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When Tokenized Real-World Assets Collide With The Real World

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Biying Cheng and I have a column in Law 360, When Tokenized Real-World Assets Collide With Real World. It reads,

The city of Detroit filed a public nuisance lawsuit in July of last year in the Michigan Circuit Court for the Third Judicial Circuit against Real Token, its co-founders and 165 affiliated entities, alleging building code and safety violations across over 400 Detroit residential properties.[1] RealT is a blockchain real estate platform that sells fractional interests in individual U.S. rental properties through the issuance of crypto security tokens.

On July 22, the judge issued a temporary restraining order — later converted into a preliminary injunction on Nov. 4 — barring RealT from collecting rent, pursuing evictions without a certificate of compliance and directing future rent into escrow until properties are brought up to code.

Detroit v. Jacobson is ongoing, with a trial scheduled to begin in May. The case highlights the brave new world we face when real estate assets are tokenized via blockchain technology.

The facts surrounding the case raise three pressing questions. First, are these real estate tokens securities? Second, assuming they are, do investors know what they are getting into when they purchase them? Third, and most importantly, are the very human tenants in these properties being provided with habitable housing by their decentralized finance landlords?

Are real estate tokens securities?

Until the Trump administration indicated that it might be taking a new approach to crypto more generally, it seemed clear that tokens like those issued by RealT were securities. Gary Gensler, chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission under the Biden administration, had stated that security tokens were generally securities under the long-standing Howey test, derived from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1946 decision in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.[2]

Trump administration officials have not, however, spoken in one voice on the issue. While SEC Commissioner Hester M. Peirce, the head of the SEC cryptocurrency task force, stated in July last year that “tokenized securities are still securities,” SEC Chairman Paul Atkins stated that “most crypto assets are not securities” a few weeks afterwards.[3]

Further muddying the waters, President Donald Trump’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets released a report around the same time that distinguished between tokenized securities and tokenized nonsecurities, such as “commercial real estate.”[4]

On July 31, Atkins also announced the Project Crypto initiative to aid “President Trump in his historic efforts to make America the ‘crypto capital of the world.'” Under the aegis of Project Crypto, the SEC intends to develop “clear guidelines that market participants can use to determine whether a crypto asset is a security or subject to an investment contract” to slot crypto-assets into various categories.

The initiative also contemplates “an innovation exemption that would allow registrants and non-registrants to quickly go to market with new business models and services,” with no need to comply with burdensome regulatory requirements.[5]

It remains to be seen which types of real estate tokens will be deemed by the Trump administration to be securities and which will be deemed interests in real estate. It is important to acknowledge, however, that it would be a radical change to deem real estate tokens like RealT’s not to be securities, and it would upend decades of settled law relating to the Howey test.[6]

Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Aug. 11 reaffirmed a broad interpretation of the Howey test in SEC v. Barry.[7] To determine whether a security token is a security, the starting point is to decide whether it is an “investment contract” for the purposes of the Securities Act. Courts have found that the Howey test requires four elements to be met to determine whether something is an investment contract: (1) there must be an investment by the investor (2) in a common enterprise (3) with an expectation of profit (4) derived primarily from the efforts of others.

The Ninth Circuit in Barry found that sales of fractional interests in life settlements were investment contracts under the Howey test, and thus are securities. A life settlement is a transaction in which someone sells a policy insuring their own life to investors for an agreed-upon price, and the investors then take over the payment of the premiums and collect the death benefit after the insured dies. The defendants were sales agents for Pacific West Capital Group, a firm that buys life insurance policies from seniors and then sells fractional interests in those policies to investors.

Applying Howey, the court held that investors’ expected profits depended on PWCG’s managerial and ongoing efforts, including its policy selection, operation of the premium-reserve mechanism and the fractionalized structure that left investors reliant on PWCG’s management. The life settlements were thus found to be investment contracts.

Although this case does not address the tokenization issue, it demonstrates that the Howey test is generally applicable to transactions that fall under the broad category of “investment contracts.” So, while recent regulatory announcements impose some uncertainty regarding the applicability of the test, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Barry shows that the Howey test is still alive and well, at least for now.

