, broadly condemning it in the opening paragraph:

One critic has called it “wrecking-ball benevolence,” James Bovard, Editorial, Nothing Down: The Bush Administration’s Wrecking-Ball Benevolence, BARRON’S, Aug. 23, 2004, https://tinyurl.com/Barrons-Bovard; while another, dismissing the compassionate rhetoric, dubs it “crony capitalism,” Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr., Commentary, Fannie/Freddie Bailout Baloney, CATO INST., https://tinyurl.com/Cato-O-Driscoll (last visited Feb. 13, 2017). But whether the road was paved with good intentions or greased by greed and indifference, affordable housing turned out to be the path to perdition for the U.S. mortgage market. And, because of the dominance of two so-called Government Sponsored Entities (“GSE”s)—the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae” or “Fannie”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac” or “Freddie,” collectively with Fannie Mae, the “Companies”)—the trouble that began in the subprime mortgage market metastasized until it began to affect most debt markets, both domestic and international. (dissent at 1)

While acknowledging that the Fannie/Freddie crisis might justify “extraordinary actions by Congress,” Judge Brown states that

even in a time of exigency, a nation governed by the rule of law cannot transfer broad and unreviewable power to a government entity to do whatsoever it wishes with the assets of these Companies. Moreover, to remain within constitutional parameters, even a less-sweeping delegation of authority would require an explicit and comprehensive framework. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”) Here, Congress did not endow FHFA with unlimited authority to pursue its own ends; rather, it seized upon the statutory text that had governed the FDIC for decades and adapted it ever so slightly to confront the new challenge posed by Fannie and Freddie.

*     *     *

[Congress] chose a well-understood and clearly-defined statutory framework—one that drew upon the common law to clearly delineate the outer boundaries of the Agency’s conservator or, alternatively, receiver powers. FHFA pole vaulted over those boundaries, disregarding the plain text of its authorizing statute and engaging in ultra vires conduct. Even now, FHFA continues to insist its authority is entirely without limit and argues for a complete ouster of federal courts’ power to grant injunctive relief to redress any action it takes while purporting to serve in the conservator role. See FHFA Br. 21  (2-3)

What amazes me about this dissent is how it adopts the decidedly non-mainstream history of the financial crisis that has been promoted by the American Enterprise Institute’s Peter Wallison.  It also takes its legislative history from an unpublished Cato Institute paper by Vice-President Pence’s newly selected chief economist, Mark Calabria and a co-author.  There is nothing wrong with a judge giving some context to an opinion, but it is of note when it seems as one-sided as this. The bottom line though is that this narrative clearly has some legs so we should not think that this case has played itself out, just because of this decision.

National Survey of Mortgage Originations

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The Federal Housing Finance Agency has issued a request for comments on the National Survey of Mortgage Originations. The NSMO is

a recurring quarterly survey of individuals who have recently obtained a loan secured by a first mortgage on single-family residential property. The survey questionnaire is sent to a representative sample of approximately 6,000 recent mortgage borrowers each calendar quarter and typically consists of between 90 and 95 multiple choice and short answer questions designed to obtain information about borrowers’ experiences in choosing and in taking out a mortgage.

*     *     *

The NSMO is one component of a larger project, known as the “National Mortgage Database” (NMDB) Project, which is a multi-year joint effort of FHFA and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) (although the NSMO is sponsored only by FHFA). The NMDB Project was created, in part, to satisfy the Congressionally-mandated requirements of section 1324(c) of the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, as amended by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (Safety and Soundness Act). Section 1324(c) requires that FHFA conduct a monthly survey to collect data on the characteristics of individual prime and subprime mortgages, and on the borrowers and properties associated with those mortgages, in order to enable it to prepare a detailed annual report on the mortgage market activities of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) for review by the appropriate Congressional oversight committees. Section 1324(c) also authorizes and requires FHFA to compile a database of timely and otherwise unavailable residential mortgage market information to be made available to the public. (81 F.R. 62889)

Obviously, this is another post on a technical subject that is not for the faint of heart, but it is very important for the health of the mortgage market. During the Subprime Boom of the early 2000s, mortgage characteristics changed so quickly that information became outdated within months.  Policymakers and academics did not have good access to newest data and thus were operating, to a large extent, in the dark.

The information in the NSMO will not only help regulators, but will also outside researchers to “more effectively monitor emerging trends in the mortgage origination process . . ..” (81 F.R. 62890) The FHFA requests comments on whether “the collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of FHFA functions, including whether the information has practical utility.” (Id.) The FHFA is also looking for comments on ways “to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information collected.” (Id.) Those with an interest in securing a safe future for our mortgage markets should take a look at the survey instrument (attached to the Comment Request) and respond to the FHFA’s request. Comments are due on or before November 14, 2016.