Are investors protected?

Promoters of real-world asset tokenization claim that they can lower barriers to real estate investing by allowing retail investors into the types of deals that once required high investment minimums and limited access to accredited investors. While the low cost and ease of entry into the real estate tokenization market are real, major challenges remain for retail investors to understand the risks posed by the tokens, as well as those posed by the underlying properties themselves.

Under the current regulatory framework, if a real estate token offering meets the Howey test, it is an investment contract and thus a security. The transaction then must be registered with the SEC or exempted.

Real estate token issuers typically rely on exemptions such as Regulation A, Regulation Crowdfunding, Regulation D and Regulation S. Each of those exemptions has various limitations on solicitation, investor accreditation and amounts raised, as well as other aspects of the offering.

States such as New York and California also have their own regulations that tokens must comply with. State securities regulators have identified schemes tied to digital assets as a top threat for retail investors.[8] It is far from clear whether real estate tokens generally comply with all of the federal and state investor protection regimes that apply to them.

In addition to being exposed to fraud and misrepresentation by token issuers, retail investors are also exposed to real-world problems relating to their investments that can rapidly interrupt cash flows and investor distributions.

Are tenants protected?

The Detroit RealT lawsuit clearly demonstrates how digital assets and their underlying real-world assets interact in a way that an investor pitch deck cannot. As alleged in the lawsuit, tenants in their properties have suffered for months from lack of heat, leaky roofs and other unsafe conditions. Investors are suffering — albeit only financially — for owning such poorly maintained properties.

Tenants are not without remedies. Many local governments, including Detroit, have significant statutory protections in place for residential tenants. Residential rentals in Detroit must obtain and maintain a certificate of compliance, and courts can effectively halt rent payments or consider noncompliance against landlords in  cases. When units are out of compliance, tenants may be directed to escrow rent until code issues are fixed, as the judge in the RealT case has ordered.

What’s next?

We are just beginning to live in a world of tokenized real estate. The RealT case in Detroit should provide some guidance as to how we should navigate this new world.

But the regulatory environment is not yet clear. Investors do not yet understand what they are investing in. And tenants may be suffering real-world consequences until a whole host of regulatory and business issues are worked out.

The sooner we figure it out, the better for all.

[1] City of Detroit, City of Detroit Announces Major Lawsuit Against Real Token And 165 Related Corporate Entities for Widespread Nuisance Abatement Violations (July 24, 2025), https://detroitmi.gov/news/city-detroit-announces-major-lawsuit-against-real-token-and-165-related-corporate-entities.

[2] Gary Gensler, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks on the Importance of Oversight and Investor Protection in Our Crypto Markets (Apr. 4, 2022), Securities and Exchange Commission, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/gensler-remarks-crypto-markets-040422. , 328 U.S. 293 (1946).

[3] Hester Peirce, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Tokenized Securities, (July 9, 2025), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/peirce-statement-tokenized-securities-070925; Paul Atkins, American Leadership in the Digital Finance Revolution (July 31, 2025), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/atkins-digital-finance-revolution-073125.

[4] President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets, Strengthening American Leadership In Digital Financial Technology 37 (July 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/07/fact-sheet-the-presidents-working-group-on-digital-asset-markets-releases-recommendations-to-strengthen-american-leadership-in-digital-financial-technology/.

[5] Paul Atkins, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, American Leadership in the Digital Finance Revolution (July 31, 2025), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/atkins-digital-finance-revolution-073125.

[6] SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).

[7] SEC v. Barry, 146 F.4th 1242 (9th Cir. 2025).

[8] NASAA Highlights Top Investor Threats, North American Securities Administrators Association (Mar. 6, 2025), https://www.nasaa.org/75001/nasaa-highlights-top-investor-threats-for-2025/.

Fannie, Freddie and Trump

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FHFA Director Bill Pulte

Central Banking quoted me in Fannie, Freddie . . . and Donald. It reads, in part,

IIn a client note on May 13, investment management firm Pimco said any privatisation of Fannie and Freddie would be a solution in search of a problem.

“If the GSEs are released but the government remains accountable to come to their rescue, wouldn’t taxpayers ultimately be the biggest loser, once again, by seeing GSE gains privatised but losses socialised?” it said, adding: “Don’t fix what’s not broken.”

David Reiss, professor at Cornell Law School, says Pimco’s view reflects the fact that the mortgage market has been functioning “pretty smoothly” since Fannie and Freddie were nationalised. According to this viewpoint, there is “no need to release them from conservatorship”.

However, Reiss says he does not like to see so much power and influence concentrated in the GSEs, and he believes the private sector would do a better job of evaluating credit risk.

“Some people – mostly investors in Fannie and Freddie securities – think [privatisation] is the right thing to do because the conservatorships were supposed to be temporary and the companies should be returned to private control and investors should be able to get some kind of return on their investments,” he says.

Reiss adds that some members of the Trump administration think privatisation would generate hundreds of billions of dollars in revenue that could be used to help pay down the national debt, offset tax cuts and seed a sovereign wealth fund.

Joe Tracy, senior fellow with think-tank the American Enterprise Institute and a former official with the Federal Reserve banks of New York and Dallas, agrees with Reiss. “The problem is that they are in conservatorship limbo, so the government has effectively nationalised a large segment of mortgage finance,” he says. “This should be carried out by the private sector.”

    *     *     *

Lawrence White, professor at New York University and co-author of Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Debacle of Mortgage Finance, says the GSEs are unlikely to become boring unless they are broken down. He believes that if Fannie and Freddie are privatised in their current form, each enterprise will be likely to pose a systemic risk from a financial stability perspective.

“The implication is that their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency [FHFAI, will need to have strong powers of examination and supervision and will need to impose substantial, risk-adjusted capital requirements,” he says.

“It is unclear whether there will be implications for the Fed as lender of last resort, since the Fed’s lending function is currently limited to banks.”

Reiss agrees that the two lenders are systemically important. If they “had to significantly scale back their lending, it would likely cause a crisis in the financial markets”, he says. “If that crisis were not quickly addressed it would cause a crisis in the real economy as well, freezing up credit for new construction and resales.”

Given that the two GSEs issue more than 70% of the outstanding $9 trillion of mortgage-backed securities in the US and, if privatised, would be two of the country’s largest publicly traded companies, the financial stability risks are clear, he says.

Reiss adds that if the privatisations were poorly planned, and if this were priced in by the markets, it would lead to “higher mortgage rates, with all of the knock-on effects that would have”. This, he says, would “increase the magnitude of a financial crisis if the two companies were to report poor financial results down the line”

Reiss’s interpretation of the Fed’s role is different to that of White, and he believes history may end up repeating itself. He says that although the FHFA is Fannie and Freddie’s primary regulator, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 requires the Fed to be consulted about any federal government processes related to the companies.

“The Fed may also co-ordinate with other parts of the federal government in responding to a financial crisis, such as purchasing Fannie and Freddie securities, as they did during the financial crisis of 2007-08,” he says. “One could well imagine the Fed playing a similar role in future crises involving Fannie and Freddie.

Move Fast and Break the Mortgage Market

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Bill Pulte, FHFA Director and Chair of Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac

I was quoted in the American Prospect’s story, Move Fast and Break the Mortgage Market. It reads, in part,

This week, the Donald Trump–appointed chief regulator for the two quasi-governmental companies that own or control about half of the residential housing market anointed himself the board chair of both those companies. This maneuver could signal a host of shenanigans: the culmination of a 17-year hedge fund get-rich-quick scheme, a balance-sheet fiction to justify tax cuts, a new favor factory for apartment developers with ties to the president, a data transfer so Elon Musk’s everything app can learn how to sell mortgages, or something equally problematic.

But what gives former board members, market observers, and officials at the regulator greater concern is the distinct possibility that mucking around with the $7.7 trillion secondary mortgage market could lead to breaking it.