What If . . . Fannie and Freddie Imploded?

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So, I was spending some quality time with the Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of the Inspector General’s most recent Semiannual Report to the Congress. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) is the regulator of Fannie and Freddie as well as their conservator. Essentially, the FHFA calls all of the shots for the two companies.

It got me to wondering, does the Office of the Inspector General really have a handle on whether Fannie and Freddie are in good shape or not? The report opens with a Snapshot of OIG Accomplishments. The Snapshot contains the following categories:

  • OIG Investigations Monetary Results
  • Judicial Actions
  • Hotline Contacts
  • Audit and Evaluation Reports Issued
  • White Papers Issued
  • Office of Compliance and Special Projects Reports Issued
  • Nonmonetary Recommendations Made
  • Regulations Reviewed
  • Responses to Requests Under the Freedom of Information Act

As I read through the report, I had the distinct feeling that I had got lost among the trees of bureaucratic oversight and had lost sight of the contours of the Frannie forest.

I want to know one thing — are the two companies solvent and will they be solvent for the foreseeable future? The OIG’s Snapshot is pretty backward facing and focuses on a lot of pretty minor issues, like counting hotline contacts, instead of focusing on the fundamentals.

I know, I know — if we can measure something, then we want to share it with the world, but the Snapshot actually decreases my faith that OIG and FHFA are taking care of the entire forest and not just a few of the trees they were able to measure.

That being said, the report does get  to some of the important issues later on. It acknowledges that

Since September 2008, FHFA has administered two conservatorships of unprecedented scope and undeterminable duration. Under HERA,the Agency’s actions as conservator are not subject to judicial review or intervention, nor are they subject to procedural safeguards that are ordinarily applicable to regulatory activities such as rulemaking. As conservator of the Enterprises, FHFA exercises control over trillions of dollars in assets and billions of dollars in revenue, and makes business and policy decisions that influence and impact the entire mortgage finance industry. For reasons of efficiency, concordant goals with the Enterprises, and operational savings, FHFA has determined to delegate revocable authority for general corporate governance and day-to-day matters to the Enterprises’ boards of directors and executive management. (10)

The OIG clearly understands what is at stake in the conservatorships. But as I read the remainder of the report, I did not see sufficient emphasis on the range of risks that Fannie and Freddie face, such as hedging risk and operational risk. Hopefully, someone at the FHFA is paying sufficient attention to the range of risks the two companies face. If not, we can expect a new type of crisis down the pike.

What Are Mortgage Borrowers Thinking?

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Freud’s Sofa

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) have released A Profile of 2013 Mortgage Borrowers: Statistics from the National Survey of Mortgage Originations. While sounding dull and perhaps a bit dated, this document is actually an extraordinary overview of the much discussed but rarely seen mortgage borrower. And while the information is from 2013, it provides a good baseline for the post-financial crisis and post-Dodd Frank world we live in.

Historically, it has been difficult for government and academic researchers to get comprehensive data about mortgage borrowers. The impetus for this report was the Housing and Economic Recover Act of 2008 which requires the FHFA to conduct a monthly mortgage market survey. In the long term, this survey will help policymakers respond to the rapid changes that are so common in our dynamic mortgage market.

The National Survey of Mortgage Originations (NMSO) focuses on

mortgage shopping behavior, mortgage closing experiences, and other information that cannot be obtained from any other source, such as expectations regarding house price appreciation, critical household financial events, and life events such as unemployment, large medical expenses, or divorce. In general, borrowers are not asked to provide information about mortgage terms in the questionnaire since these fields are available [from other sources]. (1)

Here are some of the findings that I found interesting, albeit not always surprising:

  • Mortgage shopping behavior differed significantly by borrower characteristics and by whether the consumer was also shopping for a home at the same time as the mortgage. (14)
  • First-time home buyers differed significantly from repeat home buyers in their mortgage search behavior and repeat borrowers differed significantly in their mortgage search behavior depending on whether they were refinancing or purchasing a home. (14)
  • Slightly more than 40 percent of all respondents reported having a difficult time explaining the difference between a prime and a subprime loan. (16)
  • Overall about one- quarter of borrowers reported that they could not explain amortization or the difference between the interest rate and APR on a loan.(18)
  • Roughly one in five borrowers had to delay their closing date. (26)
  • In general, respondents believe that mortgage lenders treat borrowers well. (35)
  • Fifteen percent of respondents expected to have difficulties in making their mortgage payments in the next couple of years. (44)

There are a lot more interesting nuggets about the subjective views of borrowers in the report. I hope that later reports offer more analysis that ties this information into other objective sources of data about borrowers and their mortgages. How well do they know themselves and how good are they at predicting their ability to maintain their mortgages over the long-term?