If that happens, homebuyers may not be able to get mortgages, homebuilders may be reluctant to break ground, and uncertainty would abound in a market that has brought down the economy on more than one occasion in U.S. history, most recently in 2008. “It could freeze sales, freeze refinances, stop people from forming households, cause people to be afraid of moving, freeze up developers of housing and the secondary market,” said David Reiss, a professor at Cornell Law School.

* * *

Multifamily Glad-Handing

The GSEs have a pretty sober business on the single-family side, and since the housing collapse really originated there, a lot of work was done to clean up that part of the business. But Fannie and Freddie also make loans in the multifamily market to support building of apartments and condos. A former official with one of the GSEs told me that business is a little looser, with ways to enhance those loans.

This president, of course, is a multifamily real estate developer himself, who has friends in multifamily real estate development. Hamara, one of the new board members, is a vice president at Tri Pointe Homes, a major homebuilder. You could imagine these relationships leading to the GSEs pushing risk limits, loosening credit standards, or raising loan-to-value ratios for favored borrowers. There is a secret mortgage blacklist at Fannie Mae for condos without enough property insurance or in need of repairs; controlling the board could make that blacklist go away, at least for certain developers.

This kind of setup resembles the opportunity zones that were a feature of the 2017 Trump tax cuts. They gave significant tax breaks to investors in certain communities deemed in need of development. Trump administration officials credit opportunity zones with increasing housing construction, but critics argue that the investments were rife with corruption and favor-trading.

That could also be the case here: New criteria guiding the new boards might lead to more multifamily housing, but with uneven results, favors to friends, and idiosyncratic deals that would be more about boosting allies than building housing. And as Calabria has pointed out, Fannie and Freddie are likely under Trump to cancel affordable-housing initiatives, meaning that sweetheart deals might only extend to the developers, rather than the public. Plus, there is the potential for dramatic losses if lending standards erode.

Reiss, of Cornell, agreed that this was all a possibility. “If someone gets to one of the directors, and they are there not acting as a fiduciary for the company, it opens the door to political favoritism,” he said.

* * *

What If It Breaks

Pulte is expected to force job cuts at the GSEs, which employ roughly 15,000 people. He has already been making familiar noises about DEI and remote work. One possibility on the table at the GSEs is merging Fannie and Freddie; you don’t usually have the same person chair the boards of two direct competitors. The regulatory agency is also likely to see cuts; already at FHFA, according to one source, fair lending and consumer protection groups have been put on administrative leave, along with employees at the Division of Research and Statistics.

Controlling the boards would limit dissent about these actions. But cuts in the name of efficiency could strain or even rupture the numerous functions the GSEs carry out, with consequences for the entire housing market.

Due to the conservatorship, the GSEs are limited in what they can pay their employees, which has led to a talent drain. Some systems have not been integrated, and others are not up to industry standards. Fannie and Freddie have a cautious internal culture that doesn’t move quickly. Hacking away at their already weakened structure could easily create operational harm.

But Reiss explained that nothing has to overtly break to lose the confidence of the markets; even a lack of workforce to move the paper around could create that impression, and disrupt the flow of credit. “If there is any kind of uncertainty, the spread between Fannie and Freddie securities and Treasury bonds will increase,” he said. “Investors will ask if the government will make good on Fannie and Freddie bonds. This uncertainty and direction could increase costs over time for all borrowers.”

The DAO of Real Estate

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Joseph Bizub and I posted The DAO of Real Estate to SSRN (and BePress). The abstract reads,

Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) have long proven their worth as liquid securities that give investors access to many real estate asset classes. Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (“DAOs”) are one of several blockchain real estate innovations seeking to provide a new path to those searching to invest in real estate. While the success of the DAO model of real estate investment is far from assured, these new investment options could offer real competition to REITs one day.

 

An Inquest into the Subprime Crisis

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Coroners Inquests in Gloucestershire from The Gloucester Journal 1814

Juan Ospina and Harald Uhlig have posted Mortgage-Backed Securities and the Financial Crisis of 2008: A Post-Mortem to SSRN. Given that the market for private-label MBS pretty much died by 2008, the title is apt. The paper presents a challenge to many of the standard narratives that have developed to explain the causes of the subprime crisis and the broader financial crisis that followed. Other researchers in this area will surely take up the gauntlet thrown down by this paper. Hopefully, we will collectively come up with the right narrative to explain the whole mess. The paper opens,

Gradually, the deep financial crisis of 2008 is in the rearview mirror. With that, standard narratives have emerged, which will inform and influence policy choices and public perception in the future for a long time to come. For that reason, it is all the more important to examine these narratives with the distance of time and available data, as many of these narratives were created in the heat of the moment.

One such standard narrative has it that the financial meltdown of 2008 was caused by an overextension of mortgages to weak borrowers, repackaged and then sold to willing lenders drawn in by faulty risk ratings for these mortgage back securities. To many, mortgage backed securities and rating agencies became the key villains of that financial crisis. In particular, rating agencies were blamed for assigning the coveted AAA rating to many securities, which did not deserve it, particularly in the subprime segment of the market, and that these ratings then lead to substantial losses for institutional investors, who needed to invest in safe assets and who mistakenly put their trust in these misguided ratings.

In this paper, we re-examine this narrative. We seek to address two questions in particular. First, were these mortgage backed securities bad investments? Second, were the ratings wrong? We answer these questions, using a new and detailed data set on the universe of non-agency residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS), obtained by devoting considerable work to carefully assembling data from Bloomberg and other sources. This data set allows us to examine the actual repayment stream and losses on principal on these securities up to 2014, and thus with a considerable distance since the crisis events. In essence, we provide a post-mortem on a market that many believe to have died in 2008. We find that the conventional narrative needs substantial rewriting: the ratings and the losses were not nearly as bad as this narrative would lead one to believe.

Specifically, we calculate the ex-post realized losses as well as ex-post realized return on investing on par in these mortgage backed securities, under various assumptions of the losses for the remaining life time of the securities. We compare these realized returns to their ratings in 2008 and their promised loss distributions, according to tables available from the rating agencies. We shall investigate, whether ratings were a sufficient statistic (to the degree that a discretized rating can be) or whether they were, essentially, just “noise”, given information already available to market participants at the time of investing such as ratings of borrowers.

We establish seven facts. First, the bulk of these securities was rated AAA. Second, AAA securities did ok: on average, their total cumulated losses up to 2013 are 2.3 percent. Third, the subprime AAA-rated segment did particularly well. Fourth, later vintages did worse than earlier vintages, except for subprime AAA securities. Fifth, the bulk of the losses were concentrated on a small share of all securities. Sixth, the misrating for AAA securities was modest. Seventh, controlling for a home price bust, a home price boom was good for the repayment on these securities. (1-2)

Ghost of A Crisis Past

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The Royal Bank of Scotland settled an investigation brought by New York Attorney General Schneiderman arising from mortgage-backed securities it issued in the run up to the financial crisis. RBS will pay a half a billion dollars. That’s a lot of money even in the context of the settlements that the federal government had wrangled from financial institutions in the aftermath to the financial crisis. The Settlement Agreement includes a Statement of Facts which RBS has acknowledged. Many settlement agreements do not include such a statement, leaving the dollar amount of the settlement to do all of the talking. We are lucky to see what facts exactly RBS is “acknowledging.”

The Statement of Facts found that assertions in the offering documents for the MBS were inaccurate and the securities have lost billions of dollars in collateral. These losses led to “shortfalls in principal and interest payments, as well as declines in the market value of their certificates.” (Appendix A at 2)

The Statement of Facts outlines just how RBS deviated from the statements it made in the offering documents:

RBS’s Representations to Investors

11. The Offering Documents for the Securitizations included, in varying forms, statements that the mortgage loans were “originated generally in accordance with” the originator’s underwriting guidelines, and that exceptions would be made on a “case-by-case basis…where compensating factors exist.” The Offering Documents further stated that such exceptions would be made “from time to time and in the ordinary course of business,” and disclosed that “[l]oans originated with exceptions may result in a higher number of delinquencies and loss severities than loans originated in strict compliance with the designated underwriting guidelines.”

12. The Offering Documents often contained statements, in varying forms, with respect to stated-income loans, that “the stated income is reasonable for the borrower’s employment and that the stated assets are consistent with the borrower’s income.”

13. The Offering Documents further contained statements, in varying forms, that each mortgage loan was originated “in compliance with applicable federal, state and local laws and regulations.”

14. The Offering Documents also included statements regarding the valuation of the mortgaged properties and the resulting loan-to-value (“LTV”) ratios, such as the weighted-average LTV and maximum LTV at origination of the securitized loans.

15. In addition, the Offering Documents typically stated that loans acquired by RBS for securitization were “subject to due diligence,” often described as including a “thorough credit and compliance review with loan level testing,” and stated that “the depositor will not include any loan in a trust fund if anything has come to the depositor’s attention that would cause it to believe that the representations and warranties of the related seller regarding that loan will not be accurate and complete in all material respects….”

The Actual Quality of the Mortgage Loans in the Securitizations

16. At times, RBS’s credit and compliance diligence vendors identified a number of loans as diligence exceptions because, in their view, they did not comply with underwriting guidelines and lacked adequate compensating factors or did not comply with applicable laws and regulations. Loans were also identified as diligence exceptions because of missing documents or other curable issues, or because of additional criteria specified by RBS for the review. In some instances, RBS disagreed with the vendor’s view. Certain of these loans were included in the Securitizations.

17. Additionally, some valuation diligence reports reflected variances between the appraised value of the mortgaged properties and the values obtained through other measures, such as automated valuation models (“AVMs”), broker-price opinions (“BPOs”), and drive-by reviews. In some instances, the LTVs calculated using AVM or BPO valuations exceeded the maximum LTV stated in the Offering Documents, which was calculated using the lower of the appraised value or the purchase price. Certain of these loans were included in the Securitizations.

18. RBS often purchased and securitized loans that were not part of the diligence sample without additional loan-file review. The Offering Documents did not include a description of the diligence reports prepared by RBS’s vendors, and did not state the size of the diligence sample or the number of loans with diligence exceptions or valuation variances identified during their reviews.

19. At times, RBS agreed with originators to limit the number of loan files it could review during its due diligence. Although RBS typically reserved the right to request additional loan-level diligence or not complete the loan purchase, in practice it rarely did so. These agreements with originators were not disclosed in the Offering Documents.

20. Finally, RBS performed post-securitization reviews of certain loans that defaulted shortly after securitization. These reviews identified a number of loans that appeared to breach the representations and warranties contained in the Offering Documents. Based on these reviews, RBS in some instances requested that the loan seller or loan originator repurchase certain loans. (Appendix A at 4-5)

Some of these inaccuracies are just straight-out misrepresentations, so they would not have been caught at the time by regulators, even if regulators had been looking. And that’s why, ten years later, we are still seeing financial crisis lawsuits being resolved.

It is not clear that these types of problems can be kept from infiltrating the capital market once greed overcomes fear over the course of the business cycle. That’s why it is important for individual actors to suffer consequences when they allow greed to take the driver’s seat. We still have not figured out how to effectively address tho individual actions that result in systemic harm.

Are The Stars Aligning For Fannie And Freddie Reform?

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Law360 published my op ed, Are The Stars Aligning For Fannie And Freddie Reform? It reads,

There has been a lot of talk of the closed-door discussions in the Senate about a reform plan for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two mammoth housing finance government-sponsored enterprises. There has long been a bipartisan push to get the two entities out of their conservatorships with some kind of permanent reform plan in place, but the stars never aligned properly. There was resistance on the right because of a concern about the increasing nationalization of the mortgage market and there was resistance on the left because of a concern that housing affordability would be unsupported in a new system. It looks like the leader of that right wing, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling, R-Texas, has indicated that he is willing to compromise in order to create a “sustainable housing finance system.” The question now is whether those on the left are also willing to compromise in order to put that system on a firm footing for the 21st century.

In a speech at the National Association of Realtors, Hensarling set forth a set of principles that he would be guided by:

  • Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac must be wound down and their charters repealed;
  • Securitizers need strong bank-like capital and community financial institutions must be able to compete on a level playing field;
  • Any new government affordable housing program needs to at least be on budget, be results-based and target actual homebuyers for the purpose of buying a home they can actually afford to keep;
  • The Federal Housing Administration must return to its traditional role of serving the first-time homebuyer and low- and moderate-income individuals.

I am not yet sure that all of the stars are now aligned for Congress to pass a GSE reform bill. But Hensarling’s change of heart is a welcome development for those of us who worry about some kind of slow-moving train wreck in our housing finance system. That system has been in limbo for nearly a decade since Fannie and Freddie were placed in conservatorship, with no end in sight for so long. Ten years is an awfully long time for employees, regulators and other stakeholders to play it by ear in a mortgage market measured in the trillions of dollars.

Even with a broad consensus on the need for (or even just the practical reality of) a federal role in housing finance, there are a lot of details that still need to be worked out. Should Fannie and Freddie be replaced with many mortgage-backed securities issuers whose securities are guaranteed by some arm of the federal government? Or should Fannie and Freddie become lender-owned mutual insurance entities with a government guarantee of the two companies? These are just two of the many options that have been proposed over the last 10 years.

Two housing finance reform leaders, Sens. Bob Corker, R-Tenn., and Mark Warner, D-Va., appear to favor some version of the former while Hensarling seems to favor the latter. And Hensarling stated his unequivocal opposition to some form of a “recap and release” plan, whereas Corker and Warner appear to be considering a plan that recapitalizes Fannie and Freddie and releases them back into private ownership, to the benefit of at least some of the companies’ shareholders. The bottom line is that there are still major differences among all of these important players, not to mention the competing concerns of Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., and other progressives. Warren and her allies will seek to ensure that the federal housing system continues to support meaningful affordable housing initiatives for both homeowners and renters.

Hensarling made it clear that he does not favor a return to the status quo — he said that the hybrid GSE model “cannot be saved, it cannot be salvaged, it must not be resurrected, and needs to be scrapped.” But Hensarling also made it clear that he will negotiate and compromise. This represents a true opening for a bipartisan bill. For everyone on the left and the right who are hoping to create a sustainable housing finance system for the 21st century, let’s hope that his willingness to compromise is widely shared in 2018.

I am now cautiously optimistic that Congress can find some common ground. With Hensarling on board, there is now broad support for a government role in the housing sector. There is also broad support for a housing finance infrastructure that does not favor large financial institutions over small ones. Spreading the risk of default to private investors — as Fannie and Freddie have been doing for some time now under the direction of their regulator — is also a positive development, one with many supporters. Risk sharing reduces the likelihood of a taxpayer bailout in all but the most extreme scenarios.

There are still some big sticking points. What should happen with the private investors in Fannie and Freddie? Will they own part of the new housing finance infrastructure? While the investors have allies in Congress, there does not seem to be a groundswell of support for them on the right or the left.

How much of a commitment should there be to affordable housing? Hensarling acknowledges that the Federal Housing Administration should serve first-time homebuyers and low- and moderate-income individuals, but he is silent as to how big a commitment that should be. Democrats are invested in generating significant resources for affordable housing construction and preservation through the Affordable Housing Trust Fund. Hensarling appears to accept this in principle, while cautioning that any “new government affordable housing program needs to at least be on budget, results based, and target actual homebuyers for the purpose of buying a home they can actually afford to keep.” Democrats can work with Hensarling’s principles, although the extent of the ultimate federal funding commitment will certainly be hotly contested between the parties.

My cautious optimism feels a whole lot better than the fatalism I have felt for many years about the fate of our housing finance system. Let’s hope that soon departing Congressman Hensarling and Sen. Corker can help focus their colleagues on creating a housing finance system for the 21st century, one with broad enough support to survive the political winds that are buffeting so many other important policy areas today.